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ABSTRACT

TIES OUT OF BLOODSHED:
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, CULTURAL TRAUMA, AND THE PROSECUTION AND
EXECUTION OF TIMOTHY McVEIGH

Jody Lynee Madeira

Dr. Barbie Zelizer

In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, processes of reconstructionremembering victims, caring for family members and survivors, and punishing the
perpetrators-"-began even as dcbris from the Murrah Federal Building was bcing cleared.
This dissertation explores how collective memory of the bombing among family
members and survivors was constructed through their participation in groups tormed after
the bombing and in the legal proceedings against perpetrators Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols. These acts cultivated the formation of various relationships-between
family members and survivors as well as between these victimized populations and the
perpetrators-that both helped and hindered individual and communal reconstructions of
meaning. Based upon data obtained through intensive interviews with victims' family
members and survivors, this research studies the impact of membership in advocacy
groups on memory work, the tensions that Timothy McVeigh's presence and actions
introduced into the lives of family members and survivors, and McVeigh's execution as
an everit which freed memory work that had stymied in the years since the bombing. The
111

implications of this case study illustrate in what ways concepts such as victimhood and
justice are continually being expanded, with the implication that the law as a social
institution is called upon to mediate cultural trauma and cultivate collective memory
more consciously.
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INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma City bombing took place on April 19, 1995, when thousands of
pounds offuel oil and fertilizer brought down the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building. A total of 842 persons were injured or killed as a direct result of this tragedy;
168 of the 842 were killed, 19 of whom were children. The blast left 462 homeless and
damaged 312 buildings and businesses.' In the weeks and months following the
bombing, several reconstructive groups emerged and became extraordinarily active,
serving as magnets for community membership and resources.
This dissertation explores how the membership of family members and survivors
in Oklahoma City bombing advocacy and support groups and participation in legal
proceedings, including witnessing the execution of Timothy McVeigh, impacted upon
their mnemetic work about the bombing.
Dramatic and tragic deaths are cultural traumas that require explanation. In their
wake, understandings are fonned collectively through such mechanisms as interpersonal
discussion and media coverage. Reconstructive "interest" groups fonn in the aftennath
of traumatic events to facilitate activities such as collective infonnation-gathering and
mourning. In the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, family members and survivors
engaged in mnemetic work and formed ties out of bloodshed that both helped and
hindered their reconstructions of meaning associated with the bombing. Rapport between
members of prominent task-oriented community groups fonned in the days and weeks

I

Karen A. Sitterle & Robin H. Gurwitch. The Terrorist Bombing in Oklahoma City, in WHEN A
Zimmer & Mary Beth

COMMUNITY WEEPS: CASE STUDIES IN GROUP SURVIVORSHIP 163-64 (Ellen S.

Williams eds., 1999).

after the bombing, was a key source of reconstructive energy and mnemetic work, and
these bonds were often felt to be as strong as those of blood kinship.
This dissertation considers how family members and survivors made sense ofthe
bombing through both group membership and participation in legal proceedings.
Engaging in collective memory work, their responses to the bombing were shaped by two
primary relationships-the positive, healing, unmediated relationships formed between
group members and the negative, destructive, mediated relationships between family
members/survivors and Timothy McVeigh. Specifically, this dissertation posed three
research questions. First, in the wake of collective cultural trauma, what impact, if any,
does advocacy group membership have upon reconstructive memory? Second, when
pursuing accountability for criminal perpetrators of collective trauma, how do victims'
family members and survivors negotiate institutional constraints to form perceptions of
these perpetrators and conclusions about the "meaning" ofthe traumatic event? Finally,
how do victims' family members and survivors react to the execution of a criminal
perpetrator, and what factors are "meaningful" in the reactions they have?
It is imperative that these questions be answered because the link between

"closure" and capital trials, sentencing, and executions is currently assumed and has not
been substantiated through empirical research. Despite a lack of research supporting a
connection between executions and closure, a supposed cause-effect relationship between
the two predominates in the criminal justice system; prosecutors in capital cases request
that juries impose death penalties to give closure to victims' families, and "closure" also
fIgures prominently in claims of death penalty advocates and opponents conceming the
moral and political propriety of executions. Yet, the conclusions of state victim witness
2

advocates who walk victims' families through the process of witnessing an executionuntil now, the primary source of information as to how victims' families react to
witnessing executions-have been condensed into a national protocol which warns
victims' family members not to expect closure.
This dissertation endeavors to answer these research questions in four chapters.
Chapter I reviews the literature to demonstrate the efficacy of using scholarship on
collective memory and cultural trauma to analyze processes of sense-making through
group membership and legal proceedings. Chapter 2 explores the impact of advocacy
group membership, briefly describing the vulnerable mental state in which family
members and survivors joined groups in the wake of the bombing and the functions those
groups played in trauma recovery. Chapter 3 to addresses the involuntary relationship
fostered by media coverage of McVeigh, explaining the parallels between this
relationship and para-social relationships. Chapter 3 also discusses how victims' families
and survivors negotiated the role ofthe criminal justice system in holding McVeigh
accountable for his actions as well as what perceptions these individuals formed of
McVeigh and Nichols as perpetrators. Chapter 4 examines family members' and
survivors' perceptions of communicative interchange with McVeigh during his execution
and analyzes the widely reported sense of "relief' that followed McVeigh's death in
tenns of a felt need to silence media coverage of McVeigh or McVeigh himself. Finally,
this dissertation concludes by exploring how these research findings not only suggest that
concepts such as "victimhood" and "justice" are continually being expanded, but suggests
that the law as a social institution needs to accommodate these constructive expansions in
endeavoring to mediate cultural trauma and cultivate collective memory.
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CHAPTER ONE:
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, CULTURAL TRAUMA, GROUP MEMBERSHIP,
AND THE LAW
Collective Memory

With memory set smarting like a reopened wound, a man's past is not
simply a dead history, an outworn preparation ofthe present: it is not
a repented error shaken loose from the life: it is a still quivering part
of himself, bringing shudders and bitter flavours and the tinglings of a
merited shame.
George Eliot, Middlemarch, bk. 6, ch. 61 (l871)
As George Eliot notes, memory is living, and not only living but social, capable
of triggering emotions such as shame that only have meaning in a collective. Thus, it is
both a communicative and collective concept. Communication scholars recognize that
"memory is not simply a mental operation that a person uses or that she or he can refine
and improve" but is instead a "phenomenon of community.,,2 Memory as a communal
phenomenon must be representational. 3 As we shall see, collective memory scholarship
focuses upon the construction of memory by a collective.
Collective memory as a concept has attracted interdisciplinary attention, and has
been approached from "sociology, history, literary criticism, anthropology, psychology,
art history, and political science," and communication perspectives. 4 This
interdisciplinarity, however, has led Olick and Robbins to criticize the contemporary

2 Carole Blair,

Collective Memory,

in COMMUNICATION As ... : PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY

Shepherd, Jeffrey St. John, & Ted Striphas eds,

52

(Gregory J.

2006).

3 (1994)
Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social NJemolY Studies: From 'Co/lectirc Alemory' to the Hislorica!

3 See ANDREAS HUYSSEN, TWILIGHT MEMORIES: MARKING TIME IN A CULTURE OF AMNESIA
4

Sociology o{Mnemonic Practices, ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 24 (1998), at 106. See also Barbie
Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape oIAlemOlY Studies, CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA
COMMUNICATION 12 (June 1995), at 214-239.

Zelizer,

4
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statue of collective memory study as "a nonpradigmatic, transdisciplinary, ccnterless
enterprise. "
A social perspective on memory only took root in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. 5 Contemporary perspectives on collective memory owe much to the
"expansion of memory in the area of philosophy and literature" during this time. 6 Early
research on collective memory may be traced to the work of Bergson, Freud, Benjamin,
Durkheim, Marx and Batilett. In 1896, Henri Bergson published Matiere et memo ire, in
which he identified two kinds of memory: a "superficially, anonymous memory that can
be assimilated to habit," and "deep, personal, 'pure' memory that cannot be analyzed in
terms of 'things' but only of 'progress.'" 7 Freud contributed a psychological perspective
to memory, postulating that "the individual's unconscious acts as a repository for all past
experiences," and that emphasis should be placed on processes of forgetting as a site of
repression, and not upon remembrance 8 Benjamin traced the presence of the past in
commodity culture as well as the relationship between commodity eulture and forms of
histOlicity9 Foundational scholars Durkheim and Marx reflected upon collective
memory only tangentially; Durkheim addressed memory only with respect to
. commemorative rituals in primitive societies, and Marx's writings emphasized the
"automatic and unconscious quality" of remembering the past.

10

In 1932, Barlett, an

experimental psychologist, investigated the social dimensions of memory, proposing not

Glick & Robbins, supra note 4, at 3.
LE GOFF, HISTORY AND MEMORY 93 (1992).
7 Id. at 93.
s Olick & Robbins, supra note 4, at 6.
9 See generally S. BUCK-MoRSS, THE DIALECTICS OF SEETING:
PROJECT (1989)
10 Glick & Robbins, supra note 4, at 4.
5

6 JACQUES
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only that remembering was a constructive process "predominantly determined by social
influences." I I American scholars Cooley and Mead also "theorized about the social

· ,,[2
context 0 f remembenng.
Though the earliest use of \he term "collective memory" was in 1902,
contemporary usage of the term is traced to Maurice Halbwachs, and the 1950
publication of his essay on collective memory, Les memoires collectives. 13 Following in
the Durkheimian tradition, Halbwachs was the first sociologist to posit that collective
memory is not only a construction of the past, but a "reconstructed picture,,14 that is
formulated in the present in response to present problems and perspectives. 15 Halbwachs
deplored the psychological emphasis on individual memory that grew out of Freudian
theory, believing instead that "in society that people normally acquire their memories" as
well as where "they recall, recognize, and localize their memories." I 6 Instead,
Halbwachs contends, collectives enable memory, such that "no memory as possible
outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their
recollections.,,17 Since 1980, "collective memory has undergone enormous
transformations with the constitution of the social sciences, and it plays an important role
in the interdisciplinary relationships being established among them.,,18
Cultural Trauma as a Type of Collective Memory

II FREDERIC BARTLETT, REMEMBERING:

A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 204-5, 244

(Cambridge UP 1995) (1932).
12

Olick & Robbins, supra note 4, at 3.

13

lei.

14 MAURICE HALBWACHS. THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY 60

lei. at35.
1(, Jei. at 38.
17 Ie/. at 43.
15

18

LE GOFF, supra note 6, at 94.

6

(1982).

For the purposes of this dissertation research, research on collective memory
helps to address the way in which collective behaviors formed in association with the
Oklahoma City bombing, such as group joining, group attendance and participation in
legal proceedings, depend on memory work. Memory work is the process of working
through and narrating experiences. As such, it is always interpretive and constructive,
and concerned with reaching closure about past events. Through memory work,
. individuals gain distance from a life event that is necessary to understand and
contextualize them and place them in causal relationships to other life occurrences-in
other words, to position themselves in relation to that event. Memory work is collective
in the sense that individuals share many life events, and collaborative interpretations of
these events may take shape as individuals gather and share memories and
interpretations, with the result that individual perceptions are in tum reshaped by these
communal exchanges. Groups may therefore perform memory work by constructing
areas of common knowledge which create social bonds between members.
In essence, memory offers a fonn and content for addressing the Oklahoma City
bombing in that it both structures and explains the evolving understandings of the
bombing and its perpetrators fonned by individuals and groups. Compelled by the nature
of trauma itself, which acquires its horrific proportions from its ability to destroy not only
an individual's sense of normality but the normality of the collectives that constitute that
individual's social support network, memory work has been shown to be central to the
recovery or "working through" of the collective, which may require processes of sensemaking, accountability and restitution, often procured through collective institutional
means such as trials and truth commissions. The psychological and psychiatric study of
7

(

trauma has been advanced largely by investigating the presence of common symptoms
among members of a certain social group, such as soldiers who fought in World War I; in
these empirical studies, it is the commonalities among members that enabled the
formulation of scientific conclusions about the nature of post traumatic stress disorder.
Most importantly, traumas affect collectives long atler their survivors have passed on; the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Holocaust death camps arc just two examples
of traumas which happened over sixty years ago but which remain problems with which
American collective memory must grapple.
The theoretical mirror I hold up to this data, however, is not simply framed by the
work of collective memory. The type of collective memory is also significant, for it calls
into playa theoretical subset of collective memory known as cultural trauma. In
analyzing the creation of meaning aflcr the Oklahoma City bombing, I document the
creation of a specific culture of interpretation and rehabilitation against a larger national

cultural backdrop that prompts American citizens to feel "compelled to honor
those ... who have been murdered for an unjust cause.,,19 Memories of traumatic events,
like those of untraumatic events, represent an interpretive culture that did not emerge
because it "had" to but because it was constructed by its participants and the cumulative
effects of their beliefs and actions over time. As Alexander and Smith state, "those
collective forces that are not compulsory, the social forces to which we enthusiastically
and voluntarily respond .... We do not mourn mass murder unless we have already
identified with the victims, and this only happens once in a while, when the symbols are

19 JEFFREY ALEXANDER, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIAL LIFE: A CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY (2003).

8

aligned in the right way.,,20 As an event comes to be made sense of, the narraiives that
are socially constructed about that event derive their strength and stability from moral

(

frameworks.

Studies of memory have long been concerned with the effects of trauma on
collective sense-making and remembrance. In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud spoke
of our complex social relations to memory in distinguishing mourning, a natural process
of recognizing the proper role of memory after loss, from melancholia, a state
characterized by "an extraordinary diminution in his [the melancholic's] self-regard, an
impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale.,,21 Freud conceptualizes mourning as a
reconstructive process in which the remembered love object is recognized as lost and
distinctive from the self.22 As LaCapra notes, effective mourning must have a
"solidaristic social context," for "social processes of mourning losses and dead loved
ones may be the only effective ways of partially overcoming melancholia and depression
or at least of preventing them from becoming all-consuming and incapacitating.,,23
24
Mourning would be analogous to a process of "working through" a memory conflict

Alexander states that it occurs "when members of the collectivity feel they have
been subjected to a horrendous event that l(c:aves indelible marks on their group
consciousness, marking their memories forever in changing their future identity in
fundamental and irrevocable ways." Cultural trauma provides a means by which
collectives can begin to address a event perceived as traumatic, to "not only cognitively
Jeffrey Alexander & Philip Smith, The Meanings (~f (Social) Life: On the Origins of a Cu/tural
Sociology, in JEFFREY ALEXANDER, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIAL LIrE: A CUl.TURAL SOCIOLOGY 3 (2003).
21 Sigmund Freud, l'viourning and jUelancholia, in THE FREUD READER 584 (Peter Gay ed., 1989).

20

22

Jd. at 587

23 DOMINICK LACAPRA, HISTORY AND MEMORY AFTER AUSCHWITZ 183 (1998).
14

Id. at 184.

9

identify the existence and source of human suffering but "take on board" some significant
[moral] responsibility for it." In this way, collectives formulate and demonstrate
"solidm-y relationships in ways that, in principle, allow them to share the sufferings of
others .... societies expand the circle of the we." Conversely, not recognizing the

(

suffering of others through acknowledging a particular experiences as traumatic bars
collectives from achieving a "moral stance.,,25
Cultural trauma is explicitly trauma of culture and so "may reverberate in the area
of affirmed values and norms, patterns and rules, expectations and roles, accepted ideas
and beliefs, narrative forms and symbolic meanings, definitions of situations and frames
of discourse.,,26 Cultural trauma is particularly invasive and damaging to a collective not
only because change destroys "cultural tissue" that is particularly sensitive to change
because it is a "depository of continuity, heritage, tradition, identity of human
communities," but because cultural "wounds" are "most difficult to heal" because
"culture obtains a particular inertia, and once the cultural equilibrium is broken, it is most
difficult to restore it.,,27
Notably, cultural trauma is, like collective memory, a collective process of
construction; as Smelser notes, "a collective trauma, affecting a group with definable
membership, will, of necessity, also be associated with that group's collective identity.,,28
"Collective" denotes not merely a mass of people, but a group of people who elect to join
25 Jeffrey Alexander,

Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, in JEFFREY ALEXANDER, THE MEANINGS OF

SOCIAL LiFE: A CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY 85 (2003).
16

Piotr Sztompka, The Trauma afSocia! Change: A Case of Post communist Societies, in JEFFREY C.
J. SMELSER, & PIOTR SZTOMPKA, CULTURAL

ALEXANDER, RON EYERMAN, BERNHARD GIESEN, NEIL
TRAUMA AND IDENTITY 161 (2004).

n ld. at 162
28 Neil]. Smelser, Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma, in JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, RON
EYERMAN, BERNHARD GIESEN, NEIL J. SMELSER, & PIOTR SZTOMPKA, CULTURAL TRAUMA AND IDENTITY
43 (2004).
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together on the basis of some core identitY: This distinction is critical, for mass coping
and collective coping are not the same thing at all. 29 Collective trauma occurs when
"people ... perceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, define it as
shared. They start to talk about it, exchange observations and experiences, gossip and
rumors, formulate diagnoses and myths, identify causes or villains, look for conspiracies,
decide to do something about it, envisage coping methods. ,,30
The establishment of a collective response to trauma may also be a "matter of
bitter contestation among groups, sometimes over long periods of time and often without
definitive settlement.,,31 In addition, the "culturally traumatic" label is applied to an
event after the fact only if the event disturbs meanings that penetrate to and are bound
into the cultural core of collective identity; "events do not, in and of themselves, create
collective trauma ... Trauma is a socially mediated attribution.,,32 Sztompka identifies
four threshold traits of what he terms "traumatogenic change," all of which are necessary
but not sufficient conditions for the application of a traumatic label: that the event be

"sudden, comprehensive, fundamental, and unexpected.,,33
The process of designating an event as "traumatic" is a claims-making process in
which a certain group enunciates "a claim to some fundamental injury, ... and a demand
for emotional, institutional, and symbolic reparation and reconstitution.,,34 In attempting
to apply a trauma claim to an event, claims makers must effectively articulate a effective
master narrative that is a "spiral of signification" enunciating the nature of the pain (what
29
30
31

32

33
34

1d. at 48
See Sztompka, supra note 26.
Smelser, supra note 28, at 28.
Alexander, supra note 25, at 91.
Sztompka, supra note 26, at 159
Alexander, supra note 25, at 93.

11

happened that was allegedly traumatic), the nature ofthe victim (whom did the allegedly
traumatic event affect), the relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience (what
shared qualities lie between the audience and the alleged victims of the trauma), and
attribution of responsibility (who was the perpetrator)35 It is this process that advocacy
groups proceeded through in the months and years after the Oklahoma City bombing.
Members of these groups soon found that trauma claims-making was "powerfully
mediated by the nature of the institutional arenas within which it occurs." In the
Oklahoma City context, this includes the institutions of the law and of mass media, each
of which shape trauma claims in particular ways, and impose particular institutional
consequences. The law as an institution narrows trauma claims to specific stages of the
constructive process, such as the attribution ofresponsibility. As a fonn of mediation,
mass communication may provide heretofore inaccessible outlets for the dramatization of
trauma, and may provide a vehicle for one interpretation to gain an edge over other
competing interpretations. Yet, processes of constructing trauma "become subjecUo the
restrictions of news reporting, with their demand for concision, ethical neutrality, and
perspectival balance," and may be "exaggerated and distorted" due to the competition
. between news outlets 36
The successful construction of trauma is rather anticlimactic, consisting as it does
ofthe naturalization of the traumatic designation. Of course, if an event is labeled as
traumatic it will affect how that event is "experienced, and thus imagined and
represented," necessitating that "collective identity [] become significantly revised."

35 KENNETH THOMPSON, MORAL PANICS 20-24 (1998).
36

Alexander, supra note 25, at 97-100.
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Once this re-remembering or reconstruction has been accomplished, however, there is a
"calming down" period during which "the spiral of signification flattens out, affect and
emotion become less inflamed, preoccupation withsacrality and liminality gives way to
reaggregation." It is during this period that memorialization of the trauma is fixed into
place and the '''lessons' of the trauma become objectified in monuments, museums, and
collections of historical artifacts.,,37 The naturalization of trauma indelibly confinns an
event as such, and enables the trauma to be continually accessed and shared, even by
those who did not experience it. In addition to confinning an event as traumatic, a
successful trauma construction will also have profound implications for those who
experienced that event, who will be accorded "victim" status-a status with myriad
material and cultural implications.
Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma and the Law: "Doing Justice"

Today there is a pcrception that, in the words of Elias Canetti, the dead "are
nourished by judgment," and that criminal law is a "means of recompensing the slain
through a deliberative act. ,,3R Agents oflegal institutions are summoned forth to answer
the call of history, guiscd in the sheep's wool of collective memory, to redress traumatic
injuries and preserve ce11ain moral truths for the benefit of future citizens. But do we
choose to acknowledge the law as an institutional vehicle for collective memory? Or do
we instead favor a "strict separation between the legal and the extralegal, between the
rule of law and the interests of collective institution,,?39

37

Id at 102.

38

LAWRENCE: DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE

HOl.OCAUST 2 (2001).
39 Id at 1.
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As do other institutions, the law has a collective memory of its own. The law is a
site for the communication and construction of cultural authority-authority which "acts
as a source of codified knowledge, guiding individuals in appropriate standards of
action.,,40 Authority is communicated through representation, often through ritual acts
which consolidate authority, "creating community among people who share like notions
about it.,,41 One of the law's chief institutional aims is policing its boundaries. The
judiciary's erection of "barriers between its members and those of the other groups to
whom they render justice" serves the purpose of "resist[ing] external influences and the
passions and prejudices of the plaintiffs.,,42 More than anything else, however, the
boundaries between the legal and the extra"legal are maintained through the judicial
tradition-deciding cases in accordance with past legal precedents, thereby enunciating
an ever-developing mnemetic framework that interprets present cases in light of the past,
and thus reinterprets the past as well.
Culturally traumatic events often serve as focal points for ritual commemoration
since critical reassessment can provide opportunities for a "decisive moment of collective
refounding.,,43 In the wake of culturally traumatic events, then, there is a need for what
Victor Turner called "social dramas," ritual processes of social scrutiny and ultimately
recovery.

Trials, including criminal prosecutions, are social dramas; criminal law, for

instance, is especially akin to the formation of collective memory since its deterrence
concerns are future-oriented, where collective memory locates greater social solidarity,
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but its retributive concerns are past-oriented, where collective memory finds its narrative
content.
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The notion that criminal trials can contribute to social solidarity originated with
Emile Durkheim; as Garland notes, the rituals of criminal justice -- the court-room trial,
the passing of sentence, the execution of punishments -- are, in effect, the formalized
embodiment of the conscience collective.,,45 The act of imposing punishment reflects the
process of working "through an event which threatens the conscience collective. Legal
decisions thus become touchstQnes for the formation of collective memory, as they "set
the tone for the public's response at the moment that they claim to express it" and
"prefigure popular sentiment and give it a degree of definition which it would otherwise
lack.,,46 "Iustice" becomes the operative concept for social solidarity, involving a
consensus both that certain acts committed are wrong and must be punished. Iustice as a
concept also has meaning for the many and the few-for society and for victims-and
recent decades have witnessed the increasing influence of private justice needs on public
justice demands. The needs of victims' families have come to be a paramount concern as
prosecutors make private concerns-a need for closure-into reasons

tor public support

for and application of capital punishment.
Collective memory is furthered by legal processes of the fonnation and
cnunciation of stories. In the criminal trial, prosecutors and judges serve as public
spokesmen who "tell the stories through which such sentiments are elicited and such
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membership consolidated.,,47 These stories are "about individual rights: the myriad forms
of the human flourishing at the exercise of such rights permits and that their violence
wrongly forecloses.,,48 In these stories, the free will of the perpetrator assumes primary
importance, since it is his choices that dictate the outcome of the story and bring about
the victim's death 49 After prosecution, imposing punishment "signals the greater or
lesser presence of collective memory in a society" since it is by punishing those who
commit the most unacceptable acts reinforces our awareness of what those acts are. 50
The ability to enunciate and fix st0l1es in legal frames, then, becomes an important source
of

. I power. 51

SOCia

As an institution, however, the law is of limited efficacy as a vehicle of collective
memory. The usefulness of legal proceedings is constrained by two concepts: its
modesty, or superficial unwillingness to play such a formative mnemonic role; and its
practices, which though traditional limit the breadth and depth of inquiry and focus on
binary categories such as guilty or not guilty.
Because of its storying potential, citizens may expect legal proceedings to take a
formative role in adjudicating history as well."S2 However, courts have often protested
taking on this task on the grounds of'·modesty."s3 In the socially potent trial of Adolf
Eichmann, the court explicitly invoked judicial modesty in rejecting such a definitive
role, pleading that it was too shortsighted and lacked the requisite authority:
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the Court ... must not allow itself to be enticed to stray into provinces
which are outside its sphere .... the Court does not possess the facilities
required for investigating general questions of the kind referred to
above .... as for questions of principle which are outside the realm of
law, no one has made us judges of them and therefore our opinion on
them carries no greater weightthan that of any person who has devoted
study and thought to these questions 54
Courts are nonetheless conscious that their opinions "prompt[J particular value
commitments on the part ofthe participants and the audience and thus act as a kind of

.
I educatlOn.
. ,,55
senllmenta
The irony is that courts pay lip service to judicial modesty, but cater to processes
of collective memory formation despite themselves; "it cannot quite contain itself from
proclaiming the trial's 'educational significance' and 'educational value. ",56 At a
minimum, judges arc aware that "their judgment will inevitably be viewed as making
history and that their judgment will itself be subject to historiographical scrutiny.,,57
The et1lcacy of the law as a vehi.cle for collective memory is also hampered by its
narrow focus on questions of guilt and innocence-an inquiry whose scope is unlikely to
reach the social implications of that criminal behavior. Legal conclusions are inherently
professionalized, derived through the application oflegal principles to decide disputes on
the basis of evidence introduced and evaluated in accordance with legal doctrine, all
orchestrated by procedural rules. Thus, "the central concerns of criminal courts ... are
often decidedly at odds with the public's interest in a thorough, wide-ranging exploration
of what caused such events and whose misconduct contributed to them."s8 In addition,
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legal practices may be tedious and droll to a public hungry for dramatic developments.
Even the Nuremberg trials seemed to many reporters as dull and of little dramatic import;
novelist Rebecca West, covering the trials for The New Yorker, declared them to be
"insufferably tedious.,,59 It is true that trials which are perceived as dull by members of a
social collective who lack a direct connection to the acts or individuals subject to
judgment may contain other meaning for those intimately connected with these affairs.
In addition, many participants saw dullness as a necessary characteristic of proceedings,
an inherent result of the detailed presentation of evidence required to obtain a conviction.
Thus, dullness is a professionally necessary as well as a morally required quality of an
effective criminal prosecution.
Legal practices may themselves constrain the impact of a trial upon collective
memory. Evidentiary and procedural rules mandate that evidence be introduced in
specific ways, and limit elicited testimony to forms of questioning acceptable on direct or
cross-examination. In addition, the law's singular focus upon the criminal suspect(s)
narrows the scope of inquiry to the deeds and motives of these individuals, which means
that the victims' story is often excluded. Thus, the legal narrative is a necessarily
incomplete narrative. Other institutional actors, such as historians or sociologists, may
need to step in to supplement the historical record of events whose memory consists
largely of a legal record focused on objective proof of the crime and not the subjective
experience of the event. In addition, the "attitude of sanctity [in which traumatic
testimony is ordinarily regarded] is deeply at odds with the skeptical, scrutinizing posture
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of any competent cross-examiner, such as defense counsel.,,60 Witnesses-and their
testimony-are on trial.
The law's efficacy as a vehicle of collective memory is directly imperiled when
offender receives a sentence that is perceived as inappropriate-when the punishment
does not fit the crime. In the context· of the Oklahoma City bombing, Nichols was
convicted only of involuntary manslaughter in federal proceedings, although many
participants believed that he should have been convicted of first degree murder,
necessitating that he be tried again in Oklahoma state court. In situations such as this,
adjudicative conclusions seem "morally compromised" for "what is most urgently desired
by those seeking a complete accounting ... is a thorough condemnation of all those
sharing significant responsibility ... plus a publicly enforced recollection of enduring
'debt' to victims and their families thus incurred.,,61
Yet another limiting factor is that the law does not explicitly acknowledge its
socially constructed nature, unlike "fickle,,62 collective memory, which acknowledges
that it incorporates past constructions and that it will be reshaped by future constructive
processes. Legal reluctance to acknowledge the primacy of social construction sterns
from its needs for finality and fixation; legal doctrines such as "res judicata, collateral
estoppel, stare decisis, double jeopardy, mandatory joinder, statutes of limitations, and
restrictive standards of appellate review" are designed to discourage or thwart altogether
the subsequent reinterpretation ofprecedent 63 In the law's eyes, the past infonns the
present by binding it, not by providing structuring lines to support constructions. The
60 1d.
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only situation in which legal practitioners overtly acknowledge constructive processes is
the act of legal "interpretation.,,64 Yet, legal actors construct proceedings every day
simply by allowing them to be mediated-not only allowing reporters and cameras into
the courtrooms but reserving room for them in the front rows of the courtroom and in
establishing media pens inside courthouse lobbies, in addition to actively orchestrating
certain legal activities such as the "perp walk" for maximum mediated effect.
As a result ofthe mismatch between the means to the law's ends and the
formation of collective memory, the law is caught between a need to maintain the
legitimacy of its institutional narratives and satisfying diverse justice needs. The law as
an institution, then, cannot bear the weight of collective memory alone any more than any
other social institution; its "credibility in telling a national story, one that will powerfully
shape collective memory, is thus alternately threatened by the narrowness or breadth of
the narrative framing. ,,65 Instead, the law contributes to organic processes of collective
sense-making. Habermas, for one, suggests that "courts may do for society at large what
psychoanalysis does for individuals. They must unearth repressed memory of historic
trauma, forcing the "patient" to work through its enduring ramifications, so that he can
confront the present on its own tern1s, not by acting out of unresolved issues.,,66
As the law sees itself as an institution with the potential to shape collective
memory, it becomes changed by that potential, aware of and thus more vulnerable to the
same movements that influence collective memory formation. Postmodernism has
brought new challenges to the collective sense-making processes, including
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problematizing the primacy of legal proceedings as a storying forum; "we have even
become suspicious of stOlies themselves, that is, of their capacity to capture and impart
important truths," and so our "desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity,
fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary" is now
recognized to be only that, a desire, and not actual coherence, integrity, fullness, and
closure. 67 Similarly, the law is also subject to new responsibilities to new populations,
such as victims' families. Legal conclusions must now "affirm as well-warranted the
victims' feelings of resentment and indignation, for this affirmation is the only way for
society at large to show that it acknowledges and take seriously their condition as
victims.,,68 Legal proceedings can be therapeutic under the right circumstances,
contributing to victims' self-respect when "their suffering is listened to in the trials with
respect and sympathy, the true story receives official sanction, the nature of the atrocities
are publicly and openly discussed, and their perpetrators' acts are officially
condemned. ,,69
Oddly enough, no prior research on witnessing executions has addressed their
therapeutic effects or even approached the issue from the perspective of victims' families,
the population most emotionally invested in the execution. Instead, the only two
previous articles to address the subject matter focused on the psychiatric impact of
witnessing an execution upon journalists and upon college students' attitudes towards
whether family members should view executions. A 1994 study by Dr. Andrew Freinkel,
et a!., endeavored to examine the "psychological distress associated with simply being an
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uninvolved, unthreatened witness to violence.,,7o Freinkel submitted a questionnaire to
journalists who had witnessed the 1992 execution of Robert Alton Harris one month after
the sentence was carried out in an effort to assess dissociative symptoms; 15 journalists
returned the questionnaire. Freinkel et al found that no journalist reported "severe or
long-lasting psychological trauma" but that many had experienced dissociative symptoms
and "short-term psychological impact;" however, this study lacked a control group of
journalists who did not witness the execution and failed to adequately distinguish the
stress that the respondents felt as a result of witnessing the execution from that
experienced from unrelated, post -execution assignments. A second study by Marla L.
Domino and Marcus T. Boccaccini questioned whether family members of victims
should be allowed to watch the executions of their loved ones' killers 71 However,
Domino and Boccaccini did not provide credible empirical evidence whether victims'
family members should view executions, but instead asked 219 students at the University
of Alabama to complete a questionnaire containing a brief description of a policy
initiative allowing family members to witness executions followed by eight attitudinal
questions about execution-viewing. On the basis ofthis questiOlmaire, Domino and
Boccaccini reported that 1) most subjects would not want to witness an execution, but
were more likely to witness the execution of a family member's murderer than the
execution of stranger's killer; and 2) most subjects felt that witnessing an execution
would "assist the family in coping with the loss of their loved one.
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An Orientation to the Oklahoma City Community and Memorial Practices in the
Wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing

In this dissertation, the tenn "collective" denotes membership within communal
groups that were organized after the bombing. As an event, the bombing created a
community of memory that created an instantaneous sense of bonding among survivors
and family members with shared experiences. Irwin Zarecka notes that, although the
presence of a "community of memory bonded by traumatic experience" in a broader
collective such as a nation-state may "be enough to secure remembrance or redefine
collective identity," more often, there will be a transition from "unspoken bonding to
outspoken (and frequently institutionalized) activity that the community of memory
acquires public resonance .... but others, especially as the years go by, find it essential to
record their experience, to create memorial markers for those who had died, to talk to the
young, to join groups or associations."n Thus, comments Irwin-Zarecka, "they then
create communities tout court, engaged mainly (but not exclusively) in the work of
remembrance. ,,73
In the Oklahoma City context, collective memory fonnation originated for many
survivors in one or more of the groups fonned in the aftermath of the bombing. The
groups fonned in response to the Oklahoma City bombing were numerous. FOTInative
among them were the Oklahoma City National Memorial Task Force, charged with
overseeing the building of the Oklahoma City National Memorial, and a group comprised
of family members and survivors seeking to shorten the lengthy habeas appeals process
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so as to bring a swifter peace to victims' families. In subsequent trials, Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols were indicted and charged with 8 counts of first-degree
murder for the deaths of federal officials and 3 other charges, including conspiracy.
While McVeigh was convicted in June 1997 on all counts and sentenced to death, the
jury in Nichols' trial found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and conspiracy after
deliberating for 41 hours, failing to reach a unanimous verdict on whether Nichols
planned the bombing "with the intent to kill." After being sentenced to life in prison
without possibility of parole, Nichols was tried and convicted in 2004 of 162 counts of
first-degree murder in Oklahoma state court, but again escaped the death penalty.
The legal aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing culminated in the execution
of Timothy McVeigh. On June 12, 2001, 232 witnesses-lOin the death house at the
state penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana and 222 at a remote viewing location in
Oklahoma City-prepared for an event that all hoped would bring some ending to an
unspeakable period in their lives. Whereas "live" witnesses viewed a side profile of
McVeigh, "remote" witnesses observed the closed circuit feed from a camera positioned
on the ceiling directly over McVeigh's face.
The process of making sense of the bombing and pursuing group goals were
collective memory processes. Because collectivities have layers of organization, each
Oklahoma City group thus had its own memory and played a unique role in constructing
the collective memory of the bombing yet simultaneously also belonged to the larger
Oklahoma City comhlUnity. Thus the memory researcher must place herself within the
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"perspective ofth[ose] group or groups,,74 because that is how the s~rvivors and family
members who joined these groups remember. 75
The Oklahoma City groups themselves were not mere conglomerates of
individual memory practices but, because they themselves provide frameworks for
memory, also had memory praCtices of their own. Thus, the relationship between
individual and group memory practices is a two-way street; " ... the individual
remembers by placing himself in the perspective of the group, but one may also affinn
that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories.,,76
Individual memories, then, were localized or positioned with reference to group
membership, since to talk about the bombing "mean[t] to connect with a single system of
ideas our opinions as well as those of [the group] circle.,,77 This is not to say that each
Oklahoma City group was a "source" of memory, or that the group has the capacity for
memory, but rather to acknowledge that the collective frameworks in which memOlies
are constructed "become embedded -- or we might say, 'actualized' -- within the
penneable boundaries established by a group."n That is how memory's social
frameworks enabled the Oklahoma City groups to persist over time by lending a sense of
continuity to group membership. Individual members could "locate [themselves] within
the framework that lends the group coherence, irrespective of whether or not that group is
present or cUlTcntly active.,,79 In the Oklahoma City context, the social framework of
each group's memories was tied to the goal each group had selected to pursue,
74
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particularly the most distinct goals of memorializing the bombing and seeking justice for
murderous perpetrators.
Because members of the post-bombing groups often referred to those groups as
"extended family," memory practices in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing most
likely parallel the processes by which memory practices form in the family.80 Memory as
constructed in the family group consists of shared images and interpretations such as
"categories, qualities, evaluative criteria." The elements of this shared perspective serve
as a common collective framework around which and within which individual family
members' memories are interwoven. More significantly, these commonalities act as
"resources ... for making sense of the present." The family's collective framework thus
"suppOliS and reinforces" its boundaries in an armor-like fashion. Thus, memory holds
together the family group; the family group does not hold together memory. To
boundary a family group in the sense of memory practices is not to cut that group off
entirely from society, however, because cultural normative processes "inevitably
insinuate themselves within group frameworks. sl
Thus, like families, Oklahoma City bombing groups-all of whom pursued goals
with primary foci as diverse as memorialization and seeking justice-were not
independent organizations but rather constituted different entities all clustered around one
organic communal unit. Each group was a communal arm that fulfilled an innate need to
"heal" by charging itself with the task of making sense of the bombing in a unique way.
In other words, each group inhabited a specific communal space in collective memory
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fonnation. Here, "space" is used to refer to a particular path to making sense of a
traumatic event in the sense that different groups inhabited different orientations to
collective memory by virtue of their chosen goals. For example, a group seeking to
memorialize the bombing must have inhabited a very different memory space from a
group seeking justice for perpetrators because each was oriented toward a different
institutional space-the fonner to the institutions of museum and monument, the latter to
the institution of the courtroom. Alternatively, these memory spaces could be seen as
"containers" for different memory practices.
This colonization of memory space is akin to "implacement," what Halbwachs
tenned the relationship between group and group environment. A physical (or I contend,
memory) space on which the fonn of a group's collective framework is imprinted
anchors that group, sometimes to the extent that the space (or perceived memory need)

/

appears to predate the collective framework, or even to be its originator 82 Memory space
did have an effect on transforming physical space, however; organized into different
memory spaces, the Oklahoma City groups contributed to the physical recovery of the
blast site, even though that particular physical space did not dictate particular interpretive
processes. Finally, the uniqueness of each group's memory space contributed to grouP.
maintenance and stability, for group stability also arises from the "spatial and physical
dimension" in which the group exists. After a group makes a certain physical place its
own, or "imprints" it, the changed space "reciprocally acts on the collective."s3

82Id. at 47
1d.

83

27

Group membership following a mass disaster often congeals around "active grief'
behavior through which "family members and survivors formed new communities to
offer support to each other."S4 While several small groups were formed after the
bombing, a few leviathan groups dominated the landscape and served as homes to the
bulk of family members and survivors.
Group Membership in the Wake ofthe Oklahoma City Bombing

!

Participants belonged to four primary community groups that were founded in the
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing: the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building
Memorial Task Force charged with building a national memorial, a "habeas group" of
victims' families and survivors seeking to curtail legal appeals for offenders sentenced to
death, the Oklahoma City Murrah Building Survivors Association which was founded
with a community service mission, and Families and Survivors United which sought to
'secure assistance for family members and survivors.
The Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building Memorial Task Force

Seventeen participants belonged to the Memorial Task Force, the largest of the
community groups which bonded together by proceeding through myriad decisions that
were essential to building the Oklahoma City National Memorial. It was also the only
group whose genesis carne ii-om outside the community of victims' families and
survivors. Thus, the story of the task force is to a large extent the story of the creation of
the memorial itself. Thoughts first turned to the question of how to memorialize this
tragedy in the summer of 1995. Several weeks after the bombing, Oklahoma City mayor
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Ronald Norick appointed Robert Johnson, an Oklahoma City attorney, to "organize and
direct'" the community memorial process, founding the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal
Building Memorial Task Force (the "memorial group"). Johnson in term selected a
dozen others to identify "different constituencies" who would have a stake in the
memorial process, while being committed to giving family members and survivors a
"primary voice" and to ensure that the process would be of more importance than its

{

result. The memorial task force was comprised of 10 operating committees, a 160member advisory committee, a coordinating committee, and an executive director. On
July 17, 1995, between 50 and 75 members of the Victims Families/Survivors Liason
subcommittee held their first meeting, during which family members and survivors
expressed anger that "outsiders" had assumed control of the memorial process. At this
stage, only a few survivors were involved in the memorialization process. Some
survivors felt guilty, others felt as if they didn't belong, and still others were angered to
be treated as if their injuries and their own losses were trivial. Gradually, differences
between family members and survivors were negotiated; "survivors consented to
privileging the voices of family members, and family members acknowledged that
survivors, many of whom had lost close friends and an important part of their world,
were ... valid members of the ·trauma club.'" Fault lines also emerged between the family
member and survivor groups; prominent sources of anger included anger over the
perceived tendencies of some individuals to speak "for" all family members or survivors,
suggestions that the memorial privilege the children, and what the memorial should look
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The first task which memorial task force members undertook had the effect of
uniting the group around a common vision of memorialization. The task force gathered
opinions as fO what visitors should "'think, feel or expelience,'" through meetings of
family members and survivors, public meetings in Oklahoma City, meetings with
"memorial constituents" who had a unique perspective due to their experiences with the
bombing, and a public memorial survey that appeared in Oklahoma City and Tulsa
newspapers, post offices, libraries, and on the Internet. 86 In the spring of 1996, a
committee began to write the mission statement. The final mission statement called for a
memorial complex with an information center, the inclusion of the Survivor Tree, a
memorial located in the footprint of the Murrah Building, the incorporation of the names
who died, and the inclusion of survivors' names "in a manner separate, distinct, and apart
from the tribute to and presentation of the names of those who died."s7 Themes to be
incorporated in the memorial included "remembrance, peace, spirituality and hope,
cherished children, comfort, recognition, and learning. ,,88 The preamble of the mission
statement utters the heart ofthe memorialization project: "We come here to remember
those who were killed, those who survived and those changed forever. Mayall who
leave here know the impact of violence. May this memorial offer comfort, strength,
peace, hope and serenity."s9
After the drafting ofthe mission statement, the task force also closed Fifth Street,
which had run between the Journal Record building and the Murrah building, asserting its
861d. at 182.
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status as "sacred ground." It also undertook the diftlcult task of determining who was a
survivor, using as examples the Holocaust and the TWA 800 plane crash to elucidate the
definition of "survivor" and the claims-making of diverse survivor groups. The survivor
definition committee evolved a "primary zone of danger and a secondary zone of
distress"; thc primary zone was flexible enough to include those who suffered injury
severe enough to warrant being held in the hospital regardless of their physical location at
9:02 a.m. Those in the primary zone of danger were to be identified on the building site
and inside the Memorial Center, and those in the secondary zone of distress would be
represented in the Memorial Center. A process was also established whereby individuals
could apply for survivor status; these applications would be reviewed by a committee to
see whether thcy met either survivor criteria 90
The processes of closing Fifth Street and defining who was a survivor were both
ongoing during the selection of a memorial design; on March 20, 1997, 624 submitted
designs were put on public display in Bricktown, hung from a fence in the building
because of the importance of the memorial fence surrounding the bomb site 91 The
wiuning design will be discussed in the following section. The completed memorial
opened on April 19, 2000, the fifth anniversary of the bombing. Many task force
members continued to be involved on oversight committees. or volunteered to lead
visitors through the memorial grounds.
The "Habeas Group"
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Six participants belonged to the "habeas group," so called because its members
sought to alter current law to do away with what members considered "an interminable
appeals process."n The group was begun by Glenn Seidl, whose wife Kathy was
murdered in the bombing. The members of the habeas group were pro-death penalty
victims' family members and survivors who believed in earning and protecting victims'
rights through political advocacy.
The first political problem that habeas members chose to address was the lengthy

time period between a capital offender's death sentence and execution-a period in
which victims' families prayed that the sentence would not be reversed. The habeas
group met in space provided in the offices of the Oklahoma Attorney General; this
agency also provided informal assistance in dratl:ing legislation to reduce appeal
opportunities for capital offenders. The resulting legislation was supported by the
Attorneys General of several other states, including California, Alabama, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Louisiana, Arizona, Idaho, and Mississippi. Group
members made several trips to Washington to lobby for death penalty reform. During
Senate hearings on the legislation, Senator Orrin Hatch stated, "rather than exploiting the
devastation of Oklahoma City, I believe that by including this provision in the
antiterrorism legislation, we are protecting the families ofvictims.,,93 President Clinton
signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 into law on March 24,
1996. Letters from several members of the habeas group were published in the

Congressional Record. Among them were statements that revealed many ofthe
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motivations which led habeas group members to seek death penalty refonn. Several
letters mention that the victims murdered in the bombing did not have fifteen to twenty
years to prepare themselves for death, and that family members did not have the chance
to say goodbye. Alice Maroney-Denison authored a letter stating, "My father will not get
to live another 15-20 years so why should the convicted?" Carolyn Templin, mother-inlaw of bombing victim Scott Williams, wrote, "Our loved ones did not have ten to twenty
years to prepare for their deaths." Similarly, Wanda Fincher, sister to Kathy Seidl, noted,
"Kathy wasn't allowed to say goodbye to her family or to share any more of her
wonderful presence with us. Tfthe murderers are sitting in federal prison for 10-20 years
they will be given the right to visit with their families and to say their goodbyes. How
does this give justice to US?,,94
Other letters intimated that a swift execution was needed for the process of
healing to begin. Group founder Glenn Seidl wrote "We need change, my family wants
justice .... When the remains of the Murrah building was imploded May 23rd there was
some relief. When the people responsible for this terrible act are found guilty and
executed, our families can begin a very important step of the healing process." Clifford
Davis, the brother of Kathy Seidl, stated that "Now the only way I can focus my anger,
loneliness and the piece of my heart that is now empty, is to try to get the Hatch/Spector
bill passed. Mr. Clinton promised swift justice to the persons responsible for this crime.
We need to have change." Diane Leonard, whose husband Donald R. Leonard was
murdered in the bombing, wrote, "We now need your support, not only for the families of
this tragedy, but for all American families who have lost loved ones at the hands of
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murderers .... We have been promised justice, but we feel justice will not be accomplished
until the verdict of a jury is carried out." In a similar vein, the letter of Nicole Williams,
whose husband Scott was murdered in the blast, stated "we want this to be swift and
quick so that we can start the healing process.,,95
Several group members later involved themselves in other legislative efforts in
response to the decisions of Judge Matsch, the judge in Timothy McVeigh's federal trial,
resulting in the passage oflegislation mandating that the Denver trial proceedings be
broadcast back to Oklahoma City and that victim impact witnesses be permitted to both
attend the trial and testify during sentencing proceedings.

The Oklahoma City Murrah Building Survivors Association
Four participants regularly attended meetings of the Survivors Association, seven
only attended a few meetings, and thirteen participants signed up to receive the group
newsletter but did not attend meetings. The Oklahoma City Murrah Building Survivor's
Association was begun by Dr. Paul Heath, a psychologist with the Veteran's
Administration, who began the organization with $1,200 of his own money and ran it out
of his own small private practice office. Despite its name, the group was open to all, but
was targeted towards all survivors, whether or not they had been in the Murrah Building.
The Survivor's Association held its first "help fair" meeting at the First Methodist
Church in July of 1995, which provided opportunities for survivors to have their hearing,
eyesight, and mental health evaluated by local otlicials. The founders of this group
wished to instill a community service orientation into its activities,but membership in the
Oklahoma City Murrah Building Survivors Association diminished in response to these
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efforts after the first year, a process which will be explained in filliher detail below.
Membership declined for two principal reasons. First, members felt that Heath had been
"monopolizing" meetings, which discouniged several from sharing their own
experiences. One participant describes these "monopolization attempts" as follows:
no matter who the facilitator in the room was, he had a way of taking
over the meeting and under the guise of welcoming the new person
and he would, this is just one example that] remember vividly, we had
a husband there for the first time who lost a wife, who'd never been to
anything and the way you let someone participate is to let them do it if
they want to. He said, "we'll go around the room, we'll introduce
ourselves" and so he came to this person and he asked the person a
question, but before the person could answer he said, for example, on
that day I was and then he went on and talked for the entire - nobody
else got to talk from that point on. So] actually got up and left the
room and] was coming out and there was a place out here, urn, there
was only five minutes left of the hour, nobody else got to talk so ]
came out and there was a station here where there were two Murrah
survivors] got to know and they said "what is the matter"0 ] said, "]
am so mad 1 could chew nails. I've just been in so and so group and
the only person who has gotten to talk is Dr. Heath." They both just
started laughing and said, well that's the case everywhere kind oflike
you had this undercurrent coming from other survivors. He couldn't
seem to help himself under the guise of trying to help other people.
He would grandstand and talk totally about himself where if somebody
got a chance to talk he would use that as a platfOlID to somehow pull it
back to his experience.
Many group members who wanted to talk with one another, and not to hear the
experiences of one particular individual, ceased to attend in response to Heath's behavior.
The second reason that prompted members to leave was Heath's frequent appearances in
the media; participants perceived not only that Heath claimed to speak for all survivors
but felt he inappropriately and inaccurately generalized survivors' needs, feelings, and
recovery status, irritating survivors by his apparently casual creation of a survivor
"collective" when in reality none existed. Despite these turnoffs, however, many others
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stayed, and continued to attend and enjoy Survivors Association meetings for several
years after the bombing.
Families and Survivors United

Several participants were peripherally involved with the Families and Survivors
United, now defunct, was started by Marsha Kight after her adult daughter Frankie
Merrill was murdered in the bombing, leaving a five-year-old daughter. Marsha, who
was also a member of the memorial group, saw a need to secure financial assistance for
family members, many of whom felt like '''second-class citizens. '" Kight's organization
approached several foundations to fund this assistance, and also commissioned a
"commemorative angel figurine," the sales of which eamed enough money to enable 19
people to attend the trials in Denver. The group also sent a "thank you" video to rescue
unit across the country. Most importantly, Kight compiled a collection of memorial
accounts from family members and the survivors, including those of eight participants,
entitled Forever Changed: Remembering Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995. Marsha Kight
also became a well-known victims lights spokesperson, "calling attention to the struggles
offamily members and survivors who wished to participate fully in the trial of Timothy
McVeigh.,,96 Kight has testiiled before the Senate Judiciary Committee several times and
went to work full-time for the National Organization For Victim Assistance in 1999.
Informal Advocacy Groups Organized Around Certain Issues

Other advocacy groups also cropped up in the aftennath of the bombing, often
comprised of many members of the habeas group. After Judge Matsch moved the trial
venues for the prosecutions of McVeigh and Nichols to Denver and dismissed a motion

96 LiNENTHAL,
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filed by Oklahoma City attorney Karen Howick to broadcast the lIial via closed-circuit
television to an Oklahoma City locale, family members and survivors went to
Washington, DC once again to lobby Congress to pass legislation allowing the closedcircuit broadcasts. Howick then filed motion on behalf of approximately 100 family
members and survivors to get the forum changed, from a room in the Oklahoma City
federal courthouse that only held 150 people to the Federal Aviation Administration's
97
· .
330-seat au dltonum.

A group of family members and survivors also sought help from Congress when
Judge Matsch decided to bar victim impact witnesses from attending the "guilt" phase of
McVeigh's trial, when evidence was presented. This resulted in the passage of the
Victim Allocution Clarification Act of 1997, legislation which" 'clarified' rights of
victims set forth in the 1990 Victims Rights and Restitution Act (better known as the
Victims Bill of Rights) and which was designed to allow victim impact witnesses to both
observe a trial and offer impact testimony. The legislation progressed rapidly through the
House and Senate and was signed into law by President Clinton on March 20, 1997, who
said, "When someone is a victim, hear she should be at the center of the criminal justice
process, not on the outside looking in.,,98
Group Commemorative and Advoc'acy Projects

All groups formed in the aftermath ofthe Oklahoma City bombing existed to
accomplish some goal. Some groups found that the process of reaching that goal actually
was a healing pursuit in and of itself. Two groups in pmticular, the Oklahoma City
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Memorial Task Force and the Habeas Group, produced lasting memorial

products~the

Oklahoma City National Memorial and the AEDPA~that acquired meaning
independently of the group, and yet continued to reflect the visions and creative
priorities ofthe group from which it originated.
The Habeas Group members who lobbied for the passage of the AEDP A
embedded their representations of the bombing within the legislative history of the act as
printed in the Congressional Record. 99 In focusing their efforts upon legislation which
would truncate habeas appeals for convicted capital offenders, Habeas Group members
shed their status of victims of terrorism and instead represented themselves as murder
victims' families. In addition, in keeping with the victims' rights movement's political
platform, the letters in the Congressional Record exhibit retributive themes tying a loved
one's death to the need to have an offender executed in a timely manner. Members'
helplessness to effect justice and powerlessness to restore murder victims to life is
contrasted with offenders' ability to appeal their convictions on technical grounds and to
possibly achieve their release through their own efforts, and most pervasively their ability
to see friends and family for years after their crime.
With the Oklahoma City National Memorial, the experience of visiting the
memorial ofIered a relevant map to understanding its representation of the bombing. The
Oklahoma City National Memorial consisted of an outdoor monument and an indoor
museum. The outdoor monument was nestled within the footprint of the Murrah
Building and incorporated numerous symbols, as described on the memorial's website. 100

CONGo REC., supra note 93, at s7481.
See http://www.oklahomacitynationalmernorial.orgisecondary.phv.?section=2&catid=30 (last accessed
April 25, 2007). Two "Gates of Time" serve as entrances to the outdoor memorial and symbolize time
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The J oumal Record Building, directly across the street from the Murrah Building,
was chosen as the site of the memorial museum, the "physical container to preserve the
memory" of the bombing. 101 The Oklahoma City National Memorial website provides a
thorough description of how the museum was organized:
The Memorial Museum takes visitors on a chronological, self-guided
tour .... through the story of April 19, 1995, and the days, weeks,
months and years that followed the bombing of Oklahoma City's
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building .... The story is told in chapters,
and takes visitors through this historical event beginning early
morning April 19, 1995, and ending with a message of hope for
today. 102
The museum has been organized into 10 chapters; visitors are lifted to the top story of the
museum by elevator, where the exhibits begin. 103 Visitors "see" the investigation in
exhibits that "show" key pieces of evidence and investigative techniques, but they are
actually meant to become immersed in the experience ofthe bombing itself. The indoor
museum has been manifestly concerned with representing the bombing as an experience
of chaos and recovery; it only devotes one short exhibit space to conveying details of
standing still during the moments of the explosion. In between the Gates of Time is a reflecting pool where
th
5 Street ran between the Murrah Building and the lournal Record Building; this mirrors visitors who are
forever changed by their visit. In the footprint of the Murrah building are 168 empty chairs standing in
nine rows to symbolize the nine floors of the building. The left foundation wall from the Murrah Building
still stands on the left side of the footprint; here one may see the Survivor Wall, listing more than 800
bombing survivors. On a circular promontory situated on the slope lawn rising to the Journal Record
Building stands the Survivor Tree, an American Elm that survived the blast. A path tmvards the entrance to
the Journal Record Building leads through the Rescuers' Orchard, a gallery of trees bearing fruit and
flowers. Outside the memorial itself is the Children's Area paved with tiles created in 1995 by children
around the nation. Finally, a 200-foot section of "the Fence" remains on the Westem wide ofthe outdoor
memorial where visitors can leave notes, stuffed animals, and wreaths as in the days immediately after the

bombing.
101 EOWARD T. LiNENTHAL, PRESERVING MEMORY: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE AMERICA'S HOLOCAUST
MUSEUM 1 (1995).

See http://www .oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org.
These "chapters" are described on the website as progressing from a background on tenorism and
history of the site to an audio recording of the blast, the confusing and chaotic aftermath of the first
moments afterward, survivor experiences in.the first hours after the explosion, the early beginnings of the
law enforcement investigation into the blast, the world reaction, the processes of rescue and recovery, the
process of waiting for death notifications, a gallery of honor for deceased victims, funerals and mounling,
criminal prosecutions and sentencing, and remembrance and rebuilding.
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criminal proceedings against McVeigh and Nichols, and while McVeigh's death sentence
is alludedto, the carrying out ofthe execution is only described on a 4-by-8-inch bronze
plaque that states "McVeigh is executed by lethal injection on June 11,2001, at the
federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana." Visitors' attention is forcibly focused away
from the perpetrators.
Methodology

The design ofthe present project had two primary goals: to prioritize the quality
and reflexive depth of data, and to enroll as participants those individuals that were most
emotionally invested in the execution. Qualitative methods have been widely used in the
fields of anthropology, communication, and sociology, particularly to conduct
exploratory research on emergent topics. One particular qualitative methodology that has
received particular attention is grounded theory, which facilitates the development of
explanatory theories through the conduct of research, instead of research that tests a preconceived hypothesis. Grounded theory also emphasizes the role of data such as
participants' voices in constructing theory. The current study utilized open-ended
questions as an interviewing tool to assess the impact of the bombing on each participant,
membership in post-bombing support groups, reactions to McVeigh's trial and execution,
and pre- and post -execution expectations and perceptions.
Participants

The 27 participants included in this study were survivors or victims' family
members of the Oklahoma City bombing. A total of 29 participants were interviewed;
however, two were not included because they wcre rescue workers, and not victims and
survivors who were present at the moment of the Oklahoma City bombing. More
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specific information on individual participants is included in Appendix B. To reach this
population, I first contacted the Oklahoma Department of Health, who put me in touch
with Dr. Betty Pfefferbaum, a psychiatrist and attorney specializing in child trauma who
had conducted years of research with this population and published many studies on the
effects of the Oklahoma City bombing on the health of city residents. Dr. Pfefferbaum
expressed interest in serving as my clinician on this dissertation project and placed me in
contact with Dr. Paul Heath, a survivor of the bombing and the Secretary and Treasurer
of a community service organization known as the Murrah Federal Building Survivor's
Association to which many victims' families and survivors belonged. Dr. Heath
consented to be a part of the project, and agreed to send letters requesting interviews to
organization membcrs. To maintain confidentiality, I forward the introductory letters,
envelopes, and postage to Dr. Paul Heath, who addressed and mailed the letters. The
interview request letters described the project, mentioned Dr. Heath's role in the project
to assure recipients that their identities were protected, and informed recipients that they
could either telephone Dr. Pfeflerbaum's secretary or e-mail me to schedule interviews.
Unfortunately, out of approximately 235 letters mailed, I received approximately
12 requests for interviews. I learned very early on in the interviewing process that I had
inadvertently committed a mistake in mentioning Dr. Heath in the interview request
letter. Survivors and victims' family members alike expressed strong dislike and distrust
of Dr. Heath since he was perceived to have attempted to have relentlessly pursued the
media limelight for years. In addition, survivors resented that Dr. Heath had made media
statements claiming to speak on behalf of "all survivors". Fortunately, it was possible to
remedy this error by switching to an alternate participant recruitment method-asking
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participants who had completed interviews if they knew of anyone else who would
consent to being interviewed. These participants then placed me in contact with these
potential participants, bringing my total interview population to 27 participants.
Participants in the current study were enrolled in the study in three stages. First,
members of the Murrah Building Survivor's Association who responded to the interview
request letters were included in the study. Second, interviews were conducted with
others recommended as potential participants by those who had already completed
interviews. Finally, witnesses who viewed the execution live at Terre Haute, Indiana
were recruited. The Murrah Building Survivor's Association is a group formed in the
aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing whose members remain in contact with one
another; members include both survivors and victims' family members, since in many
cases the categories overlap. Contact letters were sent to approximately 10 to 12 persons
who witnessed the execution live in Terre Haute and who gave media interviews
afterwards. 104 Finally, some interview participants recommended others who they feel
could make contributions to this project, and contact letters were also sent to these
individuals, informing that who has recommended that they receive contact letters.
The final participant sample was composed of 18 females and 10 males. All but
one of the 27 participants were white; the other was African-American. This
demographic composition parallels both the overwhelmingly white membership of the
post bombing groups, including the Murrah Building Survivor's Association, and that of
the larger victim population. All participants were over 18 years of age (participants'

I04 T hese persons include Paul Howell, Shari Sawyer, Kathleen Treanor, Doris Jones, Cathryn· AlanizSimones, Carla Wade, Richard Williams, Larry Whicher, Gloria Buck, and Peggy Broxterman.
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ages ranged from mid-30s to low-70s) and thus were able to legally consent to
participation.

Interviewing Methods and Procednres
Two prior studies had used short survey instruments to ascertain the psychiatric
effects of witnessing an execution on journalists and to identify college students' attitudes
toward execution witnessing. In my dissertation, I wanted to focus not on psychiatric
symptoms but on the social and communicative dimensions of capital trials and
executions, and so believed that a survey instrument would too narrowly constrain my
data. Conducting intensive interviews with open-ended questions allowed me to
conversationally guide participants through the task of describe how the bombing, trials,
and McVeigh's execution impacted their lives while granting participants complete
freedom of response (versus a survey instrument that provided a limited range of
responses) and allowing me to retain the flexibility to ask follow-up questions. Of
course, that flexibility came with a price; the intensive in-person interviews wcre more
costly than surveys and necessitated transcription and more time-consuming data
analysis. However, since I was conducting exploratory research, I placed a high priority
on the quality and depth of information versus the quantity of participants. A survey
instrument that covered the same subject matter as my intensive interview questionnaire
would have been very lengthy and fatiguing to participants.
Because no interview instrument existed, I created my own in consultation with
my dissertation committee. Questions concerning the impaCt of the Oklahoma City
bombing, group membership, and attendance at capital trials straightforwardl y asked
participants to recall the day of the bombing and the weeks following. With respect to
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the McVeigh execution and its impact on participants' lives, specific questions were
written after I researched the execution and watched online media interviews with
victims' families and survivor witnesses. Prior to interviewing participants, questions
were refined as a result of input from the dissertation comI]1ittee and from the two
institutional review boards who reviewed my protocol and interview instrument.
The current study design and interview instrument has been approved by two
institutional review boards: the Social Sciences IRB at the University of Pennsylvania
and a medical IRB at the Oklahoma University Health Sciences Center. The OUHSC
IRB permission was necessary in order for Dr. Betty Pfefferbaum, the chair of Behavior
Science at Oklahoma University Health Science Center, to serve as my clinician in the
event that any participants were unsettled by the intensive interview.
Interviews with all participants took placc in the spirit of narrative inquiry, which
"aspires to an ideal of pmiicipation and involvement" and "dissolves traditional
boundaries between researchers and subjects.,,[05 I was aware that my own experiences
with parental loss would influence this project, and found that the death of my father in a
car accident at the negligent hands of a tractor-trailer driver as well as the ensuing
wrongful death lawsuit gavc me insight into coping with sudden loss and the impact of
legal proceedings on accountability, finality and healing. Thus, when participants
inquired into my reasons for conducting research on this subject matter, I was
forthcoming with describing the early life experiences in which this inquiry was rooted. T
always stated, however, that my own experiences were very different from and
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incomparable to the Oklahoma City bombing, and did not describe my experiences
further unless participants asked me about them. My willingness to share my own life
experiences with participants, together with my genuine enthusiasm for this inquiry,
gained me a measure of trust and confidence that I otherwise doubt I would have been
able to achieve with participants, many of whom had been interviewed many times by
media sources.
Interviews were conducted at any site in Oklahoma City that was comfortable for
the participant. While most interviews took place in participants' homes, two interviews
took place in a private room at the Oklahoma Health Sciences Center in downtown
Oklahoma City and two interviews took place in a hotel room I had reserved at the
Sheraton Oklahoma City. All participants were asked for pennission to tape the
interview and all consented. Prior to each interview, I read a consent fonn describing the
project with each participant, who then signed the consent fonn as well as a Health
Information Privacy Act fonn. Each participant also received a copy of both fonns to
retain for their records. This comported with "active" consent procedures. The tape
recorder was then tumed on, and the interview commenced.
Three interviews with participants who lived in Texas, Minnesota and Georgia
were conducted electronically over a land line telephone. In these cases, two packets of
the consent packets were mailed to participants beforehand together with a stamped
envelope addressed to myself, and the interview was not scheduled until I had received a
completed packet in the mail. After an interview appointment was scheduled, I called
each participant at home, discussed the consent fonn at that time, .ascertained if they had
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-any questions, obtained their permission to record the interview, and commenced the
interview.
Participants were at low risk of being further traumatized through the intensive
interview through a variety of methods. The first protection against emotionally difficult
subject matter is partial or total nonparticipation; participants could choose to not answer
individual questions, or not to be interviewed at all. Finally, participants were informed
in the consent form that they could obtain a confidential referral to a qualified counselor
(through Dr. Betty Pfefferbaum) if they should become distressed as a result of the
interview.
No participant was financially compensated for participating in the intensive
interview. To offer incentive for interview participation, each respondent was informed
of the lack of research on this subject matter and the altruistic benefits of participation.
All costs for this study were borne by myself and paid for by means of personal funds
and a dissertation research grant through the Annenberg School at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Finally, to maintain confidentiality, only I knew the participants' identity and I
retained all copies of interview recordings and transcripts, on which participants are
identified by number. Two support personnel were hired to help with transcription;
before I tumed over interviews to these individuals to be transcribed, I numerically coded
the tapes and stripping identifying information from the recordings. All copies were
returned to me at the conclusion of the transcription. The list linking participants' true
names with their participant numbers was always maintained in locked and secure files
and all data was stored in locked file drawers at each stage of data transfer. Moreover, all
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data were accessible only to research staff, and no participant will be identified by name
in any published report. Finally, all research staff were trained in ethical issues associated
with this research, with specific attention to confidentiality.

Data Analysis
Because this project was exploratory and no a priori theory existed to guide my
inquiry, I adopted a grounded theory methodology from its inception. Although I was
aware that grounded theory did not readily permit generalization to other situations, this
concern was not paramount since this dissertation research was being conducted with the
goal of accumulating conclusions that would allow me to generate hypotheses for future
research projects. Strauss and Corbin lo6 describe data analysis as a process of breaking
down, organizing, and reassembling data to develop a different understanding of
phenomena. In accord with procedures outlined by Strauss and Corbin regarding data
analysis for grounded theory research, the following coding procedures were
implemented in the current project: open coding, axial coding, and selectivc coding.
While I utilized Strauss and Corbin's suggestions as guidelines, [ also chose to focus on
theory generation rather than theory verification, and so followed Glaser l07 in not
prioritizing verification of categories and conclusions by other coders. This section
describes how data were deconstructed, and subsequently reorganized to provide an
understanding of how victims' families and survivors were impacted by membership in
post-bombing groups, attendance at capital trials, and McVeigh's execution.

106 See generally
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Strauss and Corbin state that the "first step in theory building is
conceptualizing.,,]08 The purpose of open coding is to begin the process of breaking data
down into concepts or representations of objects and events. After transcription, I
reviewed participant interviews and broke them down according to subject matter of
question, for example placing together all participants' remarks on the impact of
membership in support and advocacy groups. I then analyzed responses to each question
individually in order to chart trends and patterns and evolved descriptive categories
regarding the practices and perceptions of participants. I then began the process of axial
coding, which according to Strauss and Corbin is to "begin the process of reassembling
data that were fractured during open coding."]OO In this stage, I began to group category
notes into main and subcategories. I ended up with six categories: membership in postbombing groups, the perceived relationship between McVeigh and victims' families and
survivors, perceptions of the perpetrators' behaviors during trial, perceptions of attending
legal proceedings, and the impact of the execution on participants. Finally, I began the
process of selective coding, which is "the process of integrating and refining
categories."]]O Here, my primary goal was to develop an overarching theoretical scheme
explaining how each of the categories related to each other. This ultimately dictated the
organization of dissertation chapters and the relationship of each chapter to the others.
After completing selective coding, I verified the accuracy of my conclusions by
"member checking," or recontacting participants. Maxwell states that member checking,
or soliciting feedback from participants, is the "single most important way of ruling out
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the possibility of misinterpretation ofthe meaning of what they say and the perspective
they have 0n what is going on."111 While analyzing data, I also previously contacted
other participants to clarify responses that were unclear or garbled on the recording.
Each participant I surveyed indicated the need for minimal or no revision.

Summary
This chapter has provided an overview ofthe scholarship on collective memory
and cultural trauma, and has addressed the efficacy oflegal proceedings as a vehicle for
constructing collective memory and healing cultural trauma. It has also discussed the
groups that formed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, described memorial
objects such as the AEDPA and the Oklahoma City National Memorial, and explicated
the methodological assumptions that guided the project. The following chapter will
address the ramifications of group membership upon the fotmation of social frameworks
of collective memory.

III .LA. MAXWELL, QUAI.ITA nVE RESEARCH DESIGN: AN INTERACTIVE ApPROACH 94 (1996).
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CHAPTER TWO:
GROUNDING COLLECTIVE MEMORY:
THE IMPACT OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON MEMORY WORK

This chapter explores the processes by which groups helped shape collective
memory of the Oklahoma City bombing. It first addresses the emotional state of
individuals at the inception of group membership, so as to appreciate the reconstructive
roles that group membership played in helping individuals build new mnemetic
foundations, new intrapersonal priorities, and new interpersonal structures. The chapter
then considers group functions which emerged after the bombing, including the provision
of companionship, the gravitation toward group narrative, and the organization of
members around chosen reconstructive goals. Each of these functions served important
mnemetic roles; companionship provided mnemetic support and enabled members to
recognize that others were going through similar ordeals, group narrative helped
members to build and maintain social frameworks of memory, and group goals gave
concrete form to these mnemetic frameworks. Finally, this chapter concludes by
exploring in more detail the effects of group membership on "seeking justice"-the
facilitation of members' attendance andlor participation in legal proceedings against
Timothy McVeigh, including his 1997 capital trial and 2001 execution. Each of these
tasks is regarded as a central nodc in organizing the group's collective memory around
the bombing.
Common Emotional and Psychological Characteristics of Group Members
It is possible to examine the response of family members and survivors to

homicide through the lenses of traumatic grief, alienation, loss of control, and anger, each
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of which help construct an "ideal type" of victim.l12 While family members and
survivors of the bombing were diagnosed with PTSD, examining response solely through
these clinical terms implies that there is a "cure," I 13 and certain elements of PTSD such
as repressed memory seem to have no useful place." Instead, this project assumes that
memory must be understood as something broader than clinical diagnoses.
Research on traumatic grief began in 1917 with Freud's portrait of grief pathology
in Mourning and Melancholia, and continued through the 1900s. This research focused
upon the grief stages that an individual would pass through, with and were not focused on
mass or collective grieving. Psychiatrist Carl Jung focused on the link between mental
illness (or "neurosis) and inability to grieve, and emphasized the need to not deny but
progress through grieving processes. In 1944, Lindemann analyzed the phenomenon of
acute grief following accidental death, and described a six-characteristic grief
"syndrome"; Engel posited in 1961 that grief is abnoDl1al in the sense of a disease, and
that "uncomplicated grief' consists of a predictable course of stages, and Bowlby
enunciated "acute grief' as an attachment to the deceased that is linked to clinical
depression and anxiety, and elaborated a three-phase separation response.
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In addition,

Elizabeth Kubler-Ross's On Death and Dying proposed five stages which terminally ill
individuals were supposed to proceed in coming to telms with their impending death.
In present scholarship, there is ample documentation of a grief syndrome,
although more recent research has shown that grief does not progress through a

(1998).
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succession of predictable stages, and does not last for any certain time period. lls A
growing body ofliterature even focuses on the psychological response and adjustment to
the loss of a family member to murder, indicating that the experience of having a family
member murdered embodies both the grieving that goes with profound loss and the anger
that is a natural response to trauma and that prompts feelings of vengeance. Thus, family
members are said to suffer from "complicated mourning" as well as from feelings of
anger, guilt, selt~blame, and shattered assumptions. ll6 It may be three to five years
.
. f systems began to wane. ll7
befiore th e most mtense
gne

Trauma and accompanying anxiety complicate the burdens ofmourning, as do
other symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), such as reexperiencing the
trauma, diminished responsiveness, exaggerated startle response, disturbed sleep,
difficulty in remembering, survivor guilt, and avoidance of activities that may recall the
traumatic event. ll8 Traumatic grief is characterized by feelings of alienation, loss of
control, and anger.
Significantly, the grieving processes experienced by Oklahoma City victims and
survivors are necessarily different from those ideritified by prior researchers who focused
on individual grief syndromes. Here, the grieving process is not only combined with
psychological trauma but is also bound up with other ongoing processes altogether
separate from the the grieving individual such as legal proceedings, the timing and
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outcome of which that individual cannot control. Stages of grieving are often contingent
upon the occurrence and outcome of these external proceedings; for example, murder
victims' families often feel that they cannot proceed with their lives until the suspected
murderer is arrested, tried and sentenced,
Alienation

Survivors of traumatic events often feel increasingly isolated and estranged in the
wake of a traumatic event It is common for victims' family members to feel as if they
are alone or alienated; this status can either come from the distanced reactions of others
or from a feeling that one is "set apart" by one's authentic expertise in suffering, since
"survivors themselves claim that one can never appreciate their significance unless one
has been bereft as they have," Sometimes, alienation is voluntary; survivors may claim
privileged status from their experiential knowledge of suffering, believing that even
experts' understanding is flawed because they had never undergone bereavement from
homicide, 119
An inability to connect with the banality of everyday life also leads to a sense of

profound abnormality, Survivors may feel as if they are strangers in their own lives,
This distancing stems at least in part from trauma: "isolation, disbelief, numbness,
strength of emotion, and incredulity about mundane activities can bring alienation from
the self and from a once familiar society,,,120
Survivors may feel too that they are at the center of a collapsing web of social
relations, either because their misfortune is somehow contagious or taboo, or because
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others may avoid associating with survivors, as if they are cursed or earners of bad luck,
with social isolation being the result. Several participants felt as if the bombing suffused
their identity; Participant 20, a critically injured survivor, was uncomfortable when
friends who were uninvolved in the bombing would introduce him as someone who was
in the bombing: "I'm used to it now but I still don't really like it, I mean, you know, it's
not what I wanna be remembered for or anything ... " Participant 27 had a similar
experience upon returning to work:
people were curious and naturally wanted to hear ... how I was doing
and which led to what happened. And you sort of became identified
with that event too. And you couldn't go anywhere without feeling
like the spotlight was kind of on you .... it was kind of awkward
because you would feel like anything you did, that's the first thing
people would think was, you know, here comes [Participant 27] and
she's from the bombing. And you sort of.. .it sort ofbecame
uncomfortable at times because ... you just would thiuk, "I don't want
to be known and remembered for this the rest of mylife.".
Murder's aftermath is also hardly conducive to the maintenance of old social ties or the
formation of new ones since it is a time of "structural disorder" and an intense focus upon
the murdered loved one, which may cause the neglect of others who are still living.
Friends and acquaintances may also impose an interpersonal distance at the point where
they tire of hearing murder-related stories, when they feel that the snrvivor is taking too
long to heal, or when they feel unequal to the task of responding appropriately to the
murder. These forms of withdrawal can produce feelings of shame in survivors. In
addition, griefitselfmay open chasms between family members, who are all grieving in
different ways. There is a common understanding among survivors that "they are
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exceptionally prone to divorce, and they will quote American estimates that between 70
percent and 90 percent of marriages collapse in the wake ofhomicide.,,121

Loss of Control
Simply put, murder is disorder. 122 There can be no readiness, and no anticipatory
mourning.

123

Murders are arbitrary deaths outside of the natural order that are

"unattractive, violent, disorganized, unrehearsed, and arbitrary"-and so there is no
leavetaking, contributing to a sense of unfinished and unfulfilled relations with the dead.
Loss of control can be triggered by a sense of physical disorder, an inability to control
one's own health or mannerisms, and the survivor's own body can becomc a symbol of
disorder. Pmiicipant 28 recalled being unable to control grieving behavior at work: "my
boss had another person come and work with me because I mean I would start crying
every time someone would say, "Hi, [Participant 28]." And I would bawl. You know,
I'd fall apart." In addition, 28 was unable to speak her daughter's name out loud in
public without breaking down. Loss of control also stems from fears triggered by violent
crime, as they feel they "privy to the real, feral nature of the world." Survivors were
powerless to prevent the first death, to thwart future harms seems impossible, as "violent,
intentional death is linked inextricably with images of powerlessness-the powerlessness
ofthe victim to resist, and the powerlessness of the bereavcd to intervene at the time of
the killing and to control events thereafter.,,124
In an effort to restore control and prevent future losses, survivors may feel a sense
of "keeping vigil" which maintains the tranmatic pitch of postdisaster life. A sense of
Id.
mId.
123 Jd.
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vigil consists of a detennination to maintain control and meaning, to never be caught off
guard, to never relax or feel secure. The sense of "keeping vigil" was pervasive following
the bombing, as participants reported "hypervigilance," a symptom ofPTSD. Participant
7 described this hypervigilance as stemming from "mostly the, the lack of conh'ol that we

all felt. Um, and then second to that was the fear of ah, another instance of it happening
again, soon .... we, we all just seemed to be kind ofum, just more hyper-vigilant, more
um concerned with instances that might nonnally not have bothered us as much." Vigils
can hinder recovery in numerous ways; protesting injustice can lead victims back into the
trauma without resolution, resisting a loss of meaning can lead to depression and despair;
attempts to protect others can prevent deeper contacts with others, and survivor guilt can
lead victims to feel that they do not deserve therapy or even to be alive. 125
Perhaps the most significant disorder that murder ushers into survivors' lives is a
collapse of meaning. 126 Homicide brings with it the destruction of a moral order, and as a
result ofthis moral loss, "survivors may wonder why they have been singled out for loss
and what a death might portend about thc moral order.,,127 This is the predicate state for
the fonnation of the questions "why" and "why me/us." Survivors often referred to
putting together "puzzle pieces" of shattered lives; as Participant 22 remarked, "any
crime victim feels helpless hopeless someone's walked in taken control of your life and I,
the way I describe it is I felt like um, my life puzzle had been blown apart and uh I

125 Melissa S. Wattenberg, William S. Unger, David W. Foy, & Shirley M. Glynn, Present-Centered
Supportive Group Therapy/or Trauma Sun'ivar.':" in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC
DISASTERS: GROUP ApPROACHES TO TREATMENT 568-69 (Leon A. Schein et al. eds., 2006).
126 ROCK, supra note 112. at 95.
127 lei. at 42
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needed to get as many pieces of that puzzle back together in order to be able to go
forward."
For these reasons, the reconstruction of moral order becomes tremendously
important for survivors. Complex moral schemas devolve into radically simplified and
absolutist moral systems. New evaluative moral schemas are often binary, positioning
the survivors against the criminal other. This relationship as inequitable since the killer
chose to commit the crime yet he lives and the victim is dead; the killer has a future and
constitutional rights that the deceased victim does not. Another very common survivor
reaction is a desperate need for information, seen as required to begin to lay a
reconstructive foundation. Because one cannot move forward without thoroughly
understanding insofar as possible the circumstances of the murder, information about the
crime and perpetrator is precious, as is information about other crimes, perpetrators, and
surVIvors. [28
Ultimately, participants slowly came to the realization that perhaps to try to regain
control by attempting to exert control only left one feeling spread thin and personally and
spiritually diminished. Participant 19 gradually realized that it was important to "let go"
sometimes: "You can talk about trials and all that kind of thing.... 1 couldn't do a thing
about it. I had no control over that ... that's even part of healing is recognizing those
things and trying to do what you can and releasing what you don't have control over."
Anger

Anger is the prototypical survivor response; it is not only a "mass of turbulent and
contradictory experiences" but a force that sets in place a new web or relations, "a larger
PS
.
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feeling which embraces the survivor, the victim, the killer, and others around the self as
an expressive unity." It is not only an emotion but an activity. Anger is also an
organizing and positioning force that encourages the adoption of a simplified evaluative
moral schema. 129
Anger is an important activity for survivors because it provides motivation,
allowing survivors to once again assert control. 130 Thus, "to be an active survivor is in
large measure to be angry." Survivors perfonn anger, and live in its experience. Anger
cannot be other than perfonnative; it "can be authentic and compelling only if it is lived
fully and in its immediacy." Meditation on anger throttles its perfonnativity; "if one
pauses to stand back and reflect, merely taking an attitude towards one's emotions, one
no longer lives in the experience but becomes alienated from it." Because it is
performed, anger is self- and world-defining. This constructive capability is
tremendously important in survivors' reconstructive efforts; survivors may "build their
very identities around enacting an abiding rage as a form of validation, as a sign of the
rigbteousness and power of their convictions." 13 1
Anger can, however, alienate survivors from themselves as they feel a sweeping
anger that is often perceived as out of character, leading survivors to question their own
sanity and normality, and to perhaps engage in self-blaming. Participant 12, a critically
injured survivor, recalled that after the bombing his personality "shifted": "for the first
time in my life I wanted to kill people. I had never wanted to kill anyone, I've never been
a violent person, and now all of a sudden I had violence, I had anger. I never cussed in
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my life, all of a sudden I had,hadn 't said very many, but I had said cuss words." In
addition, interpersonal reactions to displays of anger may be disturbing to survivors, who
feel that others-even other survivors-view them as vicious or consumed by hate. 132
In summary, these components of traumatic grieving-alienation, loss of control,
and anger-reveal that the group members at the core of this study were subject to
varying psychological disturbances. These disturbances, however, made the integration
into groups and the invocation of group memory potentially all the more worthwhile.
Functions of Groups Formed in the Wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing
Research has shown that "social contact is a powerful buffer ofthe effects of
stress.,,133 Because of the instinctual need for companionship in times of stress, available
social support is "one ofthe most robust predictors of recovery from trauma," with "those
who do not anticipate that friends and loved ones would be available if needed cop[ing]
with stress and trauma far less well than those with high perceived social support.",34
Adults seeking treatment in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing who reported
receiving support in their workplaces were less likely to display traumatic stress
symptoms six months after the event than those who report receiving suppOli from
ld at 50.
K. Chase Stovall-McClough & Marylenc Cloitre, Traumatic Reactions to Terrorism: The Individual
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counseling, suggesting that adults with stronger social networks were more likely to
"recover.,,135 Similarly, injured survivors who had registered with the Oklahoma State
Health Commissioner noted that "tuming to others for support was a nearly universal
response." 136
Ironically, though social support played a key reconstructive role in the wake of
disaster, trauma symptoms can erode existing social support networks, promoting a
decline in levels of social support. In the aftermath of a traumatic event, people are most
likely to resort to methods of coping that are most familiar to them, and socially
connected individuals who handle trauma ditlerently (for example, through discussion or
through withdrawal) are likely to feel unsupported, leading to conflict. 137 Participant 12
related how his supervisor chose an avoidance coping strategy out of fear that the office,
which was the supervisor's coping focus, would be shut down; this choice negatively
affected his entire workplace, until he tinally engineered a situation in which the
supervisor would have to discuss the bombing and its effects. 138

135 P. Tucker, B. Pfefferbaurn, S.J. Nixon, & W. Dickson, Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in
Oklahoma City: Exposure, Social Support, Peritraul1wtic Response, JOURNAL or BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SERVICES AND RESEARCH 27, (2000). at 406-416.
136 C.S. North, SJ. Nixon, S. Shariat, S. Mallonee, J.c. McMillen, E.L. Spitznagel, E.L., & EM. Smith,
Psychiatric disorders among sun'ivors (~lllte Oklahuma City Bombing, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 282 (1999), at 759.
137 Stovall-McClough & Cloitre, supra nore 133, at 136.
138 Participant 12 recalled,

The first three months or so, six months, um we weren't allowed to talk about it at
work, with my coworkers, my boss was in denial.. .. she couldn't accept that it
happened .... she was calling everybody in Washington the day after ... she was on
the phone as soon as she got [through] to Washington saying everything was just
fine, there were no problems .... Well my coworkers never got any counseling or, or
any help or anything, and um so 1 an'anged for the police department to do a
deprogramming session for all of us, and I tricked my boss into being there and she
had to, first she really, you know, was angry and then she listened to the people and
went through it \\'ith them and then um afterward she said it was the best thing, that
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The groups that fonned in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing served many
important functions for their members, chief of which were companionship, providing
sites for narrative and nonnative construction, and organizing members and orienting
them towards positive goals. Significantly, all of these functions were reconstructive,
which is not surprising since the notion of reconstruction is implicit in "survivor" status.
Survivors were " ... forced to define chaotic events in uncommon and uncomfortable
ways; and they have sought to restore order to disorder, driven by a great demiurge to
found new organizations, and moved by a dialectic that yields distinct and unstable
institutional fonns.,,139
Strangely" enough, membership in a group was often not a deliberate matter, but
rather the result of family members and survivors hearing of meetings from friends and
deciding to attend, or of group members reaching out to friends outside groups. As Rock
remarks, "joining was often more a matter of contingency than of deliberate choice, of
the bereaved having chance meetings at opportune times with others in lay referral
networks.,,140 Another influential factor was the level of comfort individuals had with the
group; as Participant 19 stated, "it was maybe a year or a year and a half before I felt that
I wanted to get involved in some kind of group and then it's like so which group do I
want to get involved with and I kind of visited a couple and it was kinpa, you know, I
went to one here and thought ooh, they're really mad, oooh, bad vibes here."

Groups as Sources of Companionship

you know, she really needed it. ... and she was trying to find a positive way but it was
still hard for her to talk about it, real hard, because it threatened her world.
supra note 112, at xiii.
Id. at 29.
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It is hardly novel to suggest that groups formed in the wake of a traumatic event

provide companionship for members. Group bonding can be a powerful antidote to
feelings of isolation or alienation: "As members listen to one another describe what
happened to them and how they have reacted, the commonality of experiences becomes a
powerful counter to the feeling of social and emotional isolation so widespread among
.
d traumatic
. events ..,·141
th ose wh0 h ave expenence
Companionship in group settings certainly helped to reduce participants' feelings
of isolation or alienation and abnonnality. Participant 9 described how she and her
coworkers together overcame a sense of being the "only one" to feel a certain way:
"sometimes we would think that we were the only ones that were feeling certain ways
and you just kinda mention it to somebody or you hear somebody mentioning it and you
think, "Oh, I'm not the only one." .... that's how we, we were more of a family .... "
At times the companionship function of the group was more of an attraction than the
group goal; as Participant 21, a member of the memorial group, recalled, "in the
beginning it wasn't really for the memorial; it was so I could be around other people."
Even when the group goal was significant, participants still weighed companionship as
being equal to the accomplishment of the goal; as Participant 22 remarked of the habeas
group, "the other part was it was that peer support. We were together a lot. And shared a
lot."
Attending group meetings was the fIrst time in whieh many participants took
stock of their social network in the sense of realizing who else had survived the bombing,

141 Daniel S. Weiss, P\yc!Joc(vnamic Group Treatment, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC
DISASTERS: GROUP ApPROACHES TO TREATMENT 788 (Leon A. Schein e1 a1. eds., 2006).

62

or how everyone else was faring physically and emotionally. The chance to obtain any
information which would allow one to sketch out the contours of this radically altered
world was welcome and alleviated some bases of worry. Participant 26 recalled this
powerful "reunion," where she learned that people she had feared dead were actually
alive: "that's where you saw who was alive. You know, some of the people that I
thought were dead were alive." Groups continued to be where survivors and family
members kept tabs on each other; meetings where were members "saw people."
Participant 5 stated that Murrah Building Survivor Association meetings was where he
saw "a lot of people," and felt that this group was "more helpful because I got to visit
with everybody, talk to them, see how they were doing." Keeping apprised of others'
progress allowed members to regain a sense of control that helped them in their own
memory work.
In addition to reconnecting with old friends and acquaintances, participants stated
that group membership allowed them to connect with others who soon became dear. For
family members, meeting new survivors who had known or worked with their murdered
loved one was tremendously meaningful, allowing them to access others' mem0l1es of
their loved ones. Participant 28 recalled meeting Participant 21, and was thriIled to leam
that she had known her murdered daughter and that the two could confinn for one
another what type of person the daughter was: "[Participant 21) was the first person that
was a survivor that I met, that knew [28's daughter), you know, because all this time I
was like, '[28's daughter) had the best laugh. She was so fun' .... But [Pm1icipant 21],
... she was the proof that she was like, 'Oh yeah, [28's daughter) was, you know, [28's
daughter) was fun. She was just a character. She just really was a character. ". From that
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moment on, 28 began to seek out survivors who knew her daughter to gain more
knowledge about her daughter's life: "survivors became crucial, so important to meet
and find people that knew [28' s daughter]: "And every time I went, you know, they'd
say, 'Oh yeah, she always went down to the snack baL Every day she went down and got
Coke.' Really? 'Yes, yes.'"
28's reaction to meeting others who had known her daughter illustrates how group
meetings allowed victims' families to mnemetically reconnect to their past and that of
their loved ones, to recover something of what was lost. This is akin to Landsberg's
concept of "prosthetic memory," processes of apprehending memories of unexperienced
events through gathering such recollections at museums. Here, victims' families were
able to have returned to them memories ofthe victims' everyday, routine lives that were
mundane and overlooked, never perceived as "lost" until the victims' deaths. Now,
memories ofthe victims were embedded in their relationships with coworkers, and had to
be accessed through opening up relationships to those surviving coworkers. Coworkers
also felt reconnected to deceased victims through forming relationships with their
families. Thus, interpersonal relationships literally became social frameworks of
memory, and victims' families undertook active searches to open such connections as
part of their memory work. In addition, old groups (such as departments of coworkers in
the Murrah Building) that were irrevocably altered on the morning of April 19th still had
surviving social frameworks of memory. Though the devastating events of that morning
altered group dynamics so forcefully that groups' existences were effectively tenninated,
it became important to preserve and re-fonn, not abandon, those former social
frameworks-defining as outsiders new hires who joined the department to perform the
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tasks of deceased victims. It was as if new groups that formed after the bombing
absorbed the ghosts of many different groups that existed before the bombing, and
membership became a way to access those ghosts for those who wished to be haunted.
After the bombing, survivors and family members just wanted to talk to other
survivors or family members. Participant 26 stated that she could not stop talking about
the bombing once she began to attend meetings of the Murrah Building Survivor's
Association: "what we would do is sometimes we would go around the room and each
person would tell their story. And that was healing for me. And I found that the more I
talked about it, the more I wanted to talk about it. And I just couldn't shut up." Talking
was a way of validating memory, and sharing memories allowed members to build new
social frameworks of memory and therefore new structures of meaning.
Even informal group gatherings proved to be healing. Participant 29, whose
sibling was a federal employee murdered in the Murrah Building, stated that in
Thanksgiving of 1995 the family members of murdered law enforcement personnel were
all brought to Miami for five days based on the idea of aU .S. Customs employee. 29
accompanied her parents, and recalled that the trip was a "turning point" for her father:
day by day all of a sudden this power kind of lifts from him and you
can kind of see life coming back into him and we were I guess at the
stadium and for the celebrity thing and they had like Julio Iglesias
came in and got a picture of him kissing my mom and there's a picture
of my dad standing in between the Miami Heat cheerleaders and there
is a smile on his face ... and it's sort of like that was a turning point for
him. And even when we got home, there was a new life to him.
This illustrated that the "collective" in collective memory was multi-layered; groups
provided myriad new opportunities for fonning other, unrelated subgroups, producing a
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web of interconnections that connected each Oklahoma City group to the others, and to
the city community and national resources.
For some participants, the bonds of companionship offered so much that it
seemed as if fellow group members became extended family. Sources of companionship
could arise from physical ties to the bombing site or because members fulfilled familylike support roles. For Participant 11, group membership in the memorial group was
family-like, since its proximity to the bombing locatioll made it feel like home: "its kind
oflike going home [to the place where it happened] or something. It's hard to describe it,
but it's really helped." This is a testament to the crucial link between memory
reconstruction and physical spacc. In fact, ties to physical space were implicit in the
categorization of certain groups, such as surviving coworkers, defined by their
relationship to the blast site. Participants 10 and 26 both stated that members of the
memorial group functioned as family members; 26 remarked, "we felt like that was your
family from the Murrah Building."
This was especially important for members who did not have a base of support in
their own families. Participant 29 felt that she had "lost" her family in the bombing since
they did not talk about it: "I mean that just compounded this horrible hurt that you're
going through. I started to see my family fall apart .... we're dealing with- first the death
of someone you love and then second a terrorist attack and then your family starts to
disintegrate." For Participant 29, the habeas appeal became another outlet "that was their
appeal for me to be able to talk to other people outside of our family"; this fellowship
was ultimately more important to 29 than death penalty reform: "more than the political,
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it was more the contact with making a new family since I had lost mine and kind of a way
to get my head off what was going on with my own family."
Unfortunately, several participants, both family members and survivors, described
their families as being unable to understand the true impact of the bombing upon their
lives. Often, family members expected survivors to be the same people they had been on
the morning of April 19, 1995. This gave rise to tremendous emotional alienation as
survivors faced loved ones' expectations that nothing had changed. As Participant 21
described,
My family was not understanding what I was going through .... they
didn't realize that I am not the same person .... my husband was the
type who wanted to, just pretend like this didn't happen and we'll be
fine. And I couldn't, I had to face what happened ... And only place I
could get that was to go and be around other survivors and families ...
Several survivors and victims' family members descri bed how the bombing did
not seem to exist for their families, rendering it impossible to talk to them about the event
and its aftennath. This may suggest that family members of survivors and victims who
avoided discourse about the bombing avoided forming social frameworks of memory
concerning the event or activating existing social frameworks by referring to the event
because accessing such frameworks was perceived as too painful an act either for these
family members or for survivors themselves. Numerous participants were offended when
family members did not call on the anniversary of the bombing. Participant 28, for
instance, found this offensive:
th

Then on April19 , did I get a call from any of them? None. ] didn't
get a call from any of my family. ] mean, of course [names], my son
and daughter-in-law, but my sisters ... I mean I get people at church
that are, you know, people I hardly even know, that are, ,.] was
thinking about you this weekend. How are you doingT But [ don'(
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even get a phone call or anything from my family. And then that's
been the way for eleven years. And not one of them has asked me
about the execution. They haven't asked me about the trials, my
testimony. You know, irs like they don't want to know it, they don't
want to hear it. They just --like it didn't happen. But it did .... you
know I would think that I could talk with my family.
28 stated that her family likely did not know that talking about the bombing was healing.
Maybe they don't want me to get upset. Maybe they think I'll be
talking to them just like to you. But they just think you know they
don't want to upset me. But they don't know that that's what's
healing. And -- and you want -- you know, when you're healing you
should -- yonr family should be helpful when you're healing. But I
don't -- I don't know, it's weird. It's a weird feeling to know that and
--and it's hurtful. It's hurtful to me to have them not, you know, ask,
after everything I mean.
As a result, several participants did not talk to their families about the bombing.
Participant 7, for instance, refrained from sharing her experiences with the family out of a
perceived need to protect them: "why would you ever inflict that pain on someone you
love that dearly and the majority ofthe things I was thinking would have petrified 'em."
Participant 9 also shared more stories with coworkers than with family because they
"understood" in a way that family members could not: "they understood but they didn't
go through so my co-workers that were there went through it so we had like a bond.
Whereas my family, I had to explain it to them. It was better at work."
These remarks about the ways in which members of groups exterior to the
family-coworkers or groups that formed in response to the Oklahoma City bombingunderscored the notion that the boundaries of "family" comprised those who shared the
same social frameworks of memory, a concept more elastic than strictnres of blood or
legal kinship. In addition, speaking of groups as "families" also implicated the family
members of survivors and victims who chose not to participate in groups, a choice which
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forced many participants to seek social support from group membership. In the case of
victims' family members, for instance, some victims' family members formed new social
frameworks around the bombing site while other members of the same family did not; the
mother of a bombing victim felt comfortable and needed to visit the bombing site
whereas the victim's aunt wanted to avoid such a visit at all cost. Clearly, members of a
family need not share a willingness to fonn social frameworks of memory around a
particular issue or event. However, as participants' remarks demonstrated, when family
members did not share social frameworks, other sources of social support outside the
family became crucial.
The timing at which the companionship function of post-bombing groups was
most beneficial varied. Some participants found it invaluable to talk to people from the
inception of group membership. Others found it more helpful years after becoming
involved. Thus, the point at which survivors and family members transitioned varied;
some worked through individual and collective memory simultaneously from early on,
and some worked on individual memory first and then later focused on collective
memory processes Participant 6, a survivor, stated that her own healing process needed
to be complete before associations with others could be truly meaningful: "Eventually I
hooked up with some survivors that probably by the third year I was getting tremendous
help fi-om. Yet, in the first two years I was just dealing with guilt. ... as I got to know
some of the survivors, [Participant 21] for example, was one of the survivors that I really
got a lot of help from because we could say anything to each other, but we didn't really
realize that until about a year or two."
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The importance of being able to speak to other group members some time after
the bombing when others had "moved on" from the tragedy may have been especially
valuable. Oklahoma City groups retained the bombing as the nucleus of their social
frameworks of memory long past the time when it was publicly eclipsed by other events.
Participant 6 stated that she and others felt as if they had to conceal their own feelings
because of the time had passed, and that outside of groups "You had to be real careful
because after six months a lot of people felt like people shouldn't be talking - that you
should've gotten over it so a lot of us had to hide our feelings." Some felt that groups
beyond those in Oklahoma City were helpful; these groups had formed social frameworks
of memory oriented toward similar concerns associated with loss and recovery, and were
broadly oriented towards the reconstruction of meaning after the death of a loved one,
even though specific goals pursued by the group may have differed from those chosen by
Oklahoma City groups. Participant 8 was a member of an online group: ""I think people
outside of Oklahoma were more sympathetic. You know the community here after the
first couple years 1 think you know unless they lost someone it was like okay enough
we're tired of it.. .. Um-hmm, cause it was in the media every day for probably at least the
first two years." For 8, it also helped to compare the manner in which her best friend
died to other, more prolonged ways of dying. Similarly, Participant 17 also felt that
joining homicide survivor groups outside of Oklahoma City was helpful, because it
showed that other victims' finnily members besides 17 did not support the death penalty:
"that organization helps me out a lot because I, my belief was that 1 was opposed to the
death penalty and it was a good feeling to find out that there's really thousands of people
out there that are murder victim's family members that believe just like 1 do." .
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The sharing of stories and extension of insider status to others continued years
after the bombing. As time passed the social frameworks of collective memory grew
flexible enough to allow in those who became affiliated with the bombing at a much later
date. As late as five years after the bombing, for instance, park rangers became part of
the memorial group "family" when the memorial opened and was staffed partly through
National Park Service personnel. Participant 6, who went through the training program
with the park rangers, stated that the rangers werc accepted after getting to know the
volunteer survivors and family members not only through hours of service but also by
sharing stories:
So we went through training with those rangers and we became like a
family because, once again, at that point which was at four years for a
new group of people we were asked to tell our story .... And as the
rangers sat there and listened to us and saw the tears, saw the tears also
softened my four years of healing, they became close to us. We
volunteered weekly with them .... We had plivate parties whcre the
rangers and the volunteers got together. So they watched us really
grow and heal. By the fifth anniversary where we had that big
celebration they were like brothers and sisters to us, so they became
family.
In summary, group nieetings fulfilled a profound need for companionship among
both family members and survivors, particularly among those lacking support from
friends and family.
Groups as Sites of Memory

In addition to being sources of companionship and camaraderie, groups that
formed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing were also "storying" sites where
narratives of the bombing and ofthe identities of its perpetrators were continually
constructed and revised. Narrative processes are key for reconstruction. In his essay
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"Remembering, Repeating and Working Through," Freud discusses the "acting out"
phenomenon, where a patient is compelled to attempt to reenact an old experience by
unconsciously and repetitiously placing themselves into a particular aggressive situation
that could harm either themselves or others. Freud contends that this compulsion can be
cured "transference," which establishes an "intermediate realm between illness and real
life through which the transition from the one to the other is made'" that consists "to a
very large extent of narrative activity: the analysands tell of their past, of their present life
outside the analysis, of their life within the analysis .... "142 According to Connerton,
"later writers ... have pointed to its central importance" in uncovering and eradicating
efforts to terminate eHarts to maintain narrative discontinuity.143 This close link between
narrative acts of storytelling and reconstruction and recovery is also present in theories of
psychodynamic group therapy for trauma survivors, since it is narrative behavior, the
giving up of a traumatic tale to an empathic ear,and not other comfort-giving behaviors,
that are most healing for group members. 144 Inevitably, then, sharing stories works to
fulflll both companionship and sensemaking functions. As Connerton states,
thus we may say, more generally, that we all come to know each other
by asking for accounts, by giving accounts, by believing or
disbelieving stories about each other's pasts and identities. In
successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing
we set a particular event or episode or way of behaving in the context
of a number of narrative histories .... the narrative of one life is part of
an interconnecting set of narratives; it is embedded in the story of
those groups from which individuals derive their identity. 145

142 PAUL CONNERTON, How SOCIETIES REMEMBER 26 (1989).
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Storytelling is a "core element" of group interventions for traumatic grief since it is a
"key developmental milestone in the achievement of selfhood," and thus is logically an
integral reconstructive behavior. 146 Significantly, narrating grief is culturally a collective
experience; "conventions which are used to impose a discursive form upon grief and
bring it in to the public realm" include "the great collective ceremonies of the funeral and
memorial service with their special language and rites, and ... the lesser vernacular
rituals of poems, shrines, pilgrimages, photographs, flowers, and candles.
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In the wake ofthe Oklahoma City bombing, grief provided the impetus to talkabout the bombing, about murdered loved ones-and through talk carne catharsis. As
Participant 29, a family member, recalled, "the interviews like what I'm doing now is
very cathartic. For me this is the therapy that I need. I can tcl! people about [29's
murdered sibling]. I can talk about what happened to me." There was an imperative for
survivors and family members not only to sce, interact, and fom1 relationships with one
another, but to share their stories with one another. As Participant 21 stated, "in the
beginning I was going to, I was very involved in the memorial. And so I would go to the
weekly meetings and I shared my stories with -- various places even at churches and
things and - survivors, we would get together and we would share stories." Participants
stated that one of the primary benefits of group membership was the chance to share
experiences with one another. More specifically, group meetings became a forum for
people to talk about the bombing; as Participant 5 said, "That's where everybody talked
about where they were ... Well they first started forming the group that's when everybody
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would go and start talking about where they were and their problems." Though it was a
drive to find others who could understand the physical and emotional complications of
the bombing that prompted individuals to share stories and experiences with one another,
additional foundations of understanding were created after a group had "jelled"-when
group members shared social frameworks of memory. At this point, the act of sharing
meaning (and memory) was not necessarily oral. Participant 22 stated, "And, uh, when
you're in a group like that you know you don't have to explain if you just start crying
they understand. They, if you do something stupid which we all did, you know, your
brain doesn't work. You just, it's hard to function, but they got it and you knew they
did."
The urge to meet with one another was so strong that individuals did not wish to
continue to attend groups not oriented around dialogic behavior. Participant 23, one of
the founders ofthe Murrah Building Survivors Organization and the group's first
President, stated that group meetings provided an atmosphere in which people could talk,.
This ultimately imperiled the mission that 23 envisioned for the organization:
when ah I tried to guide to the organization to become a service
organization ... I found that to be almost impossible because people
need to verbalize and unload and talk about their bombing experiences
was the most important thing they wanted to talk about .... the people
who needed to talk, maybe they couldn't talk at home. They'd come to
the meeting and that's all they wanted to talk about, and ah that began
to be a divider rather than a ah, than something to bring the group
together. And since I couldn't, didn't, wasn't able to and neither was
the three presidents that followed me, or the organization .... the
presidents that followed me to try to organize these meetings could
not, they were not any more effective than I was to get people to ah
catch the idea of the organization.
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Thus, group members likely prioritized an active focus on the creation of social
frameworks of memory and on the maintenance of these frameworks.
As one of the people who attended briefly and then ceased to attend, Participant
12 was angry that Paul Heath, the founder of the Murrah BuildingSurvivor's

Association, did not "allow" survivors to talk to one another on the grounds that it would
have hampered recovery: "but then stopping us and we could've helped each other, we,
we, we couldn't, we could've really relied on each other." Participant 21 echoed this
sentiment:

In the very beginning there was a group of us that met because we
wanted to come together, come together. I mean we all worked in this
Federal Building ..... We saw each other in the snack bars and credit
union or the elevators. And when we went to this meeting; it started
out very good and urn Dr. Heath wanted to set up a big place where we
could just all meet ....And he started giving ideals of what he wanted
to do. And there were a couple of us that said, we don't want to do all
that. We just want to come to one big room and see each other and hug
... We just want to see each other. Well he still set this all up and
created all this chaos and it wasn't what we needed at that time. It was
too early. We just want to see each other.
As a process of forming social frameworks of memory, sharing stories created a
set of normative expectations or assumptions as to who the group was and what it stood
for. Research has shown that simplified evaluative moral schemas developed by groups
of homicide survivors very soon after losing a loved one to murder become incorporated
into homicide survivor groups and perpetuated within group culture: "the new dualisms
oflhe bereaved were continually to be reinforced and celebrated in the narrative
structures of activist groupS.,,148 As Rock comments with respect to pervasive themes
such as the alienation, loss of control, and anger processes identified earlier, "the sheer
14' ld at 103.
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strength and pervasiveness of those themes make it apparent that there is a firm
interpretive logic shared by activist survivors" that "stems from a traumatic confrontation
with violent death, but also flows from the interpretations that come to be shaped and
ratified by survivors in their subsequent talk with one another.,,149
The need to tind others with similar experiences is so important that it is one of
the chief purposes of group therapy for traumatic grief. 150 As Davies et al notes, "the
social milieu in group-based trauma treatment provides a unique opportunity for
members to learn from one another, which often results in awareness that they are not
alone in their struggles -- a phenomenon known as universality.,,151 It is not surprising in
view of recent trauma research that one of participants' primary requirements for sharing
stories with others in the time period immediately following the bombing was similarity
ofloss. This illustrates that reaching out to others with a shared orientation to a traumatic
event may have been the first foray into processes of collective memory formation and
that these tirst steps must be taken before one could fully engage with the totality of
possible orientations to that traumatic event. One's otientation to others with different
experiences ofloss, then, occurred in stages, tirst empathizing with the experiences of
"others" whose experiences of loss were most similar before turning to those with more
disparate experiences.
Participants wanted to share experiences with those who had endured a
comparable experience; as Participant 11 stated, "[I talked about bombing experiences1
I d. at 30.
Shear et aI., supra note l14, at 326.
151 D. Rob Davies, Gary M. Burlingame, & Christopher M. Layne, Integrating Small··-Group Process
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mainly with my boss because we have both shared the same experience and everything
and, and I think -- well right, tirst I don't think that some ofthe other people really
understood, you know, what had happened or what was going on." Unfortunately, it was
not always possible for participants to share stories with other individuals with whom
they had experienced the bombing; Participant 18, for instance, was disappointed that 18
could not exchange experiences with a woman with whom 18 had survived the bombing
because she suffered from mental trauma. In addition, sharing experiences with others
with different types of bombing experiences was difficult. Participant 12, a critically
injured survivor from the Journal Record Building, related the positives and negatives of
sharing stories with non-critically injured survivors:
Some were in the Federal building, some were in the Southwestern
Bell building, some were in the apartments, urn, they all had unique
experiences and ... I always went last, I always hated to say anything
because they would all either start crying or cringe when they'd hear
about my week or what was going on with me ...
Sharing stories with others with different experiences ofloss very soon after the bombing
may actually have been harmful. Participant 24 described a reh'eat held soon after the
bombing that was oriented around storytelling but took an "unhealthy" approach:
Well, that just didn't work. , . it was too soon, there were too many
emotions and quite honestly, too many jealousies, animosities and
other kinds of things because of people who were not injured, or not
there that day or who responded from the other building across the
street, there were very different views about everything that happened.

Injured survivors found it necessary to be careful when

shm~ng

stories in the presence of

noninjured survivors. Participant 24 noted that this was particularly problematic for
uninjured survivors.
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The benefits of exchanging stories is often discussed in abstract terms as
"healing"; Participant 28 even explicitly described talking tbrough trauma as the only
form of counseling she had. Participant 27 stated that it was the act of talking that held
the potential to heal: "I think that's where a lot of the healing came in too ... Yes, the
talking and the ... all the commons threads that you know, you would find." Collective
memory reconstruction was not only beneficial in tenns of mental health, but held the
potential for a more physical experience of release as well. Participant 21 stated that her
fellow group members were a "support base" and that group participation was
"cathartic. "

One reason why exchanging stories was perceived as therapeutic may be that it
helped participants to become more aware of the impact of one's physical condition upon
mental and emotional states. Even the physical act of speaking itself could result in
emotional healing. Telling one's story makes one more aware of trauma; Pmiicipant 6
recalled one moment where she unexpectedly broke down:
In the first families and survivors meetings that I went to and they had
everybody around tables and they asked you to talk about something.
I thought I was there to listen and facilitate, right, but as they came
around the table to me well I started talking, I started crying just like I
did today and realized I had a whole lot inside that was going to need
to be taken care of.
Storytelling, then, renders apparent internal conflicts with a traumatic event:
... there is a typically a key point in the story were each individual's
composure changes, the ability to proceed is disrupted, and, typically,
crying occurs. Remarkably, these moments do not typically occur at
the moment in the story where the most "objectivelY" horrific or
distressing aspect of the event is told. Rather, such moments typically
reflect the difficulty the individual is having in coming to terms with
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the way the events unfolded. At these moments, the conflict is most
clearly presented. 152
In recalling one such moment of conflict, Participant 28 discusses how talking about her
daughter before other members of the memorial group was important to her recovery. At
the memorial meeting, 28, who was quiet and shy, had to stand up and speak, and could
not at first say her daughter's name, but after talking more and more about her daughter,
her emotional state' improved:
And they would just say, 'What are you fceling?' You know, or
'What would you want someone to know that you're feeling?' And so
... each time we met, a different person would stand up and talk, be
the representative of that table .... it was my turn. I had to get up and
I got my name and I couldn't say [28's daughter's] name. I just, you
know, the tears just began to jnst pour. And I finally got out [28's
daughter's] name and ... and so I don't even remember what we talked
about at that time. I was just trying to get through that tlrst time. And
so the next time I had to do it, I was able to say [28's daughter's name]
and then I began to cry again. But each time I went you know, I would
get a little bit better ...
Other participants commented that they found telling stories helped in adapting to the
traumatic effects of the bombing; as Participant 27 noted, "you would talk and talk and
talk that first year and tell it over and over and over and over again. And so I think
naturally, it becomes ... you sort of become desensitized to it, to what you went through in
a way."

For group members, it was at times diftlcult to remember that both they and their
groups were also part of a larger world in which not everyone was aflected by the
bombing. As time wore on, members were forced to confront these changes; for
152
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instance, survivors found that new coworkers replaced those murdered in the bombing,
until those who had "been there" on April 19, 1995 were in the minority. By this time,
survivors had jelled into groups of their own accord, and did not often admit others into
the circle. Group identity was preserved despite the presence of these uninvolved others;
Participant 2 recalled participating in a coworker "bombing group" in her office:
[we] had a "bombing group" of employees ... It was very cliquish for
awhile. The new people didn't understand. We didn't expect them to
understand. And uh, the survivors were the majority for awhile but it
didn't last very long. It was only a year or two because they replaced
all the people that were killed ..... But we still, you know, had things
together. We always had a memorial service every anniversary in the
office ...
In summary, then, groups that formed in the wake ofthe Oklahoma City bombing
were "storying" sites where narratives of the bombing and of the identities of its
perpetrators were continually constructed. These narrative processes were responsible
for the building and maintenance of social frameworks of memory that helped reconcile
people to the bombing and its aftermath.
Groups as Goal Setters

In the Oklahoma City context, groups often worked together to build some
memorial product constructed in accordance with the group's memorial orientation-its
social frameworks of memory. Of necessity, these etTorts embedded or fixed these social
frameworks within the memorial product's design and through the adoption of certain
constructive priorities and visions. For example, the memorial group vowed to choose a
memorial design that was inclusive of all loss experiences and not to privilege one site or
orientation to memory, such as the perspective of victims' family members or the murder
of the children in the America's Kids daycare center in the Murrah Building. Thus, this
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priority, originating in the task force's social frameworks of memory, was embodied in
the mission statement which provided the foundation for the memorialization process,
and which called for an informed and intentional inciusivity.
In addition to facilitating the sharing of grieving stories and encouraging others to
unify despite differences in experience and opinion, accomplishing a goal such as the
passage of habeas legislation or the building ofthe memorial provided an outlet for
anger-motivated activity. Family members of victims killed in other instances of
telTorism have used anger as a unifying force. IS3 When united, survivors and family
members were a potent advocacy force, as have been families of homicide victims: "they
are unusually driven and unusually halTowed, and policy-makers, practitioners, and
politicians have found it impracticable to deny them an audience."ls4 Some survivors and
family members directed their intense emotional passions into advocacy to such an extent
that they became career advocates, and are still carrying advocacy work eleven years
after the bombing. Participant 17, for example, still serves on the board of directors for
the memorial, as well as volunteering at the Oklahoma City Memorial Marathon each
year and other fundraisers. In addition, 17 travels nationally and internationally to speak
out against the death penalty and serves both on the board of Crime Victims for a Just
Society in Mason, Michigan, a group primarily funded by Michigan State University, and
on the board of the National Association to Abolish the Death Penalty (NDACP).
Frequently, active involvement in group teamwork-the act of communally
accomplishing goals-was also described as reconstructive. and therapeutic. In addition
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to being vocationally interested in the memorial as a project, Participant I also found the
building process "healing": " ... my office being right across the street from it and
watching it go up, it was like, you know, a little pet project of mine kinda, you know, I
was, uh, that, that was probably as much healing as anything watching the memorial be
built ... " Similarly, Participant 23 was thankful for opportunities for group participation
since they enabled 23 to channel PTSD symptoms such as hypervigilance into positive
activities.

The therapeutic benefits of communal activity were the byproduct of staying

active and not giving in to despair; for Participant 22 also stated that participation in the
memorial task force and habeas group was "healing" because it satisfied the need to "do
something." This need to "do something" could evolve to the point where participants
literally wore themselves out. Participant 29, another intensely involved finnily member,·
stated that the price of intense action-exhaustion-was also its primary benefit:
I think for me, um, it was [healing]. It was that partly it was having to
do something, um, and the other part was having to keep myself busy
night and day so that I was just so exhausted that I just could hnda go
home and fall into bed. You didn't really just sit and think about it. I
think that was part of my motivation tou.
Those who were active retained a focns, illustrating that goal-setting contributed purpose
and direction; Participant 21 noted that "in those initial stages [it was the memorial group
that] that gave me kind of a purpose and the support." Significantly, the function of
groups as goal setters also overlapped with the function of grou·ps as sites of narrative
reconstruction; sometimes this involvement in group tasks explicitly involved
storytelling. For 26, volunteering at the memorial provided an outlet to talk about the
effect of the bombing on the Oklahoma City community:
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I'd get down there [to the memorial] and I would have breath of
energy or you know, a sudden increase in energy. I felt like if] go in
there, I felt like a new person. And I talked to people. That's where I
went to talk to, talk more about it. I didn't tell my experience. I told
the story of the Murrah Building and the people that worked in there.
The life that was once there on the inside.
Group goals were seen by group members as accomplishments that were worthy
in their own right. Participant 6 described the memorial both as a tmth-telling
mechanism and as a site that was symbolic of the culture of Oklahoma City:
The memorial was so important to me. I wanted to be sure that the
tmth was told and by that time we were already hearing people that
would come up and claim what all had happened that day and they
would give facts that I knew weren't tme and that drives library people
nuts. You know be accurate whatever the truth is, but I also wanted
people coming from other places who had been so wonderf).!l to us. I
wanted them to experience a wann welcome and to feel the warmth of
the good part of Oklahoma City even while they were visiting the
memorial so that was impOliant to me. I telt like I needed to pay back.
Participant 21 described the memorial as a monument to a creative use of destmctive
forces and to the healing process itself:
Well we, we tell people that you know when you scc the memorial I
mean, I am proud of it because its like, look what we do with our pain
and our anger we could have done so much destmction. And we
learned to listen to each other,to compromise and I said -- it's not just
the physical memorial but it was a healing process. It really did so
much for so many of us.
In addition, group members were able to see how collective memory formation
overlapped with individual memory constmction by ascertaining that particular group
goals both aligned with members' unique areas offocus after the bombing and fulfilled
members' personal needs for certain kinds of activity. Sometimes members' immediate
needs were directly fulfilled by the group; Participant 12, a critically injured survivor,
was in danger of being fired from his job because of the extensive leave time required by
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a succession of multiple surgeries and periods of recovery, and the habeas group helped
him to keep his job:
I liked the group in the attorney general's office, and there were a
couple of times when I needed. their help, and they did help me and
that was like um I don't think it was in the first year, probably in the
second or third year. And they actually did do some things that
helped .... [this group1was the only one I had any respect for.
Occasionally group members took on additional advocacy responsibilities within the
context of achieving a group goal. Participant 24, an injured survivor who had also been
the Assistant Building Manager for the Murrah Building at the time of the bombing and
who knew the building and its occupants intimately, assumed the mantle of survivor
advocate to ensure that survivors were accorded an appropriate place in the
memorialization process, and to continually put out the message that survivors had been
injured and traumatizcd in addition to family members:
Well, I always felt like that I spoke for those who were in the building
and survived and those who were, maybe not at work that day, who
worked there and as it turned out even those who were in the other
buildings outside of the Murrah building urn keeping in mind that
there were people killed in other buildings besides the Murrah building
and that there were many, many injuries in a delineated area around
the Murrah building itself. So, I felt like that it was my purpose
because of my connection with the building, my connection with the
people, most of the survivors for that matter. I didn't really know all
those -- the other people in those other buildings but I felt like because
of that connection and because of my position with GSA at the time to
represent the building and the people and the ACC that kind of thing
that I sort of naturally became that survivor representative if not -- you
know, because I advocated for the survivors.
The products of collective memory construction were a physical panacea for
group members; accomplishing group goals also helped group members once more attain

84

a sense of control and overcome helplessness. Participant 19 felt empowered by the
habeas group's successful lobbying for the passage of habeas reform:
that was a real interesting thing too because, again, part of it was
we've had tremendous loss of control, what do you do in terms of
having, being able to regain control and again, so part of that was the
urn seeing some of the laws change all the way from not only the death
penalty reform ...
Significantly, different groups fulfilled different functions. Participant 28, a
member of both the memorial task force and the habeas group, stated the memorial group
allowed her to remember her daughter and her unborn grandchild:
In the ... in the Memorial Group, I was remembering [28's daughter).
And I was remembering, making sure her baby was not forgotten.
And I got really wrapped up in that too, because you had this fear that
they would be forgotten. I mean I'm sure you've experienced that.
And being so close to the event, you don't know that this whole world
is looking. You know, that it's not just you. It's the whole ... everyone
was seeing it and how big it was. 1 didn't. .. you know, you don't...!
didn't. I never felt that enormity. 1 just knew that my daughter was
dead imd 1 didn't want her forgotten. And you know you got to
cemeteries and they're, "Oh, 1 haven't been here since she died. 1
don't even have any flowers. 1 didn't want that to happen with [28's
daughter). And so that was my function with the Memorial.
By contrast, the habeas group was not about remembering 28's daughter but achieving
justice:
With the Habeas, with the trial group, that was the whole ... the whole
justice, you know, making sure that who did this, was punished and
the right judgment, the right justice, whatever you know. And I
wasn't...1 even you know, and 1 even said and I meant it. You know, 1
don't want just anyone executed or found guilty. 1 don't want just
anyone. 1 want the person who did it. 1 want the person who killed
my daughter to have to pay for what he did. You know, if they can
prove it wasn't him, then it wasn't him. So we'll find who it is and
we'll get them. It wasn't! just wanted someone. That wasn't it. I
wanted the right person. And 1 felt like we had the right person. And
you know, 1 was able to see enough evidence and I wrote down all
everyday 1 guess."
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Group members themselves remained intensely proud of the accomplishment of
group goals. Participant I stated that the passage of the AEDP A in 1996 was "a miracle
in most of our eyes," and also recalled that being part of the memorial process was "quite
an honor." Participant 24, who became seen as a survivor 'advocate' in the memorial
group and in other contexts because he insisted on the appropriate inclusion of survivors
within post-bombing recovery efforts, also felt "honored" to take an active part in the
memorialization process: "being a part of it actually helped because I was helped, I was
very honored to be able to represent kind of as the survivor advocate, for, on the, on the
memorial panels and everything for those survivors that, you know that I knew for so
many years." Participant 22, who was present on the stage with one other when President
Clinton signed the AEPDA into law, stated of that day, "What an amazing day that was.
It was incredible to see those initials going on that piece of paper and know .... "

Participant 24 described the memorial as a miraculous accomplishment as well: "You
know whether it's gonna be a stone in the ground or urn you know, and obviously I don't
know that any of us really thought it would end up being what it is today. That, that's the
miracle about the whole process." Participant 24 stated that group members knew very
early on that the memorial was going to be a very unique and special achievement:

But we knew very early on that there was, there was -- because ot: of
what we call the Oklahoma standard and that's the response that
people all over the nation and the world literally gave to Oklahoma
City that there was something there that we had never dealt with
before, that we felt like would be necessary and that would be a
memOlial to those who were killed, those who survived and the rest
would be you know, those who were changed.
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As beneficial as the accomplishment of a collective goal was, there came a time
when some members felt that involvement was no longer necessary. For some, moving
forward created the incentive to cease to become profoundly involved. As 27 stated,
after about the fifth anniversary, when they opened the Memorial, and
the Memorial got off and running, I sort of didn't feel like it was as
therapeutic anymore. I just wasn't. .. and by then I mean we were
trying to have a baby and we doing some other things and going to
school and all that stuff. So it didn't become, you know, as necessary
for me to be involved in any group at that point.
This point came at around the same time for Participant 25, who ceased to become
involved because the attendance at the memorial had declined, and volunteering could no
longer keep 25 very busy:
About a year and a half ago they ... my problem is I've got to keep
my mind and my body occupied. And during that period of time
it was, the amount of people coming to the Memorial at that time
was not that heavy. And so it got me into trouble. So that's
when I quit that deal.
Finally, other participants terminated their involvement when their idealistic
conceptions of what the memorial stood for conflicted with its other political and profitmaking potentials. For Participant 28, a family member who quit a former job to become
the gift shop manager at the Memorial, it was best to return to her fonner job after seeing
how the memorial ran as a business in addition to a site of memory, and particularly
when she felt in the middle of contests between the Memorial Foundation and the
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism:
And it was so good until...until I started seeing the ... the business
endeavor. And I know what has to be there and I don·t know if this
should be in there .... But there were things that were said and done that
as a family member I did not need to be doing. I didn't need to hear it.
I didn't need to be there you know ... .! had quit my job and I went to
work there. And I probably would have stayed but just the ... it was
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just too much. I couldn't handle being in the middle, is exactly what I
felt like. I felt like I was being pulled between all these groups and
everyone wanting to know, "What do you know? What do you
know?"
Here, Participant 28 commented a process that Huyssen terms the "new and public
politicization of the museum," through which the museum "has been sucked into the
maelstrom of modernization: museum shows are managed and advertised as major
spectacles with calculable benefits for sponsors, organizers and city budgets, and the
claim to fame of any major metropolis will depend considerably on the attractiveness of
its museal sites.,,155 Thus, for 28, these political and commercial concems interfered with
28's ideal of the memorial as a reconstructive project and therefore threatened to violate
the goal of the memorial as constructed with the task force's social frameworks of
collective memory, prompting her to terminate her involvement to retain a unsullied
impression of the memorial as a purely memorial entity. For 28, the museum was a
memorial, not a spectacular exhibit space or an entity to capture tourist interest within
Oklahoma City.
Electing Not to Join Groups and Coping With Group Tensions

Not all participants became involved in groups. The choice not to become
involved with a group was precipitated by discomfOli or dislike toward the social
framework under construction in a particular group. For some, it was not desirable to be
around others who were not at a compatible healing point in recovery or reconstruction;
exposure to the memory practices of such people carried "lisk." For Participmlt 3, for
instance, there was no benefit but only danger in being around people who were not at the
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same stage in healing: "But I couldn't risk being around people who were still hurting so
much, and so ] stayed away from the large group."
Discomfort with a particular group's social framework was felt by most
participants, who tried to attend various group meetings until they found a framework
that accommodated their needs or ceased their joining behaviors upon feeling that they
did not belong. Merely making a physical effort to attend a group meeting was an
assertion of identity, of a right to be present and of a sense of belonging, even if members
were making an initial foray into the group to ascertain its dynamics and orientation.
Both family members and survivors felt alienated if their relationship to deceased
victims or to the bombing event was atypical; Participant 6 remarked, "] felt like] didn't
belong anywhere because I hadn't lost a family member and I could not call myself a
survivor because I wasn't in the Murrah Building." Similarly, Participant 14, whose exspouse was murdered in the bombing, "just didn't feel comfortable" at early memorial
meetings because her story earned an "oh" reaction, and fclt sure that this alienation was
due to the fact that it was her fonner spouse that was killed.
There was also little incentive to join if one's need for constructing a social
framework were being met elsewhere. Participant 27 also stated that because she had
tremendous support from family and from church, she felt no need to attend a group at
first because she felt that her survivor status and other members' anger were both
alienating:
J had family, a lot of family and friends and my husband very
supportive and ] could talk to them any time. So] didn't feel the need
to go and publicly ... And the people were so angry still. ... And it
just felt ... it didn't feel like a good time for me .... And you were
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with people who had lost people. So you sort of felt awkward about,
you know, they were still angry.
Thus, participants were not likely to join groups if they had strong social suppOli
networks elsewhere, particularly if they Jelt awkward or out of place througb
confrontations with others in group meetings.
Finally, as effective as groups were in cultivating a sense of companionship,
certain group dynamics of the memorial task force-interpersonal frictions generated by
bringing together individuals with varying political opinions and radically different
experiences ofloss from the bombing--also were very diffIcult to work through in the
tlrst months following the bombing. Although overcoming these interpersonal
challenges was one of the processes that most tightly knit group members together at a
latcr point, at first they isolated members in different categories, temporarily preventing
them trom fInding a common cause. It was as if one's orientation to the bombing
positioned one in a unique memory-making perspective to the bombing, which had
repercussions for the reconstruction of both individual and collective memory. The very
lack of social frameworks of memory meant that social insecurity and its symptomatic
jockeying for memorial power and prestige was natural. Some time had to pass before
survivors or victims' family members could negotiate through the challenges of their own
orientations to the point where it was possible to empathically understand and validate
other perspectives. It was commonly assumed that one's perspective to the bombing
carried an implicit valuation in terms of one's stake in making memory. Those who had
endured what was perceived to be the greatest loss-the death of a family member-were
thought to deserve a louder voice in constructing the collective memory of the bombing
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than survivors who actually had a much closer physical proximity to the blast. In this
way, various loss groups attempted to make memorial claims-making into an exclusive
privilege.
Profound sources of interpersonal tension existed between survivors of the
bombing and family members whose relatives had been murdered in the explosion,
between injured survivors and apparently uninjured survivors who experienced survivors'
guilt and other forms of mental trauma, and between those who supported the death
penalty and those who opposed it. IS6
Survivors' geographic proximity to ground zero at the time of the bombing was
also a source of tensions; as Participant 24 stated, "some people would look at you like,
well who are you and why are you here. You know you were two blocks away and
where-I was right there ... "
For survivors, memorial group meetings assumed a hostile air as family members
who resented the presence ofthe living sought to limit or altogether terminate their
participation. Participant I recollected that these tensions rose to the tore when the
survivors and family members met together during memorial group meetings: "there was
a, strong feelings among family members who had lost someone, in the bombing, uh ...

156

Participant 23 observed that

it became very apparent to me early on that people who are the families of victim
members who 'died as a result of the bombing did not feel that survivors ah especially
early on, had any right to think about, talk about or in anyway be involved in
decision making processes, where \VC were collectively gathered together .... And I,
very early, I learned that if you were an injured survivor, they had a perspective and
the more injured they were, ah the more intense the feelings ah that, that sort of tried
to separate ah people's involvement ah in a collective way in meetings. IfY9U were
not an injured survivor, they wondered why you were even willing to open your
mouth.
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had a lot of bad feeling toward people who survived the bombing, ..... And urn the
family members were very abusive in a lot of cases toward survivors ... Verbally
[abusive), ... Very angry, quite often said you don't belong in the same room with us."
Participant 7 recalled being told that "you don't have a right to be here, you didn't die,
you don't have a right to be here, you don't have a right to say anything." Other
participants, such as Participant 15, experienced outright rejection from family members
immediately after the family members learned she was a survivor:
this one mother who was carrying, this mother, 1 don't know what her
name is but I know whose mother she was and she walked up and,
"Oh, who was your family? Who did you lose?" 1 go, "I didn't lose
anyone. I'm a survivor." She just immediately turns around arid just
walks off
Family members felt as if survivors did not understand the pain of death or loss,
privileging the death of a loved one over the physical and or emotional trauma of
survivorship. This is indicative of the "trauma membrane" phenomenon, which is
"characterized by the passive or active exclusion of people who are perceived not to have
experienced the same, or similar, dramatic events.,,157 Thus, hierarchies of bereavement
evolve. 158 One family member, Participant 8, stated that the sight of other survivors,
especially survivors who worked with her best friend who was murdered in the bombing,
was incredibly painful because it was not apparent others had lived: "There was one girl
that worked with Frankie that survived and I just could not stand to see her ... It's
ten'ible. I wouldn't want her dead, but then I'd look at her and go well why her, you know
is she ditTerent? Is she special?"
157 Davies, supra note 151. at 401; see J.D. Lindy & J.P. Wilson, Re.~pecting the Trauma Membrane:
Abm'e all. Do No Harm. in TREATING PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA AND PTSD (J.P. Wilson & M.J. Friedman

eds., 2001).
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This animosity retraumatized survivors, exacerbating survivor guilt and causing
additional emotional trauma at a time when survivors were most vulnerable. Participant
15 recalled, "A few of them hurt my feelings and at that time I was really raw and 1'd cry
a lot ... " According to Participant 6, this animosity, together with the pain of recovery,
helped to make some survivors who were critically injured feel guilty, and wish that they
had not survived: "Some of those people had over 24-29 operations and·there were times
when some of those people felt early on with all the pain they were going through it
might have been better if they had died and to hear a family member say you aren't going
through anything, you are a survivor. Well they were going through so much, just
exacerbated that hurt and anger and pain."
Survivor guilt came about for many participants when they were brought into
physical contact with victims' family members, even ifthe family members were not
openly hostile. As Participant 21 recollected,
I had so many people even in the hospital you know -- you are special
you must be special, you know God has a special purpose for you. And
I was so overcome with -- I was scared to death. If I am so special
what is it I'm supposed to do .... Urn I had heard about survivors'
guilt, didn't understand it, .... probably about two weeks after the
bombing they were going to take families and survivors down to this
sight. And we were all supposed to meet. ... And they had buses and
they took you down there .... as we got to the site survivors guilt hit
me because I am like, here I am with all these families who lost
somebody and I am alive. And it hit me and it hit me hard. It's a
horrible, horrible feeling you feel b'Uilty for living. I felt guilty when
family members would come around it took me probably two or three
years to really start getting over that.
Perhaps this was because reconstructing one's own life and integrating the bombing into
new routines was a demanding enough task without being physically reminded of and
confronted with what family members had to cope with. Survivor guilt, then, was
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testament to the fact that survivors' individual memory reconstruction processes were
more collective than family members' because they included an awareness of perceived
disparities between their own traumatized position and that of family members. Meeting
with family members exacerbated survivor guilt; as 21 noted,
1 can remember the one [memorial task force1meeting in particular. 1
am sitting next to a man who almost bled to death in the building and
we were there, and we were talking -- they were talking about putting
survivors names on, on something. And the woman got up and said,
this is not for survivors this is for -- you know, she lost her daughter
and she was very vocal. And it hit me and this other man hard. And
after the meeting 1 looked at him and 1 said, you know, ifthere was
human -- she doesn't realize that ifit was humanly possible I'd trade
places with her daughter ...
Such exhibitions of hostility forced survivors to modify their behavior. As
Participant 17 stated, " ... you have to be very careful not to -- around certain people.
You have to be very careful that you couldn't voice how you were hurting because they
lost a loved one, you know. It was hard, it was very hard."
Another common source of tension between survivors was support for or
opposition to the death penalty. Few members of the memorial group also belonged to
the habeas group; the two groups had become intensely committed to very different goals
to which their members devoted intense labor. Participant 28, who was both a member of
the memorial group and the habeas group, stated that some members of the memorial
group tried to discourage her from joining the habeas group: "1 always felt like people
were like, 'You know, what are you doing?' You know, and but 1 felt 1 was right. 1 felt
right about this. And it wasn't right that. .. that people can sit you know, and get all of
these appeals and appeal and appeal." 28 stated that there was only one other individual
who belonged to both groups, and that while she shared information concerning
94

memorial task force proceedings with habeas group members, there was little need to
share proceedings of the habeas group with memorial group members. Tensions
resulting from differences in death penalty opinion also led some participants to cease to
become involved in groups that they had found helpful in the past as opinions changed in
the years following the prosecutions of McVeigh and Nichols. Participant 19, for
instance, began to disaffiliate from the habeas group after the habeas group tried to
accomplish additional changes to death penalty law and capital procedure:
one of the things that happened for me with that particular group
because that group would be very, very pro-death penalty, okay, and
after 1 guess it would have been after both ofthe Federal trials then it
almost kind of got into well, by-golly, we ought to see if we could
make it 10 out of 12 jury votes for a death penalty and going farther.
Yeah and it got to a point where this group of people that had been
very important and in whom I'd gained a lot were going in a direction
that I thought was a little too far and had problems, and 1 had problems
with that.
Gradually, these hostilities diminished and empathic understandings of others'
orientations became more common and others' experiences ofloss began to be
appreciated and validated. At this point, members stated, it became apparent that this
animosity was itself a symptom of trauma. Participant 1 attributed this negativity directly
to PTSD. Unfortunately some survivors had already ceased to attend; Participant 7
stated, "I took it deep to my core imd it I, 1 distanced myself Okay fine 1 won't be
around them, 1 don't want to inflict this on them so I, I wouldn't. I dropped out early
on ... .1 thought okay, I'm not gonna put myself through this. rm not gonna harm them
by being in their presence. So 1 pulled myself and 1 didn't get involved until years later."
Other members, however, persisted in attending groups despite this acrimonious
behavior, mindful of the need to fulfill a higher calling; as Participant 21 noted, "And 1
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was not going to go back to the meeting and then I was like, no, I came here for a purpose
and I am going to continue."
In summary, significant obstacles had to be overcome in order to understand and
validate others' members experiences ofloss. Some potential members felt so alienated
in the early stages of group formation that they elected to forego membership activities
altogether. But those who stayed within groups long enough to surmount experiential
differences and take part in the construction of common social frameworks of memory
found that the experience of "growing together" as a group was healing and
reconstructive.
The Memorial Effects of Group Goal-Setting

The selection and pursuit of a particular group goal influenced group members
towards or away from attendance and/or participation in legal proceedings against
Timothy McVeigh, including his 1997 capital trial and 2001 execution.
Membership in post bombing groups undoubtedly provided companionship,
narrative structure, and positive goal outlets for anger and other emotions, thus rendering
groups a site of collective memory formation whose members together negotiated the
meaning of cultural trauma. Just as members shaped groups, groups shaped members'
understandings ofthe bombing and of the experience ofloss. Groups-and group
goals-played an especially significant part in constructing the degree to which members
felt that attending various stagesoflegal proceedings, including McVeigh's execution,
was personally meaningful, particularly in comparison with other possible activities such
as work, becoming involved in a non-legal group goal, or spending time with family. In
essence, then, members' "justice needs" were partially constructed through the formation
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of group identity and the selection of group goals. This section contrasts the membership
of two groups, the memorial task force and the habeas group.
The memorial group indisputably had a very different focus than the habeas
group. The memorial task force was focused on remembering those who had been
murdered in the bombing, recognizing the survivors, commemorating the rescue workers,
and telling the story of the memorialization process. The Oklahoma City Memorial does
not focus heavily on the prosecutions of McVeigh and Nichols; the only museum display
that tells ofthese legal proceedings is a two-panel installation entitled "Justice" that
includes chronological timelines of the prosecutions along with sketches from the trials
and blowups of three newspaper articles: a Rocky Mountain News article from June 2,
1997 announcing a guilty verdict in the McVeigh case, a Daily Oklahoman article from
December 24, 1997 describing a h'1lilty verdict in Nichols' federal trial, and another Daily
Oklahoman article dated May 27,2004 announcing a conviction in Nichols' state trial.

There is no mention of McVeigh's execution with the exception of a nondescript 4-by-8inch bronze plaque that was installed within an hour of McVeigh's death stating only
"McVeigh is executed by lethal injection on June II, 2001, at the federal penitentiary in
Terre Haute, Indiana.,,]59 The plaque, which hangs next to the Rocky Mountain News
mticle detailing McVeigh's conviction, replaced a plaque which stated that McVeigh's
execution had been postponed from May 16 to June II. Participant 24, who helped to
hang the plaque, stated to the media on the occasion of the plaque's hanging that "[t)his is
a part of the evolution of the museum," and described the execution as "a very significant
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New Plaque at Bombing Memorial Ajier AlcVeigh 's Death, available online at
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change in the timeline." Thus, the memorial task force endeavored to remember and
represent murdered victims as well as living survivors and rescue workers, and focused
on making these memorial constructions as full and robust as possible-a goal centered
around creating and ensuring a presence, not an absence. In so doing, it strove to give
voice to the dead and the living, a voice that emphasized tragedy and turmoil but also
rebirth and rebuilding through remembrance.
The habeas group, in contrast, may have pursued death penalty reform in the
names of murdered loved ones, but that group's focus was very much on what surviving
family members of murder victims had to endure through waiting as long as seventeen
years for an offender's execution to be carried out. Thus, much of the habeas group focus
was on the justice of eradicating opportunities for offenders such as McVeigh to pursue
additional appeals which prolonged execution-a focus on the offender and on the need
to expeditiously carry out death sentences, albeit one pursued in the names of murder
victims and their families. The essential focus of this group was the timely conclusion of
legal proceedings against an offender. For this reason, the habeas group was pursuing the
enactment of absence, ensuring the attainment of accountability and the removal of an
offender from the lives of victims' families.
In keeping with these goals, core members of the memorial group were likely to
find the building of the memorial or the guilty verdict in the McVeigh trial more
meaningful than the execution. By the time of the execution in June of2001, more
memorial task force members spoke of being too involved in family or work or other
activities that they see as positive to attend the execution. Habeas group members, on the
other hand, were more likely to see the trial and execution as meaningful-particularly of
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the execution being the culmination oflegal proceedings. They spoke of not only a need
to see as many legal proceedings as possible, but also a need to be involved in
proceedings for reasons of completion and of a personal struggle to ensure widespread
access to proceedings (i.e., ensuring that victim impact witnesses could attend evidence
presentation in the case in chief: ensuring that the trial was broadcast back to Oklahoma
City after the change of venue, ensuring that the execution would be broadcast back to
Oklahoma City from Terra Haute). Thus, if group goals were healing, then choosing a
goal for many members defined not only a major focus of healing, but also the point at
which most ofthe healing process could be accomplished (the building of the memorial,
McVeigh's trial, or McVeigh's execution) and the institution that would "enable" healing
(the memorial, the criminal justice system, or both). Goal selection also reflected
informed judgments about what was the most appropriate way to memorialize the
bombing, those murdered, and the bombing's impact on survivors, rescue workers, and
family members.
One might point out that what mattered was not group processes and goal
attainment but members' prior personal and political beliefs on issues such as the death
penalty. Of course, the choice of a goal was dictated by many factors, including
members' opinions on the death penalty-but personal and political opinions in and of
themselves did not accomplish group work. Thus, although opinion formation predated
selection of groups and goals, they were not solely responsible for commitment and
sacrifice to achieve group goals. Because of a likely interdependency of death penalty
opinion and group membership, however, an eft()rt will be made to identify members'
stances on the death penalty when discussing certain participants' reactions.
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The diflerence between the memorial group and the habeas group can most
conservatively be characterized as a rhetorical difference--how they spoke of the
meaningfulness of legal proceedings versus other possible time investments. Differences
between the groups were not found in disparities in group members' support for the death
penalty, although all of the habeas group participants did in fact support the death
penalty; in telms of an appropriate sentence for McVeigh, some memorial task force
members reported support for life imprisonment without possibility of parole for
McVeigh and others reported support for the death penalty. Nor did execution witnessing
provide an adequate means to distinguish between the two groups, although three out of
the six (or 50 percent) of the habeas group members interviewed attended as compared to
6 out of 18 members (or roughly 33 percent) of the memorial task force (including
participants who belonged both to the habeas group and to the memorial task force). Six
of the eight execution witnesses were members of the memorial task force; four of the
eight execution witness participants were members only of the memorial task force, and
another two witnesses were members of both the habeas group and the memorial task
force.
It is not surprising that memorial task force members who opposed the death

penalty stated that they did not need an execution for "justice" to have been attained. As
Participant 6, a death penalty opponent, related, "my sense of justice, I think, would have
wanted him in jail, but I was sure he was going to get that. I had no need to see him
killed. In telms of justice I knew he was going to get justice."
What is surprising, however, is that whereas all habeas group members spoke of a
need to attend and be involved in legal proceedings for various reasons, some memorial
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task force members who supported the death penalty either all the time, who had "no
opinion," or who were willing to support it on a case-by-case basis did not mention that
the trial and execution as particularly meaningful proceedings. Participant 21, who
reported holding "no opinion" on the death penalty, attended the closed circuit broadcast
of the execution only to support friends (but unexpectedly had a healing experience at the
execution herself), stated that the execution held no real personal meaning in and of itself,
but was instead focused on whether McVeigh would be found guilty and thus held
accountable: "Yes, yes he was found guilty. He is held accountable, what happens to
him, the death penalty or not, was not important to me." 21 did not feel a duty or
responsibility to attend the trial because of an effort to return to work:
I think I went there, you know I went back to work and I was more
focused on I have to, I have to work .... And I don't have the luxury of
taking off and following it. I didn't feel like I, 1 mean had so many
friends that were going and keeping me posted, I didn't feel like I had
to be in there.
Participant 24, an injured survivor and a supporter of the death penalty, also reported no
desire to attend the trial or the execution, and stated of the execution, "I don't know ifit
healed me, I don't know if it might work. I don't know. I just didn't deal with it at that
time. 1 was actually too busy to think about it to bc quite honest." In June of2001, 24
was involved with many other concerns not related to legal proceedings: " ... I was so
focused on business and the memorial and family and life that I think it was just another,
I keep saying another chapter in that book. I think it was just like 'okay this part is over
and I don't have to deal with that anymore." 24 did not feel a personal need to see the
execution in order to know that McVeigh was held accountable:
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It was not something that was important to me. I knew it was going
happen. I knew he was going to be execnted and I knew when he is
going to be over. I knew when we were given minute by minute
update .... But I did not have to personally be there to see it happen
for to be over that part of it to be over for me.

Participant 27 also did not feel a duty to attend the trial because of a desire to get back to
work in defiance of McVeigh's ability to change her life:
I sort of...! felt a bigger responsibility to getting back to work and
doing my job and continue to do my job well. And sort of used work
kind of therapeutically that way in terms of. .. that's where my survivor
instinct came in that he had changed my life but he wasn't going to
change that part of it because I love what I do work-wise. So I didn't
want to take time away from work to go ... you know be away from
work to watch the trial.
27 just happened to be on vacation in Colorado at the time that the verdict was expected
to be handed down in McVeigh's trial, and decided to take one day of vacation to attend
on that day. 27 recalled that the gnilty verdict marked a personal "end" to proceedings:
just a sense of relief when they found him guilty. Just a sense that he
wasn't going to be able to do it to anybody else or get off, you know,
that he ... just for me ... just I remember sobbing when they read the
guilty verdict, just because it was just such a sense of - okay, it's done.
For me it was done ... .! don't want to say closure, but I got a huge, I
mean I moved very fast-forward.
For other members of the memorial group, the memorial itself played a very
significant role in recovery. Participant 26, an injured survivor who was an opponent of
the death penalty after the bombing, recalled a personal ability to forgive McVeigh
around the time the memorial was opened in 2000. 26 believed that there was a
connection between the two:
I've often told the story the way I felt when the Memorial opened that
day, on April 19th 2000. And when I walked down the steps I could
feel the ... something being lifted from me. And I felt lighter and I felt
relief. And when I thought about it later, I could describe it as I had
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been wearing an overcoat for 5 years and had all these feelings of
depression, anger, sadness, guilt, despair. All these things I'd been
carrying for 5 years. And now I had a place to hang that overcoat and
leave those feelings there. J didn't need to carry them with me
anymore .... 1t was as if a burden had been lifted. It was very
liberating.
Participant 26 described this moment as being more poignant than the experience of
learning of the guilty verdict in McVeigh's trial.
The memorial group was a very large and inclusive organization, both in intent
and in actuality. Unlike the habeas group, it was not formed as an advocacy group that
would strive to achieve political ends such as the passage of a certain piece of legislation,
and so it would be surprising if every group member had chosen not to attend the trial out
of a desire to prioritize other activities. Thus, of course, some members of the memorial
group did find it meaningful to attend McVeigh's trial and execution. Three participants
attended both the trial and execution; two of these individuals were only members of the
memorial task force, and the third belonged to both the memorial task force and the
habeas group. Participant 7 stated that attending the trial and execution was an important
step in being "involved in the process" and an important step in healing:
And I think it was important to my healing process as well. I don't
think I realized that at the time, but [ do now in hindsight think that
that really helped me ah in ways that I might not have known. And ah,
may still not understand. But it, it did help me to see justice be done.
Similarly, Participant 15 attended the execution to see justice done-to see McVeigh
suffer and to see accountability; she described it as "something I had to do":
The execution was something I needed to do for myself because I
deserved; I believed he needed to be punished because he knew those
babies were in that daycare. He knew. He knew that there was 200 and
some people working in that building, 300 however many there were, I
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can't remember and he did it just because he hated the government.
And I can't comprehend hate.
In contrast to some members of the memorial task force, all participants who
were members of the habeas group felt that attending the trial, execution or both were
important steps in being "involved" in the process or "made a difference." This is not
surprising; the habeas group, which was much smaller than the memorial group with an
approximate maximum membership of 30 people, was explicitly formed to be an
advocacy group and chose advocacy as a very different form of memorialization than
building a national memorial. While the memorial goals of the memorial task force did
not overlap with legal proceedings against McVeigh and Nichols themselves but only
dealt with them in order to represent their significance to the Oklahoma City community
and to thc nation and the world, members ofthe habeas group explicitly sought to change
legal proceedings in several different ways, drastically shortening the habeas appeals
available to defendants sentenced to death through the Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, and fighting to have the federal trials of McVeigh and Nichols broadcast back to
Oklahoma City, to allow victim impact witnesses to attend the presentation of evidence in
the case in

chief~

and to allow the execution to be broadcast back to Oklahoma City as

well. Thus, the focus ofthe habeas group was largely on legal proceedings from the
group's inception.
Participant 1, a survivor, stated that be retired to attend the trial in Oklahoma
City at the FAA Center and only missed one or two days of the trial proceedings. 1
attended out of "a desire to see that, that justice was served and witness it so that if it
didn't come out the way 1 knew it should've I could understand why, it didn't." Though
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knowing that the execution would be caJTied out was very important to Me Veigh,
Participant I did not want to see him die: "] don't wanna see anybody die no more]
wanna see people die the day of the bombing."
PaJ1icipant 22, a family member, attended the closed circuit broadcast of the
execution because she had a need to actually see what it would be like. Seeing the
execution was especially important to her because a member of her immediate family had
committed suicide prior to the bombing, and she had chosen not to view the body and
then always regretted that decision and wondered what it would have been like. 22
stated, "] had watched that man and] needed to complete the process. ] needed to see it
through. And, urn, that's why] did it." 22 also attended the execution because she had
fought for it to be broadcast via closed circuit, and recalled explaining to Attorney
General John Ashcroft that the impact of not seeing her immediate family member:
We had to fight for close circuit. We had to meet with General
Ashcroft and talk him into doing close circuit for execution and one of
the arguments] gave him then was, ] gave him the example of my
[immediate family member who committed suicide]. And the torment
] went through as a result of not having seen her and I did not want to
have nightmares for years to come after the execution about what]
thought it must have been like. Again,] wanted to deal with reality.
22 described witnessing the execution as a fonn of "self-preservation" and didn't want to
"guess" what the execution would be like:
It's, it's the same type of need, urn, to me it was selfpreservation.
Because I already knew from that one expelience how honible it was
to guess. ] didn't want to guess about what my [murdered spouse]
looked like and] didn't want to guess about what Mc-, what the
execution was like. I wanted to deal with reality.
Participant 28 also witnessed the execution to "see things through" and because
she had also fought to have the execution broadcast via closed-circuit: "You know, I had
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talked the talk. Did I. .. was I big enough to walk the walk? And I was ... " On the
moming of the execution, 28's son-in-law told her that he was not going to go, and she
told him that she was going to follow it through: "I have to do this. That's the least I can
do is follow it through. 1 fought a long, long battle to not face, to not see it to the end."
Finally, Participant 29 also reported a need to "see things through" and to finish
what for her had "started" the moming of April 19, 1995: "And I have this real
complacent hang up about anything that 1 start. You know it could take me four years to
read a book but damn it I'm going to finish it. You know, I was downtown, I saw it
happen." 29 felt very lucky to have been able to attend the trials and the execution, and
get a profound sense of completion as a result:
You know so like being able to attend those trials, being able to testify
at both trials, being able to you know physically witness the execution,
.... I'm telling you this was luck. I just lucked into the right place at
the right time. 1 was able to do so much .... But again this was this
whole cyclical thing, 1 mean everything that went around. I just
happened to fall into. Trials, testifying, attending all three trials. You
know being able to get a seat because some people especially the first
trial didn't even get a lottery seat so and again the timing, you know I
didn't go on some dry boring testimony week. I went when like
closing statements. The big time. So I mean I just- that was just all so
important for me and ifI had missed any piece of it, I would have felt
incomplete for this whole thing that we've been through.
Participant 29 stated that witnessing the execution in person "the most important thing,"
and her profound gratitude at being able to attend the execution was evident:
That was- I think that was the most important thing to me. I could
have- I mean I could have viewed it as the FAA center if I had to and I
mean, what are you going to do ifthat's what happened, that's what
happened. But it was just ... just complete relief when I found out I
was one of the 10 selected. Because I mean I can'!. . .! cannot even ...
there aren't enough words to describe how important it was for me to
do that. Oh wow. It's just- I still can't believe it. ... "Oh God, I don't
even know if I can put that into words [what it meant to be present at
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the execution]. ... Physically being there. Yeah. Yeah. I mean and I
can't- I can't put it into words ... .l don't know how to say it. But yeah,
physically being there was so ... for me, I don't know why but yeah,
yeah.
These statements made by habeas group members attesting to the importance of attending
McVeigh's trial and execution directly contrast with the statements of memorial task
force members who elected not to attend the trial and/or the execution, choosing instead
to prioritize of other concerns such as work and family. The responses of Participants 22
and 28 also suggested that advocacy work played an important role in attendance, in that
participants were more likely to attend or become involved proceedings that they had
endeavored to bring about, again confilming that goal selection played a significant role

in memory construction.
Summary

This chapter has explored the proccsses by which groups contributed to the
collective memory of the Oklahoma City bombing. It did so by reconstructing the
members' emotional states and detailing how post-bombing groups ameliorated their
emotional vulnerability by providing companionship, providing sites for narrative and
normative reconstruction and organizing members toward chosen reconstructive goals. It
has also detailed the ways in which membership in one of these two groups-one focused
on memorialization, the other on the criminal justice process-channeled members away
from or further into pmiicipation in legal proceedings, including witnessing McVeigh's
execution. The progressively healing and constructive relationships formed between
group members, created and strengthened by group social frameworks of memory, helped
members to make sense ofthe bombing and to ascertain their own relationships to it. Not
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all relationships helped to stimulate intrapersonal and social exploration and
reconstruction, however; as they became familiar with Timothy McVeigh as a
perpetrator, victims' family members and survivors also felt increasingly pulled into an
involuntary and destructive relationship with McVeigh that would end only after his
execution.
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CHAPTER THREE:
McVEIGH, FAMILY MEMBERS, & SURVIVORS:
RELATIONSHIPS, THE LAW, AND MEMORY

This chapter explores how family members and survivors negotiated their
relationships with McVeigh and the crimimll justice system. It analyzes these
relationships chronologically from McVeigh's arrest through his trial and ultimately
execution. It first outlines the victim-offender relationship that was perceived to exist
between family members/survivors and McVeigh, exploring its para-social origins. The
implications of this relationship, in which McVeigh was seen as a defiant offender, posed
a potential barrier to the construction of social mnemetic frameworks. This chapter then
links the para-social relationship to the behavior of family members and survivors
through the federal trials of McVeigh and Nichols, elucidating how family members and
survivors perceived the criminal justice system by analyzing their opinions on the death
penalty, the trial and execution. Though McVeigh was held accountable for the
bombing, the trial did not facilitate memory work for family members and survivors.
Finally, this chapter examines the state of family members' and survivors' impressions of
McVeigh immediately prior to his execution, including their ability to forgive, their
willingness to meet with him in person, and their expectations concerning his conduct at
the execution. Their impressions reflect the degree to which McVeigh's defiance
unsettled them, revealing how participants' attitudes towards the perpetrators and the
criminal justice system affected processes of mnemetic reconstruction.

The Victim-Offender Relationship
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Just as the relationships between group members were healing in terms of
collective memory, participants perceived that they shared an involuntary relationship
with Timothy McVeigh that cast a negative aura upon reconstructive social frameworks
of memory. This hindered the recovery process by "manipulating" the victims through
the media until his execution in June of2001. Participants could not help but incorporate
this involuntary relationship as part of their collective memory formation, and they did so
in ways that delayed or at the very least unsettled the healing process. But whereas the
formation of beneficial relationships between group members was unmediated and not
subject to constraints by outside institutions, the victim-offender relationship was entirely
mediated by institutions. It was first facilitated by the news media, and then boundaried
by the criminal justice system which controlled "exposure" to McVeigh and created
forums such as the trial and execution where family members and survivors could assess
McVeigh's behaviors. Interestingly enough, the criminal justice system even placed
limitations on the media coverage of McVeigh while he was imprisoned; Ed Bradley's
"60 Minutes" interview with McVeigh was filmed in his cell on death row.
These constraints were in tension with the historical treatment of victims in
criminal prosecutions, with key tenets of the victims' rights movement, and with recent
state reforms designed to expand victim participation in criminal trials and executions.
Victim participation in death penalty jurisprudence and practice has grown increasingly
complicated from medieval times to the present day. Before the criminal justice system
evolved as a state institution, victims were at the heart responsible for initiating criminal
charges and even prosecuting offenders. The

stat~,

however, gradually took over the

tasks of criminal prosecution and sentencing, minimizing victim participation until they
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were altogether excluded from the process, and only granted the participatory rights
enjoyed by other citizens. Execution itself was also radically different; mid-nineteenth
century executions in America were typically public hangings in the courthouse square
by the local sheriff, and executions in eighteenth and seventeenth century London were
very dramatic public spectacles where prisoners were paraded before mobs eager for
entertainment.

In contrast, contemporary capital cases involve extended pretrial periods and
trials, result frequently in life sentences rather than death sentences, occasion reversals
and retrials, see a decade or more transpire between sentence and execution, and as a
result of numerous initiatives focusing on victims' rights and interests. Significantly,
capital trials now commonly involve victims' families with much greater regularity and
centrality than in earlier eras due to the advent of victim impact testimony and very
recent accommodations made to assist victims' families in witnessing executions. The
Victims' Rights movement of the 1980's won an increased role for victims in securing the
defendants' punishment for most crimes, and victims' family members battled through a
succession of Supreme Court cases (Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South

Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)) before winning the right to present "victim
impact evidence" at the penalty stage of a capital trial in 1991 in Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991). Furthermore, states have increasingly accommodated victims' family
members throughout the capital trial and execution. By 1998,22 states had instituted a
position of Victim Advocate responsible for maintaining contact with victim family
members throughout condemned prisoners' successive appeals, preparingthem for the
execution, and actually attending the execution with victims' family members.
III

Additionally, in the 1990s two themes converged to make victim-related issues of
even more immediate importance: the suggestion that imposing and carrying out a death
sentence brought needed "closure" to victims' families, and the notion that justice
requires carrying out executions in the name of murder victims and their survivors.
CUlTently, advocates and opponents of capital punishment both claim that the death
penalty has a profound effect on the families of murder victims; the former assert that it
provides them with "closure," the latter assert that it further victimizes them. Criminal
justice officials themselves use "closure" as support for capital punishment.
These constraints placed around Timothy McVeigh's prosecution and execution
vastly limited opportunitics for even para-social forms of engagement; participants had to
tight to witness in three contexts. First, after the trial judge granted McVeigh's attorney's
request for a change of venue from Oklahoma to Colorado and refused to broadcast the
trial back to Oklahoma City by closed-circuit feed, family members/survivors petitioned
Congress to ensure that this broadcast occurred. Second, after the trial judge refused to
allow a slew of family members/survivors to attend the trial because they were slated to
give victim impact testimony during sentencing, these individuals again asked Congress
to pass legislation (known as the "Victims Rights Clarification Act of 1997") allowing
them to both attend the penalty phase of the trail and testify at sentencing. Third, angered
by the fact that only 10 victims (assigned by lottery) were permitted to witness
McVeigh's execution in Terre Haute, family members and survivors had to petition
Ashcroft to broadcast McVeigh's execution back to Oklahoma City via closed-circuit
feed so that additional witnesses could be accommodated.
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It is not surprising that such institutional mediation would alter reconstructive

memory processes. Legal institutions, including the police, judiciary, and penal systems,
specialize in capturing, prosecuting, and punishing an offender impersonally,
concentrating on the offender and not on his victims. Institutional outrage at crime stems
not from the human loss crime engenders but from the legal violation itself. Victims, in
contrast, cannot remain impersonal but are submerged in an emotive role; their
orientation to the crime is relational, their outrage stemming from an intimacy lost
through criminal behavior. Victims cannot relate to institutional technology. Thus, while
institutions are indirectly affected by a violation of a disembodied law, victims are
directly affected by an embodied crime made manifest through a lost beloved body.
The lynchpin in the relationship between victims' families/survivors and
McVeigh was that he be held accountable for his role in the bombing, whether or not
forcing accountability upon him later led him to accept responsibility for his heinous
deed. The successful formation of new individual and social mnemetic frameworks
demanded that McVeigh be tried and sentenced for his crimes-tasks that in a nationstate are solely within the province of the state or federal criminal justice systems. Thus,
the criminal justice system also was at the helm of the accountability process that was
key to the reconstruction of collective memory. Its institutional routines left indelible
fingerprints upon the accountability inquiry, defining the scope of inquiry into the
bombing and investigating McVeigh's criminal intent. The result was that the
accountability inquiry was narrowed to a question of guilt and innocence, which of
necessity excluded queries that were not legally relevant though still meaningful to
victims' families and survivors. In addition, victims' families and survivors were
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bystanders to adjudication of guilt or innocence, aside from the handful who testifIed in
the guilt phase of the trail; the primary actors in this drama were the trial judge, and
members of the prosecution and defense teams. Allowing victim impact testimony
during the penalty phase of the trial, sentencing proceedings, did somewhat mitigate the
silencing of victims' families and survivors, but the statements of such witnesses were
very closely circumscribed. As discussed in the literature review, criminal tJials are key
to the production of collective memory but are problematic vehicles of collective memory
by themselves; their specialized inquiries break down under the weight of memory's
demands if asked to bear that full weight alone, and so must be supplemented by other
endeavors. Nonetheless, the criminal justice system not only controlled visual access to
McVeigh through the media and legal proceedings, but also affected the formation of
collective memory through manners as diverse as how expeditiously the trial was held,
how it was held (e.g., whether it was broadcast to other venues), whether family members
and survivors were allowed to attend, what verdict was handed down, and whether
sentence was carried out.
Existing methods of researching the psychological and emotional states of
homicide survivors are incomplete in and of themselves to address the experiences of
victims' families and survivors. Neither going through the grieving ,"stages," nor
attending or testifying in legal proceedings or even witnessing the reading ofthe guilty
verdict or the execution, nor media representations of victims can account for the
phenomenon of how victims process the afielmath of murder, attend legal proceedings, or
witness and interpret an execution. Significantly, each of these approaches positions the
victim as a passive self, a body that travels through grief stages, a body that attends the
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trial and perhaps witnesses the execution, a body that can be represented by others. This
creates the impression that victims are both defIned by and confined by these models and
their codes of behavior. An altemate approach is to examine the phenomenon of
homicide survivorship as an involuntary relationship between the victims' family and the
offender, that exists even when neither party knew the other prior to the murderous act,
and that is like any other in communicative dimensions, structured through speech and
silence.
This relationship is rarely tacitly acknowledged (but never explicitly defined) in
criminological scholarship. It is a concept whose logic is the combined logic of several
facts-publicity about the offender and the murder, the victims' families' need to know
"why" and "how" the crime occurred and the necessity of understanding the offender to
answer those questions at least in part. How could victims' families help but feel they
know an offender through the plethora of intimate details that emerges through
contemporary media coverage? Sharp notes that coverage of Jeffrey Dahmer's murders
extended to thorough details of his personallifc: "the type of beer he drank, his cigarette
preference, the types of potato chips he ate, and the brand of baking soda he used in his
refrigerator.,,160 This relationship may also extend to offenders' families; offenders and
their families (and even offenders' communities) may be roped together into a category
of othemess, set apart by disgust and hatred, with offenders' family members
experiencing intensely negative publicity. 161
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What is the communicative nature of this relationship? In the context ofthe
Oklahoma City bombing, it was a relationship in which victims' impressions of McVeigh
as a man and, in some cases, as a monster contextualized his mannerisms and his
statements. It was a relationship characterized by perceptions of communicative iniquity,
inequity and inequality, in which victims/survivors perceived they had little
communicative control over McVeigh. McVeigh was seen to have great communicative
agency and an ability to communicate with victims/survivors despite their antipathy
towards such efforts, while victims had to settle for channeling their own
communications through media or through victim impact testimony. It was a relationship
pregnant with communicative necessity and perceived obligation, in which victims very
much wanted to hear "why" and how McVeigh carried out the bombing and yearned in
many cases to speak with him in person. It was a relationship whose only possibility of
termination lay in the death of McVeigh or of victims themselves.
In addition, this involuntary relationship between McVeigh and family members
and survivors profoundly influenced the formation of collective memory and the
resolution of cultural trauma because it was perceived as a challenge to the reconstruction
of identity through the group and individual processes discussed earlier. As will be
discussed shortly, because of the understandings of McVeigh that participants evolved,
. many described McVeigh's continucd existence as a barrier on the road to "recovery"
and resolution. In occupying one camp in the involuntary relationship between victim's
family/survivor and offender, and therefore bound to victims' family members and
survivors, McVeigh became a part orthe collective, instead of being cast outside it. The
inclusion of McVeigh in the collective was traumatizing to family members and survivors
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because it directly affected the narrative resolution ofthe trauma and delayed family
members' and survivors' control over the resolution process; at any time a message could
issue from McVeigh that could potentially aggravate wounds just starting to heal. Thus,
the collective memory ofhomicide~including the collective memory of the Oklahoma
City bombing~was shaped not only by the events of the murder but also for the duration
of the involuntary relationship between the offender and family members/survivors.
Significantly, refocusing research on the victim-offender relationship also
recognizes that victims and survivors define as well as become defined by the
experiences of survivorship. It implies an exchange, a give and take of activity and
passivity, and recognizes that processes of sensemaking are mutually constructive and
cyclical, and not self-constructive and linear. Victims change and alter conceptions of
grieving in the course of healing; they are active participants in the trial with the potential
to change its practices and potentials; arid they challenge representations of victims in
addition to conforming to existing representations.
Finally, refocusing research on the victim-offender relationship also effectively
organizes how participants made sense ofthe chaos of post-bombing social relations. It
explains why the vast majority of participants regardless of political views on the death
penalty felt relief in tbe wake of the execution which terminated the involuntary
relationship that had begun six years before.
In the wake of homicide, family members and survivors become involuntarily and
intimately linked to the offender through the offense, so that they must "live with" the
offender to a greater or lesser extent until

death~either

the offender's or their own. As

Janice Smith, a nonwitness family member whose brother was murdered in the bombing,
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stated in a media interview after McVeigh's execution on June 11, 2001, "It's over. We
don't have to continue with him any more.,,162 The obligations ofthis linkage are
contradictory; on the one hand, the offender has murdered at least one family member,
yet on the other the offender is often the only possible source of information about the
offense and the victim's last moments. This linkage is also most often mediated; through
news coverage, other forms of media, and trial proceedings, victims become very familiar
with the offender's personal history, including his family. Victims and offenders may
hear each others' statements through press conferences, media interviews, trial testimony,
books or websites, or other forms of public communication. Less often, victims and
offenders may communicate more directly, through letters or by meeting face to face
through mediation programs. Such communicative interchanges deepen and
contextualize the victim-offender relationship. There may even be a sense that family
members and survivors are an offender's "audience" and an interactive positioning based
on this perception. Constance Richardson, a nonparticipant family member whose 20year old daughter was murdered in the bombing, chose to visit the memorial on the
morning of June 11,2001 instead of witnessing the execution by closed-circuit, stating "[
didn't want to be part of his audience." I 63
Intensive interviews with family members and survivors revealed a perceived
intentionality, a conviction that statements made by Mc Veigh were targeted to these
individuals to further wound them. As Participant 21 stated, "it [seemed] like every time
he turned around, he was doing something to jab at us and it was just very painful

162 Nick Bryant, Pain Remains For McVeigh Victims, BBC (June 11,2001) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/world/americasil383171.stm.

1631d.
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because he could sit there behind those bars and get us three squares a day and everything
and not have all these worries ... "
Many participants attributed malicious intent to McVeigh's communications; for
instance, Participant 24 stated, "I have always felt like that if, if McVeigh and Nichols for
example had access to the family members, survivors, through the media, through books,
through whatever purposes they had that it would always just be keep digging at us,
sticking that knife and twisting." Participant 25, however, contrasted McVeigh's intent
with that of Nichols:
McVeigh, even though he knew that he was getting the death sentence,
he was defiant all the way up to the point where it actually happened,
okay? He would speak out to the media .... And everything that he
did was doing nothing but hurting the family members here in
Oklahoma ..... Nichols, Nichols is a little different because since he's
been tried and convicted, you don't hear about him .... 1 can live with
him being in prison for the rest of his life, for the simple reason that he
is not defiant and he's not going out and getting on the news and so
forth and trying to hurt the family members.
Tennination of media coverage allowed Participant 15 to cease to think of McVeigh:
"I've quit completely, stopped thinking about him the day they executed him." This
intimation of malicious intent through media contact was especially strong when
McVeigh made a statement that tinnily members fonnd especially painful. One of the
most wounding messages that family mcmbers and survivors recalled hearing from
McVeigh was his tenning the murders of the children in the America's Kids daycare
center in the Murrah Building "collateral damage."
Significantly, family members and survivors embodied their relationship to
McVeigh in how they worded their responses to interview questions, creating the
impression of a dialogue between themselves and McVeigh. Participant 21 refelTed to
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McVeigh jabbing "at us," while 5 stated that McVeigh has hurt "me," 25 noted that
McVeigh "would tell the families" and 24 spoke in terms of McVeigh and Nichols
having "access to the family members, survivors through the media, through books," In
addition, participants seemed at times to assert that they "knew" McVeigh; several
pat1icipants, for instance, claimed to "know" that McVeigh would not have sincerely
meant any apology that he may have given at his execution,
Though family members and survivors perceived themselves to be the targets of
McVeigh's statements, such communication did not fit within the most narrow
fonnulation ofthe interpersonal communication interaction, which involves face to face
meetings between two participants consisting of a simultaneous "two way" exchange of
meaning. 164 All message exchanges outside of the trial context were mediated. Within
the trial context, those witnesses who testified in McVeigh's trial were involved in
interpersonal exchanges with the attorneys who were eliciting direct testimony from or
cross examining them, and not with McVeigh himself. It is entirely possible that there
was an actual interpersonal interchange between McVeigh and trial witnesses, for
pat1icipants recalled looking at McVeigh during their testimonyand recollected their
impressions of his reactions. However, even this interaction was not what is meant by a
purist definition of interpersonal c0l11l11unication. 165 So how best to explain the intimacy

PETER HARTLEY, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 20,24 (2d ed., 1999).
Attempts to define exactly what interactions constitute interpersonal communication are fraught with
peril. Mark Knapp, John Daly, Kelly Fudge Albada, & Gerald R. Miller, Background and Current Trends
in the Stud}.;' of Interpersonal Communication, in HANDBOOK OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 9 (,3 rd
Edition, Ed. Mark L. Knapp & John A. Daly eds., 3d ed., 2002). Communication scholars disagree on the
"number of communicators involved, the physical proximity of the communicators, the nature of the
interaction units used t6 explain an encounter, and the degree of formality and structure attending the
interactants'relationship." ld. Perhaps all it is possible to agree on is that interpersonal communication
involves "at least two communicators; intentionally orienting toward each other; as both subject and object;
whose actions embody each other's perspectives both toward self and toward other." A. P. Bochner,
1M
165
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of the communicative relationship between McVeigh and his victims, to account for
participants' perceptions that McVeigh was speaking to them?
In 1956, Horton and Wohl published an article in Psychiatry seeking to explain
television viewers' perceived relationship to television personalities. 166 Terming this
illusory relation a "para-social interaction," Horton and Wohl defined it as "the illusion of
face-to-face relationship with the performer" in which "the conditions of response to the
performer are analogous to those in a primary group." This relationship is built upon a
cumulative "exchange" of affective messages between the personality, termed the
"persona," and the audience, whereby the audience is "subtly insinuated into the
program's action and internal social relationships and, by dint of this kind of staging, is
ambiguously transformed into a group which observes and participates in the show by
turns." Para-social relationships are characterized by a "lack of effective reciprocity"
since "the interaction, characteristically, is one-sided, nondialectical, controlled by the
performer, and not susceptible of mutual development"; thus, "the audience is free to
choose among the relationships offered, but it cannot create new ones." Despite the lack
of communicative give and take, the persona who is the focus of the para-social
relationship becomes integrated into the audience member's social circle as a familiar
presence." Significantly, this presence is above all a reliable presence. Nonetheless,
Interpersonal Communication, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMUNICATIONS 336 (E. Barnouw,
G. Gerbner, W. Schramm, T. L. Worth & L. Gross eds., 1989). Cappella emphasizes the ability to
influence another as the focus of interpersonal communication analysis. IN. Cappella, lnlclpersonal
Communication: Definition.", and Fundamental Questions, in HANDBOOK Of COMMUNICA nON SCIENCE
228 (C.R. Berger & S.H. Chaffee eds., 1987). Despite this lack of consensus, however, certain definitional
practices are morc common than others. For instance, it is most common to limit the number of
participants in an interpersonal encounter to two, and another assumption involves limiting such
interactions to face to face exchanges involving close physical proximity. Knapp et aI., supra, at 9.
!66 Donald Horton & R. Richard Wohl, luass Communication and Para-Socia/Interaction: Observation all
Intimacy at a Distance, P.lychiatlY 19(3) (August 1956) (republished in INTER/MEDIA: INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION IN AMEDIA WORLD (Gary Gumpert & Robert Cathcart eds., 2d ed., 1979) (188-211).
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however artless this relationship may appear, it is also a strategic and constant one.
Producers formulate the persona's character specifically to enhance audience members'
loyalty to the persona. 167 Subsequent research into para-social relationships further
suggests that this illusory intimacy, the subjective creation of audience members, is
actually taken as "real."168 Para-social relationships continue to pervade media usage
today.169
Researchers have always construed the persona that is the target of the para-social
relation as being in the position of a para-social "fnend," someone who is likeable and
trustworthy. Thus, this type of investiture can be termed a "positive" para-social
relationship, or a investiture of positive affect in a persona. But logically, if one can have
relationships with para-social "friends," then one may also have relationships with parasocial "enemies," opening the door to the formation of "negative" para-social
relationships. Negative para-social relations have the same characteristics as their
positive counterparts, thongh these characteristics fonn an identification that is the
inverse of that encouraged by the positive relation. A para-social relation with an
"enemy" also frames spectators' perceptions of the performer, enabling persistent dislike
167
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Analyzing the para-social relationships that viewers of television news form with new:,castcrs, Levy
notes, "[e]ven though this affective tie is completely the subjective invention of the audience, para-socially
interactive viewers believe it is genuine and they interpret the behavior of the news personae as
reciprocating this 'real' bond." Mark Levy, Watching TV News as Para-Socia/Interaction. in
INTER/MEDIA: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN A MEDIA WORLD 185 (Gary Gumperl & Robert
Cathcarl eds., 2d ed., 1979)
169 In the wake of "Crocodile Hunter" Steve Irwin's death on August 31, 2006 from a stingray barb
embedded in his chest, this popular figure was publicly mourned, becoming the leading celebrity story
despite others such as the debut of Katie Couric on the "CBS Evening News," Rosie O'Donnell's aITival on
"The View," and the release of the first photographs ofSuri Cruise. One CNN story on the intense
coverage of Irwin's death and public mourning featured a media expert who directly attributed the
phenomenon to the strong para-social relationships Irwin fostered in audiences: "Every no\\' and then a TV
star has the ability to transcend the electronic barrier of what a television is and really feel like they're one
of the family ... " David Williams, Irwin's Death Strikes {f Chord, available at
http://www.cnn.coml2006/SHOWBIZITV/09106/irwin.outpouring/index.html.
168
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and animosity. Whereas the positive para-social persona is an "ingroup" member, a
desirable associate, the para-social enemy is an outsider, a deviant Other. Victims are as
encouraged to be loyal to their hatred of criminal personas as audience members are
encouraged to admire their media personas. Realizing how negative para-social relations
are cultivated also necessitates broadening the concepts of "media" and "media
producer," extending them from application in the narrower context of mass media to
application in the broader context of social institutions who may take on strategic
mediating roles-including criminal justice ot1lcials who orchestrate the arrest and trial
of criminal offenders from the "perp walk" to incarceration or execution.
From participants' attributions of malicious communicative intent to McVeigh
and the degree to which their responses attributed a dialogic character to their interactions
with McVeigh, it is clear that there was ample evidence of a negative para-social relation
between family members and survivors and McVeigh. McVeigh was their para-social
enemy, the one who, however mediated his communications may be, both had the
potential to communicate and actually communicated with the intent of inflicting further
harm on an especially vulnerable and wounded population. However, while the parasocial relationship as a concept implies that the victim-offender relationship was illusory,
it truly was so only in the sense that participants spoke in terms of an unfortunate
intimacy with McVeigh. McVeigh actually initiated the relationship, after all, by
traumatizing them, injuring them, and murdering their loved ones.
The intimacy of this negative para-social relation was particularly ironic in light
of the impersonal nature of the Oklahoma City bombing itself. According to numerous
media interviews and statements made to the authors of his biography An American
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Terrorist, McVeigh saw himself as standing in opposition to the United States

government, at the natTOwest opposing the government agencies involved in Waco and
Ruby Ridge, and explained that he chose to bomb the Murrah Federal Building because
he thought that it would make a spectacular media target, not out of personal animosity
toward anyone who worked in the building or anything housed in the building. Yet, the
bombing immediately became intensely personal, as images brought to life stories such
as the iconic image of the dead Baylee Almon, the one-year-old baby girl cradled in the
arms of Oklahoma City firefighter Chris Fields. The impersonality of the bombing was
an incomprehensible affront to family members and survivors, who could not see it as
such.
How did the para-social relationship between Me Veigh and victims' families and
survivors come about? Because para-social identification is enhanced or discouraged by
the construction of mediated images of a persona, the visual technology of mediated
images plays a key role in the fonnation of such relationships. Meyrowitz contends that
an affective relationship can be encouraged by the composition of a television shot, such
that "the way in which a person is framed may suggest an interpersonal distance between
that person and the viewer.,,170 Thus the interpersonal distance between the audience and
the actor's image can bolster the sense that an interpersonal relationship exists. The parasocial identification of viewers with viewed personae is enhanced by technological
reproduction of key interpersonal proxemic distances. The visual relationship alters with
a "framing variable" that mediates the distance between the viewer and the center of that

170 Joshua Meyrowitz, Television and Interpersonal Behavior: Codes of Perception and Response, in
INTER/MEDIA: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN A MEDIA WORLD 225 (Gary Gumpert & Roberl
Cathcart eds., 2d ed., I979).
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image through use of a close-up, medium shot, or long shot. Actions in long shots "tend
to be viewed in tenns of abstract' events '" and "close-ups focus attention on personal
characteristics and response," with intensity ofresponse being related to shot distance. In
addition, some shots portray an "objective distance" of a detached observer, while others
utilize a "subjective distance" that allows audience viewers to assume the perspective of a
character. Also relevant is Goffinan's concept of "front," "that part of the individual's
perfonnance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the
situation for those who observe the perfonnahce.,,171 "Personal front" includes manner
and appearance, and "front region roles" are roles that reflect onstage behavior in which
someone plays out an idealized conception of a social role.,,172 Significantly, "the enemy
.
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. fr
. ro Ies on Iy. ,,17]
generaII y seen mont
regIOn
Media coverage of McVeigh was be limited to two "moments": shots of

McVeigh being escorted to and from the courthouse in Oklahoma City by law
enforcement, and an Emmy-award winning "Sixty Minutes" interview that aired March
13,2000 which Ed Bradley conducted with McVeigh while he was on federal death row.
The "perp walk" shots most certainly portrayed McVeigh in the "front region" role of
criminal and social enemy. Thus, it is not surprising that McVeigh's profile from these
"perp walk" shots later became the centerpiece of news graphics headlining execution
stories. Ed Bradley's "60 Minutes" interview, on the other hand, allowed McVeigh to
explain himself in his own words, yet the interview alternated between camera shots of
McVeigh captured over Bradley's shoulder, positioning the viewer in the interrogator's

171

ld. at 221-27, 229-30, 236.

m ERVING GOHMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 22 (1959).
173

Meyrowitz, supra note 170, at 236.
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chair, and close-ups of McVeigh's facial expression. The following pictures illustrate
these orientations:

Figure 1: Photos from McVeigh's '''perp walk" in Oklahoma, in which McVeigh is walking in public
for the first time after being identified as the bombing suspect.

Figure 2: Still shot from Ed Bradley's "60 Minutes" interview with McVeigh, aired March 13,2000

In addition, the image from McVeigh's Oklahoma "perp walk" was the dominant
photoh'Taph of him used in media coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing, and was often
incorporated into news graphics, as in the following examples of online news graphics
and images from execution coverage and images from print media.

BBC
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USA TODAY

COURT TV

NEWSHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER

Figure 3: News graphics for the l\lcVeigh execution from BBC, USA Today, Court TV, and the
N ewsHour with Jim Lehrer
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Ti m othy

Figure 4: Images of McVeigh in print Media, from left to right: the cover of American Terrorist
written by Michel and Herbeck with McVeigh's cooperation, the graphic used by the Terra Haute
Tribuue-Star, and the May 1, 1995 cover of Time

Further attention was drawn to McVeigh's gaze by textual descriptions of these
very same images. Early media stories described McVeigh's expression as that of "hard
eyes unlit by the faintest flicker of emotion," the look of a man whosc "name didn't mean
much then but the image did," the stare of "a poker-faced killer in a crewcut."I74 This
tirst impression resurfaced continually, including on the morning of his execution: "[i]n
his last moments, his face was as blank as it was that April day six years ago when
America tirst saw him escorted out of an Oklahoma jail."l75 Interestingly, early media
constructions of McVeigh were cyclically incorporated into subsequent constructions,
snowballing upon one another to produce a coherent image of McVeigh as para-social
174 S~m I-Iandlin, Profile afa A1ass j\1urderer: Who is Timothy Me Veigh?, available at
http://w\Vvl.courttv.com/news/mcveigh_special/profile_ ctv.html
175 Me Veigh Shows No Remorse at Execution, available at
http://www.courttv.com/news/mcveigh_special10612 _ noremorse _ ap.htmL
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enemy. Thus, McVeigh's gaze became crucial in the construction of McVeigh as a parasocial enemy.
The heavy media focus on the "perp walk" images could easily have influenced
the early impression formation of family members and survivors, constructing
expectancies regarding the import ofhis communicative behaviors. Impression
formation upon initial acquaintance is rapid, or even instant, as the subconscious makes
its "highly stereotypic" impressions. 176 Because what can be gleaned from introductory
verbal exchanges is restricted by convention, nonverbal cues such as "stable physical
appearance and kinesic and vocalic cues" are especially significant in "shaping
interpersonal expectations and in generating a frame for the parties' interpretation of
subsequent behavior. Moreover, interactants require only very brief glimpses of behavior
to fonn "fairly accurate and strong" judgments of actors. The rapidity of impression
formation is necessary because humans are "driven by an underlying need for uncertainty
reduction" and by a need for sensemaking. Significantly, humans' initial impressions of
unfamiliar individuals are highly consistent, but is more accurate as to jndgments of sex,
age, occupation, and social status than as to attitudes, values and personality traits. Initial
impressions are "highly persistent, even in the face of subsequent contradictory cues,"
and humans seem to seek out communicative information that confinns first
.

.

ImpreSSIOns.

177

Thus, the moment when family members and survivors were "introduced" to
McVeigh via media broadcast ofthe "perp walk" was very likely when they formed

176 Judee K. Burgoon & Gregory D. Hoobler, Nonverbal Signals, in HANDBOOK OF INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICA TlON 262 (Mark L. Knapp & John A. Daly eds., 3d ed., 2002).
177 [d. at 262-64.
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initial impressions of McVeigh as a person and as a perpetrator. Significantly, this
footage or still shots from it were rebroadcast freqnently and repeatedly in ensuing years
on local and national news, thus reinforcing the visual cues from which the initial
impression was formed. Several execution witnesses, unprompted by the interviewer,
remarked on the similarities between McVeigh's gaze during the execution and his gaze
on previous occasions captured and aired on television. For instance, Participant 22, a
closed-circuit witness, stated, "[h)e didn't just look. He had that same look in his eyes
when they arrested him. Do you remember him coming out of the court house and that
stem look on his face? That's the look he had ..... Like defiant." Participant 15,
another remote witness, stated in response to the inquiry of whether McVeigh' s gaze
during the execution seemed cold, "Yes, very cold. He was the whole time. Any time you
ever saw him on TV." These comments revealed not only that witnesses were aware of
how McVeigh was constructed in and by the news media as a person and an offender, but
that they found these constructions meaningful.

Pursuing Accountability Through the Criminal Justice System
Significantly, participants' remarks provide evidence of the strong belief of the
Oklahoma City victims and survivors community (especially habeas group members) that
institutions such as the criminal justice system must privilege their needs, most obviously
by allowing attendance and participation in criminal trials. This belief pervades victims'
and survivors' views on trial attendance and participation, and thus is a crucial pmi of
understanding how participants came to draw a link between attendance/participation and
recovery. Participants believed that they had rights to these roles; Participant 22 referred
to both "our right to testify" and "our right to attend." Similarly, Paliicipant 28 recalled
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that victims and snrvivors gathered to persuade Ashcroft to arrange a closed circuit
broadcast of McVeigh's execution asserted that "we had the right to attend ... "
McVeigh's execution: "if we want to witness then we should have been able to ... we
should be able to witness it. That's our right." These nncompromising claims caused
quite a bit of tnction between victims/survivors and the criminal justice institution,
embodied in U.S. District Judge Matsch who presided over McVeigh's federal trial.
Such claims are also solid tenets ofthe victims' rights movement, in which victims claim
the right to be kept informed of each development and the right to participate in criminal
proceedings. Unfortunately, these demands have the effect of channeling victims' and
survivors' expectations and hopes into the criminal trial, an institutional product that is
not victim-centered in either its focus (which is upon the defendant's actions) or in its
inquiry (which centers upon guilt or innocence).
In the Oklahoma City context, these claims became most concrete in two separate
incidents when victims and survivors went to Congress to override a decision by U.S.
District Judge Matsch which would limit or prohibit attendance at McVeigh's trial. In
1996, after McVeigh applied for and received a change oftrial venue from Oklahoma
City to Denver, Colorado, victims and survivors hired Oklahoma City attorney Karen
Howick to fight forMcVcigh's trial to be broadcast back to Oklahoma City via closed
circuit. In Aplil 24, 1996, after an intense lobbying effort by victims, Congress passed
legislation allowing for closed-circuit broadcasts of trials that are moved out of state or
relocated 350 miles from the original trial location.
Moreover, in March of 1997, when U.S. District Judge Matsch initially batTed
victims and survivors slated to give victim impact testimony at sentencing from attending
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the guilt phase of McVeigh's trial, just weeks before the scheduled trial start date. A
group of victims and survivors, many of whom were members of the habeas group,
initially appealed Judge Matsch's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, which upheld the ruling. Another appeal was institutied; however, Participant
22, who was heavily involved in efforts to change Judge Matsch' s ruling, recalled that
there was a sense that that route was going to be unsuccessful, and since 22 was working
in the Oklahoma City Attorney General's office at that time she asked for proposed
legislation to be written. After an intensive lobbying effort, legislation allowing victims
to be present at trials was brought before Congress and passed with historic speed. As
Participant 22 recalls:
as it turned out the AG [Attorney General] and I went back [to
Washington] and uh watched it pass the floor or the I think it was the
House was first one day and the floor ofthe Senate the next day. And
then it was signed into law that evening by Clinton. So it was in two
days time it passed both Houses and signed into law.
This legislation, known as the Victims' Rights Clarification Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C. §
3510, states amongst other provisions that "a United States district court shaH not order
any victim of any offense excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of that offense
because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the effect of the
offense on the victim and the victim's family ... "
Survivors and victims' families also believed that they were entitled to
accountability, achieved through the trials of thebombing suspects. As soon as Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols were identified as the perpetrators, victims' families and
survivors of all political persuasions looked forward to the day when they would be held
accountable. Even before trial, however, victims' families and survivors felt that
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McVeigh was defiant. Perhaps this para-social impression affected expectations of
McVeigh's behavior at trial; what is certain, however, is that victims' families and
survivors who attended the trial either by closed-circuit broadcast were truly positioned
opposite to McVeigh, their aggressor and antagonizer, in the forum of United States v.
Timothy McVeigh. It was in this forum that victims' families and survivors sought

accountability-not only in holding McVeigh responsible, but also in identifying his
motivations and the origins of his criminal intent so as to answer the (potentially
unanswerable) queries of "why" and "why us."
Thus, the accountability inquiry took on an interpersonal dimension that
penetrated beyond the question of guilt or innocence. It was profoundly important to
victims' families and survivors that they sought to wlderstand both McVeigh and Nichols
as persons and as offenders, to gauge the depths ofthese men who had wrought such
destruction. The offenders' bodies were literally bodies of evidence that family members
and survivors could scrutinize tor insights essential to their reconstructive processes. The
following diagram illustrates the mnemetic relationship between victims'
families/survivors, otfenders, and the bombing.
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Family
Members!Survivors
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McVeigh!
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Bombing
as Event

Figure 5: The mnemetic relationship between victims' families/survivors, offenders, & the bombing

Seeing the offenders' behavior provided insight not only into the mediated victimoffender relationship, solidifying family members' and survivors' perceptions of
McVeigh and Nichols, but also into the relationship between McVeigh and Nichols and
the bombing, which allowed trial attendees to speculate how the offenders felt about the
bombing-whether they regretted or took pride in it Family members and survivors had
to form such perceptions to negotiate the involuntary victim-offender relationship; for
example, it was necessary to apprehend how one felt towards McVeigh and how one
believed McVeigh felt about the bombing in order to integrate the offender into the
reconstructive process,
Family members and survivors who attended the trial in Denver constantly
scrutinized the defendants' behaviors; as Participant 25 noted, these behaviors "were
some of the things that we was [sic1trying to watch and see how both of them would
react under circumstances." This suggests that defendants' bodies were objects on which
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memory work can be perfonned. Participant 17 described the intensity of this behavioral
scrutiny:
during lunch breaks and all that they are talking that all of this angry
thing and how this person you know or what McVeigh did at the table,
where you're sitting there, you know some facial exp, that he had
expression of some kind or how he sat on the chair ..
The nature of the Denver courtroom as a public space seemed to enhance such
surveillance. Participant 19, a victim impact witness in McVeigh's trial, described the
Denver courtroom as a more "intimate" space; she enjoyed attending the trial in Denver
because of the increased opportunity to see "body language" and other communicative
cues: "you could see demeanor of the body language, you could hear the vocal quality
and the way that the witness was talking and so forth."
The heightened physical proximity between attendee family members and
survivors and McVeigh enabled a revelation for some. Participant 28 was struck by
McVeigh's humanity upon seeing him in person for the first time during the Oklahoma
City change of venue proceedings: ·'but it hit me too, he's just a man. He's a man. You
know, in my mind he was a monster. But he really was a man." But the continued
presence of McVeigh could also be unnerving; as Participant 28 stated of the FAA trial
broadcast, "the camera was set on Judge Matsch and we could see the attorneys and ....
Sometimes you could see him when he leaned back .... that was pretty unnerving, you
know, npsetting ... " Thus, McVeigh's body could serve as a mnemetic magnet, directly
immersed onlookers once more in the hon·or of the bombing.
Impressions of McVeigh's behavior at trial not only confitmed earlier
perceptions of his defiant demeanor fonned from media images of his perp walk, but also
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explicitly contrasted with impressions of Nichols' behavior as a solemn, remorseful
otIender. The beginning of McVeigh's trial meant that another institution besides the
news media now offered visual access to McVeigh as a defendant. Not surprisingly,
McVeigh's demeanor in the courtroom bolstered his behavior "as seen on TV."

The

most frequent characterizations of McVeigh at his trial reflected an "inappropriate"
emotion or reaction to the trial event; McVeigh was described variously as
inappropriately jocular, sarcastic, arrogant, unemotional and unremorseful. Presumably,
the ideal defendant should be solemn, respectful, remorseful, and intimidated by the
machinations of justice moving against him. These very same qualities appeared in the
most frequent characterizations of Nichols, wherein Nichols was emotional, shamed,
quiet, and nervous. The entire range of characterizations of the two defendants are
summarized in table form below.

Characterizations of McVeigh's
Behavior
Inappropriately happy/joking
Sneering/Sarcastic
Evil
Maliciously interested 111 the hurt he had
effected
Proud/arrogant
Aggressive
Unremorseful
Unemotional
Impassive/unreadable
Cold
Callous
Cowardly

Characterizations of Nichols' Behavior

More emotional
the opposite of McVeigh
ashamed
nervous
refined
quiet
afraid

Table 1; Participants' characterizations of McVeigh and Nichols at trial
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One of the most pervasive trial witness characterizations of McVeigh was as an
unemotional defendant whose reactions were nonexistent or impossible to interpret.
Participant 2, for instance, stated that McVeigh "was always just sitting there
expressionless, never showed any remorse. Never showed any emotion. He was just like
a statue there." For Participant 29, this impassivity was inhuman: "I mean McVeigh was
just automaton almost. Just so- didn't move. Nothing. Just stony. Like I said, no likewasn't even a human being." Often, this impassivity was connected to a coldness of
demeanor; Participant 10 remarked, "McVeigh was a raw hard person to understand and
to get any kind of vi be from; he was just cold and callous." Participant 28 associated this
passivity with callousness: "you know, hp never showed anything. Never. .. you know, it
was all like nothing, it was nothing. It was -- so what, people die." Participant 27 linked
this passivity with a capacity for deceit: " ... even ifhe'd said something whether you
could have trusted that what he was saying was honest or... I mean just because hc was
so stoic throughout the trial and he always had the same look on his face." Two
participants connected this coldness to "evil." Finally, Participant 22 felt that this cold
demeanor helped her recognize that McVeigh was a coward: "we locked eyes and that
was the most cold feeling I've ever had in my life and I remember thinking what a
coward."
Another onhe most pervasive charactelizations of McVeigh was asa proud or
arrogant perpetrator who enjoyed attending the trial; for instance, Participant 8 stated "He
is a cold son-of-a-bitch and he sat there arrogant and looking like he was enjoying the
show." Several other family members and survivors were angered by McVeigh's
apparently casual behavior that they perceived as relaxation or enjoyment of the
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proceedings. Participant 28 first perceived McVeigh as jocular at the Oklahoma City
change of venue proceeding: "when they drove in, ... he was just waving at people and
talking to them ..... I thought, he was really smiling." According to Participant 8,
McVeigh appeared to enjoyed himself during the trial because he "[p ]ropped his feet up
on the chair in front of him." Participant 16, a trial attendee in Denver, recalled that
"McVeigh would walk into the courtroom laughing, and joking, and sneering, and
looking at the victims ... like he was just having a good old time until the jury and the
judge would come in and then he would settle down and, you know, be more serene."
Participant 22 noted that McVeigh was relaxed and disengaged when he was uninterested
in the testimony: "the rest of the time he was, he didn't care. He was like leaning back in
his chair ... " Such behavioral displays greatly angered participants; Participant 28, for
instance, stated, " ... he just made me sick, because he would sit up there and talk to his
lawyers and smile at the media and you know, I just. .. it was just crazy."
The moments of inappropriate jocularity and informality contrasted with other
moments in which McVeigh was obviously paying a great deal of attention to the
proceedings. Participant 22 perceived that McVeigh was only interested in evidence of
the truck bomb and the harm it had caused:
The things he paid attention to were anyone who was testifying about
that had bomb knowledge, uh, how they're built and what works, what
doesn't work .... and any rescue workers ... because he wanted to
know the damage he'd done. And victims. He wanted to know how
much he had hurt everybody.
Participant 25 also described McVeigh as "very aggressive" and very involved at times:
"He watched a lot of the ... people testifying. He got involved in a lot of it. When they
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brought out parts and they was talking about the telephones and the chemicals, he looked
like he was really interested in it more than Nichols was."
Victim impact witnesses differed in the degree to which they looked over at
McVeigh during his testimony; several did not look or limited the times that they looked
for fear oflosing focus while on the witness stand. Participant 21, for instance, lost her
composure while testifying:
I couldn't, I, I looked at him, [mean I was so nervous and so scared
and I really don't understand why it was affecting, well it was
affecting me emotionally.... I just wanted to cry and when I looked
over him, it shook me out so bad that [ was like I can't look at him or I
can't stay focused on what I am here for. ... So I did not look back
over at him.
Participant 24, who testitled in the prosecution's case in chief, had been coached not to
look over at McVeigh by prosecutors and tried not to, but could not resist; he minimized
such glances to remain accurate and in control.
Trial witnesses characterized Nichols' conduct as the opposite of McVeigh's
behavior; for Pm1icipant 25, these differences individualized the defendants. Participants
reported that Nichols was more emotional than McVeigh; according to Pm·ticipant 24,
this emotion was elicited by the trial: "[ felt like things that were said or done not
necessarily by me during my testimony but by maybe others, victim impact, that kind of
thing, that there werc times when he was very emotional." Participants also credited
Nichols with displaying situationally appropriate emotions; for example, Participant 8
stated that Nichols appeared to be "uncomfortable, scared, guilty ... He looked very
frightened." Participant 28 described Nichols as "a little more nervous," and Participant
24 stated that Nichols may have felt shame: "I felt like that Nichols was maybe more
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ashamed of what he couldn't have stopped from doing." For Participant 29, these
displays of emotion were signs of humanity: "And I hate to give him credit for this but
you kind of see a person in Nichols." Nichols was also quieter, according to Pmiicipant
25, and Participant 28 stated that he was more somber: "he wasn't the jokester whatever.
... he did lean over and talk to his attorneys and but he didn't do the waving at people
and the laughing and you know, he did not do that. He was much more serious."
Participants' impressions of McVeigh as a defiant, remorseless defendant who
took pride in the sophistication of his crimes set the tone for the years between the
handing down of the guilty verdict and the final sentencing proceeding during which
McVeigh was sentenced to die by lethal injection and McVeigh's execution. It was this
period of time in which McVeigh was perceived to attempt to manipulate victims'
families through media contact, prompting Ashcroft to plead with journalists not to
interview McVeigh shortly before the execution, and sparking creative responses such as
the political cartoon below:

Figure 6: Political Cartoon Reflecting Ashcroft's Efforts to Muffle McVeigh Before Execution.
Source: Steve Sack, Minnesota, THE MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, available at
http://cagle.msnbc.com/news/mcveigh/ex7.asp
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McVeigh's behavior at trial was a nail in his coffin; it is what cemented family
members' and survivors' initial impressions of him as a defiant, remorseless, arrogant
offender; trial attendees now felt they "knew" what sort of men McVeigh and Nichols
were. Moreover, his behavior profoundly affected the reception of his later remarks to
the media, cultivating the widespread perceptions that such remarks were made to
manipulate and further wound families and survivors. This would ultimately produce a
sense that McVeigh had to be executed in order to silence him and thereby end the
victim-offender relationship--a justification that was never given in efforts to impose the
death penalty upon Nichols.
Participants' Perceptions ofthe Criminal Justice System Prior to the Execution

All victims' family members and survivors could agree on the need for
accountability; all wanted McVeigh to be placed on trial for his role in the bombing.
Thus, short of pursuing vigilante justice, all had to accept the role of the criminal justice
system. However, beyond the threshold issue of accountability, there was great diversity
in how individual victims' families and survivors negotiated the involvement of the
criminal justice system in attaining the goal of accountability, particularly in terms of
opinions on appropriate sentence and whether it was necessary to attend the trail and
execution. In addition, victims' families and survivors learned that they not only had to
await the outcome of McVeigh's trial but also had to negotiate their troubled
relationships to McVeigh as a perpetrator, grappling with whether to forgive, perhaps a
desire to meet McVeigh before his execution, and expectations as to what his execution
would achieve in their own lives.
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Two sets of interview questions provided insight into how participants
accommodated the criminal justice system and legal procecdings into their individual and
collective memorial frameworks: participants' opinions on the death penalty, whether
participants felt a duty or responsibility to attend McVeigh's trial, and whether
participants felt a duty or responsibility to witness McVeigh's execution.

Participants' Opinion on the Propriety of the Death Penalty
Whether a victims' family member or survivor was for, against, or ambivalent
towards the death penalty necessarily corresponded to the desired penal outcome in
McVeigh's trial-what sentence participants felt that McVeigh merited. The awarding of
the desired verdict and sentence, in tum, was directly related to participants· satisfaction
with the involvement of the criminal justice system-and therefore to reconstructive
mnemetic processes. Notably, however, even if the "right" verdict was given, and the
"right" sentence was handed down, the manner in which the sentence was imposed also
had implications for the formation of individual and soCial frameworks of memory; for
instance, it was a key tenet of the Habeas Group that postponing execution for as long as
17 years caused "suffering"-memory wounds-for victims' familics.
In the context ofthe Oklahoma City bombing, the tie between memory and
judicial outcome was aptly demonstrated by the community's reception of the verdicts
and sentences in the federal trials of McVeigh and Nichols. When a federal jury
convicted McVeigh on eight counts of fIrst degree murder and detem1ined that he should
die by lethal injection, many survivors and victims' families literally embraced the jury;
members of the Habeas Group brought the McVeigh jury to Oklahoma City to meet
others and see the bombing site as well as other area attractions, and later traveled to
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Colorado as jurors' guests. But when another federal jury convicted Nichols only of
eight counts of involuntary manslaughter (and not guilty of eight counts of first or second
degree murder), survivors and victims' families responded with anger and confusion.
The tesult of this abhorrent verdict was a second state trial for Nichols in McAllister,
Oklahoma, which cost the state millions of dollars for Nichols' representation alone, in
which the jury handed down the "right" verdict, convicting Nichols of 160 counts of
murder and of one count of causing the death of an Ullbom child. However, this trial
failed to award what many felt was the "right" sentence of death, leaving Nichols
imprisoned for life without possibility of parole. In the end, then, the interests of memory
were served by those of justice, in that accountability in the form of a murder verdict was
achieved.
Participants' support for the death penalty declined slightly after the bombing.
Pre-bombing

Post-Bombing

No opinion

3

1

For

16

15

Against

7

8

i
11

3

Case-by-Casc

i

Table 2: Changes in participants' support for the death penalty before and after the
bombing

In summary, eight participants reported no change in opinion or change in
strength of opinion, eight rcported that their current opinion had grown stronger, one
participant changed from against the death penalty to for the death penalty, three changed
from for to against, three struggled with their opinion following the bombing but
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ultimately retained it, and two fonned an opinion for the first time. Thus, participants
were most likely to fonn an opinion on the death penalty after the bombing.
Participants listed a variety of reasons for supporting the death penalty. For
Participant 1, it was a safety issue: "If we don't execute these people if we can
incarcerate them, can't guarantee they stay there, uh, as a society, uh, we cannot allow
'em to be released in a society and brutalize, and continue to kill and murder, that's just
insane." Participants 5,10,14,15,16, and 24 stated that certain perpetrators "deserved"
the death penalty or that the death penalty was the proper "response" to murder. As
Participant 5 remarked, "I believe this way - you commit a crime you deserve what you
get. ... if you killed somebody, you know, they can't do nothin' about it. I mean, why,
they died - why don't the person that killed them, why don't they die?" Participants 16,
22 and 24 also stated that the death penalty law was "on the books" and so should be
applied. 16 recalled telling the Oklahoma Governor and Lieutenant Governor "well, if
it's not appropriate in this case where he killed 168 people, when would it ever be
appropriate?" 22 stated that "the laws of our land state that if you do this then this is the
penalty and I strongly believe that should be enforced." Finally, Participant 5 was
unwilling to pay to keep murderers alive. Thus, support for the death penalty seemed to
stem from the fact that it was reserved as the ultimate response to a heinous crime that
certain ofTenders merited.
Participants also opposed the death penalty for a number of reasons; responses
focused on the concept of absence-an absence of those lost, an absence of civilized
standards, an absence of closure, and an absence of accountability. It also focused on the
concept of surfeit-an abundance of suffering, and an abundance of money being spent
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to execute o±Ienders. Participant 2 commented on the perpetual absence ofthose lost: "I
don't think that killing a person is going to bring back anybody else. It's not .... it just
doesn't solve any problems ... " Participants 3 and 27 lamented an absence of civilized
standards by intimating that the death penalty was uncivilized or barbaric, and that
execution wounded yet another family; Participant 27 stated that "he done such a teDible
thing and yet we were going through as a civilized society and inflicting that same stuff
on others that ... were affected." Participants 2 and 27 felt empathy for McVeigh's
family who had already suffered. Participant 17 lamented an absence of closure from
execution, and remarked, " ... even people that are not anti death penalty that have gone
through for example Tim McVeigh's execution .... They are still angry, still not dealt
with it, even though they delivered the body to them." Participants II and 19 lamented
an absence o{accountability for executed offenders. Participant 11 felt that death was
"really too easy" and that "it would have been better ifhe'd served life in prison and
thought about his crimes ... " Finally, opponents also noted the expense of the death
penalty; Participant 23 stated, "they cost more in this country in legal expenses and other
expenses to execute a United States citizen of course than it costs to keep them in prison
for life." Opposition to the death penalty, therefore, stemmed from participants'
expectations that the execution would fail to achieve certain outcomes tor victims and
would cause additional hann to the offenders' family, the process of accountability,
government coffers, and the national image.
Incorporated in many participants' responses regardless of their stance on the
death penalty were indictments of the current criminal justice system. Participant 10
commented on the inconsistency of the system:
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It angers me that people who kill one person can get the Death Penalty

but people who kill 5 or 6 get off with the life sentence for the same
state you know and it -- I think, I think it should be straight if you
know, if you kill somebody that mean it's an eye for an eye.
Participant 12 lambasted the current system for being too slow, and stated that new
policies should be created in certain "heinous" cases to effect death immediately after
conviction: "I think that there are extreme situations and I don't know how they can
legally be defined ... there are special circumstances I believe where especially if guilt is
proven ... those people should be executed, on the spot, no waiting, no delay ... "
Participant 16 regretted that too many murderers escape the noose:
here in Oklahoma back when it was a territory ... we had a hanging
judge Parker, is what they called him. And uh, I had always heard this
saying that the crime decreased in the Oklahoma territory when
hanging Judge Parker here, not because of the severity of the
punishment, but because of the surety of it. .... But our system seems
like·lt's gotten to where there's so many loopholes and there's so many
ways they can get around being punished, they think they can get away
with anything.
Finally, Participant 19 advocated restorative justice, feeling that accountability was lost
in the adversarial games-playing and politics of criminal litigation, and other concerns
that should not be present are introduced because "everyone pleads not guilty even ifthey
have a video camera that actually shows them in great detail doing the crime," "the
defense is over here trying to play games of all sorts to try to get the person otf or
whatever" and lawyers for the defense and the state" may be trying to build a career."
These negative perceptions of the criminal justice system revealed that although victims'
family members and survivors did rely on it to achieve accountability, they maintained a
critical distance from its proceedings and worried that its shortcomings would impeJil its
mISSIOn.
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Death penalty opponents indicted the current criminal justice system for making
the death penalty available as a sentencing option. To be a death penalty opponent is to
critique the criminal justice system, to fault it for being uncivilized, imposing further
suffering. In addition, Participant 17 noted that "closure" has become an improper
justification for the death penalty:
I can see now the horrible lies that are told to ... victim's family
members by prosecutors that are otherwise good people, they are
educated people, they are all liars and about how that they need to get
the death penalty for this guy so that they can have some type of
closure and like if we bring you his dead body, you are going to feel
much better about the loss of your son or daughter whoever it is ...
Thus, whether participants were for or against the death penalty played a key role in
structuring their expectations of legal proceedings as well as the outcomes that they
desired, and so played a crucial role in guiding individual fi'amcworks of memory.
The Perception of a Duty or Responsibility to View or Participate in the Trial
and Witness the Execution

Whether participants felt a duty or responsibility to attend the trial and execution
addresses the issue of whether and how they felt it necessary to incorporate legal
proceedings into their reconstructive processes. The criminal justice system not only
mediated the involuntary relationship between victims' families and McVeigh, it also
mediated other types of memory work through which these individuals labored to form
supportive ways of comprehending and recovering from the bombing. Significantly, its
mission to achieve accountability made the criminal justice system a mediating entity for
every victims' family member and survivor whether or not they attended the trial, but it
was especially so for attendees. In addition, however, legal proceedings potentially both
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created a new mnemetic duty-a duty to themselves or to murdered victims to attend
legal proceedings or witness McVeigh's execution-and provided a venue in which that
duty could be satisfied. This section addresses what types of duties victims' family
members and survivors identified in relation to legal proceedings and how these duties
were satisfied.
Testifying in open court was the only way one could actually satisfY a duty to
participate in legal proceedings. The witness called to the stand at trial was literally a
memory vehicle, "the mirror of what has been, and so is key to making present the truth
about the past." The witness thus was responsible for being the "porter for things past,"
for exercising a two-dimensional fidelity-·fidelity towards the accurate recollection of
events and loyalty to deceased victims through serving as their representative. Like
others who bear witness, the witness on the stand "has a certain obstinacy, a stubbornness
and a willingness to resist" that enables him to exercise response-ability so that "he
answers the crime with the enduringness of the will to remember, to testify, and to see
that justice does not forget." Because the witness "testifies to matters already placed
within a legal horizon saturated with moral judgments, with notions of responsibility,
agency, and fault," the lawyer eliciting testimony from a witness places the witness's
testimony within a legal context, in effect translating lay memory into legal memory.
Testifying, although a felt obligation, was constructed as "elective," but "the fact of its
voluntariness, far from diminishing its moral weight, rather strengthens the mandate to
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remain faithful to the victims of mass crime by not completing the perpetrators' work of
effacement." 178
Significantly, two participants who were called as witnesses at McVeigh's trial
but who did not feel a duty or responsibility to attend the trial felt a tremendous duty to
testify. Participant 24, a witness for the prosecution, stated, "I felt like it was my
responsibility because I was asked by the US Attorney to ... be the Government's
witness for GSA for the building ... " 24 stated that this duty made the act of testifying
more difficult: "probably the most difficult thing I ever did because I felt a tremendous
responsibility to my friends, my coworkers, my community, to make sure that my
testimony was a part of helping to prosecute those people." Participant 20, a critically
injured survivor who was slated to give victim impact testimony but whose testimony
was cancelleclat the last minute, also spoke of a duty to help sentence McVeigh to death:

The way I looked at it was ... my story and my case and injuries ...
could make a big impact and if it could help to get him the death
sentence then I was ... I'd do my part, you know .... they were gonna
pay my way up there for the trial and pay the lodging and all that, but
if 1 thought me being there would help him get the death sentence, I'd'
a paid my own way ...
Thus, Participants 24 and 20 were willing to go through a tremendous ordeal for a higher
cause in order to satisfy a complex system of responsibilities to individuals localized and
dispersed, dead and alive, known and unknown, as well as to answer the deeds of
McVeigh and Nichols. The efforts of participants who testified also diluted the
impersonal nature oftrial proceedings, making it possible for witnesses-particularly
those giving victim impact testimony-to raise their own voice and hear the voices of

178 BOOTH.

supra note 51, at 130-132.
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others in a chorus of protest against loss in a forum in which they were otherwise
bystanders.
One did not have to take the stand in order to be a trial witness, however.
Physical presence, though a silent presence, was a profound reminder that others stood in
for the deceased victims, out oflove and duty for those individuals or from a desire to
gather information to understand what happened to those so cherished. To attend a trial
was to experience justice. Interestingly enough, fewer participants characterized
attending the trial as a duty or responsibility than an important step in being involved in
the process. Bya small margin, most participants reported that they did not feel a duty or
responsibility to attend McVeigh's trial. Of 27 participants, 14 did not feel a duty or
responsibility to view the trial, 12 reported feeling a duty or responsibility, and one felt a
duty or responsibility to be a witness at the trial, but not to attend the trial itself
However, 15 participants felt that attending the trial was an important step in being
involved in the process, while 12 felt that it was not. This indicated that terming
attendance a "duty or responsibility" meant that it was something more than significant or
meaningful; the dimensions of this term are analyzed in this section.
Family members and survivors who felt a duty or responsibility to attend the trail
cited the need to represent murdered victims-a type of bearing witness. The rcason
most frequently cited by participants who felt a duty or responsibility to attend
McVeigh's trial was to represent the individuals murdered in the bombing; 9 of the 12
participants listed this as a response. Participant 7, a survivor stated, "I thought it was
critical for me to be there as a representative of the friends that J lost ah and for their
families that couldn't ... " Participant 22 attended to represent her murdered spouse: "so
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many of us want to and I'm included in that group, you want to represent your loved one.
They can't be there. You want to be there for them." Sometimes this felt need to
represent the victim stemmed from a perception that the victim would have wanted that
person to attend, a need to keep others from forgetting the victim, or a need to be a
spokesperson for the victim, as evidenced by 28's remarks:

I did, I felt I did for. .. for my daughter. I felt .... she can't be there.
And believe me, she would have been there. If it had been the other
way round, ifit had been me, she'd be there, I know she would be
there. She would have been very vocal. ... And that's the least I
could do as her parent, to do that, to be there and be her voice ...
Thus, attending legal proceedings to represent a deceased victim served the function of
somehow keeping alive that person's presence, and bringing it into attempts to achieve
accountability.
Another reason frequently cited by family members and survivors was the need
for information, which is key mnemetic need, since one must know what occurred before
one can hope to understand it. Five participants (four of whom also felt a duty or
responsibility to attend the trial to represent those killed) felt a responsibility to attend for
information-gathering purposes. Participant 10 attended from a longing to gain "insight"
into the why the bombing occurred: "I went, for some insight to see if! could, 1 don't
know, figure out why he could do something like that, you know, why people would not
report it .... I never got any, you know, any insight to it but I felt better." This craving
for infonnation could be a consnming need:
I needed to find out everything that went on, how it went on, how they
was able to prosecute or catch him and all these things. The more I
knew about what was going on and in that case the better off I was as
far as myself and my family was concemed.
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Paliicipant 26 also wanted to be saturated with infonnation: "I felt a responsibility. And
I wanted to, I wanted to be there. I wanted to hear all of it that I could." For Participant
23, being there in person was an important part of gathering this information for
increased accuracy, "so that when I spoke about it, when I thought about it, it was based
on facts and rule oflaw and ah not just driven by rumor and emotion." Interestingly
enough, some participants needed to glean as much information as possible, but did not
consider this a "duty." These participants will be discussed in the following subsection.
The "duty" to attend in representation of those murdered was closely related to a
duty to pass on information to others. Three participants who felt a duty or responsibility
to attend the trial to represent those killed also felt a responsibility to attend to share
information with others unable to attend, demonstrating not only the impOliance of
information for mnemetic reconstruction but also that these frameworks-and methods of
building them-were above all social. Participant 7 stated that it was also important to
go to share information with coworkers who "didn't want to go ... didn't want to get that
involved, didn't want to be ah, reinjured, urn, whatever their reason was, that I, I'll go for
them." This in effect created a liaison role where one person from a family would be
designated to attend; for instance, Participant 25 stated, "My family expected me to be
the one who would come back and tell them what was going on, if they had any kind of
questions or so forth."
Two participants who felt a duty or responsibility to attend the trial to represent
those killed also felt a responsibility to represent living family members or coworkers.
Other sources of a duty or responsibility given were to be supportive, to represent one or
152

more organizations, and to see in person that McVeigh was guilty, each of which were
cited by one participant. Not everyone who attended for the above reasons acknowledged
that they felt a "duty", however. Significantly, participants often implicitly define a duty
as something owed to those who could not attend, versus a personal need or a desire to
support others who were there. Participant 19 did not term it a duty to attend "just for
myself," and another participant who attended the victim impact testimony portion of
McVeigh's sentencing hearing to support friends who were testifying did not tenn this a
duty or responsibility. Participant 22 distinguished a "duty" to attend the trial to
represent 22's murdered spouse from a personal need to attend for information.
The relationship oflegal proceedings to memory reconstruction does not
necessarily have to be described as a "duty"; it can also be a visceral "hunger" to attend
proceedings

In person, to be "part of' proceedings.

The most consistently given reason

cited by participants who did not feel a duty or responsibility to attend was infonnationgathering; three participants attended for this purpose. Participant 22 described this need
as a desperate hunger: "a huge part of going was information. I just was starved for
information. I needed, I was desperate for information." Two participants remarked that
infonnation helped them to put the "puzzle pieccs" back together.
Interestingly enough, five participants' statements evidenced a desire to bear
witness to justice live, although these participants did not describe attendance as a duty or
responsibility to others. Participant I not only went to see "justice" accomplished, but
also wanted to be a representational presence so that the jury would see those who were
very concemed about the outcome of the trial. Participant 16 tied attendance to
participation: "1 don't think I felt a duty or responsibility as much as just wanting to
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know that I was there and a part of it and was able to look him in the face, you know, and
call him a creep. Which I did ... "
In addition, the body of the defendant as a device upon which to perform memory
work proved to be an incentive for attendance. Two participants wanted to see McVeigh
and observe him in person or witness his reactions to the trial proceedings. Participant
16, who remembered that McVeigh came in with others to the Journal Record Building
before the bombing, stated,
I always wondered when he was looking at us in the courtroom too. If
he ever recognized any of us, like, when he came to my office. Do you
know that you came to my office, that fm a real person, you know,
and you hurt me? And a, I don't know, what it, that was one reason I
wanted to be there, to look him in the face and to just know ifhe ...
Participant 12's interest was not limited only to McVeigh's reactions, but also to trial
strategy, how'the prosecution presented evidence and how the defense responded.
In summary, these remarks revealed that "duty" was regarded by participants
largely as a relational debt that was owed to others deceased or alive who were unable 10

attend. It did not extend to the fulfillment of a personal need for information or firsthand observation.
Not everyone who attended the trial found it a positive experience. Four
participants attended the trial for at least one day and then ceased to attend because it was
harmful or meaningless. Many participants noted that attendance was emotionally
difficult or hannful; for two participants, this was related to a sense that they as uninjured
survivors did not have priority to attend the trial. Participant 6, a non injured survivor
who was in neither the Murrah Building nor the Journal Record Building, recalled feeling
"guilt," Participant II went because "I felt that the people that had been in the Memorial
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building, the people that had lost loved ones that they should have the top priority for
going if they want to go," and Pmiicipant 9 did not attend because "Jt wasn't going to do
anything for me but upset me." The evaluation of attendance as a harmful experience
could have been prompted by proceedings themselves; after attending an early pre-trial
hearing in which a victim's mother took the stand and broke down, Pmicipant II, an
uninjured survivor who was in the Journal Record Building, found proceedings too
emotionally devastating to attend again.
Attendance was not a priority for some participants who could perform memory
work more effectively without being present at legal proceedings since the attendees'
demeanor or the tedium of evidence presentation detracted from the trial's overall
mnemetic significance. Participant 17 did not attend the trial both because other
attendees were angry or obsessive and because the trial was "boring" and 17 could follow
the trial in other ways. Participants 21 and 27, both injured survivors, were focused on
work and also stated that they kept up with proceedings through other means.
Three participants did not attend at all (beyond one participant who attended one
day only in order to testify). All three either stated that they stayed away from the trial to
maintain mental health or because they had moved on and chose not to get wrapped up in
proceedings. Participant 3 recognized attendance was not a healing activity, stating "I
felt for my own mental health that I had a duty to stay away from it"; similarly,
Participant 24 remarked, "That's not something that I needed personally ... to be able to
move on ll1 my process.
[n summary, willingness to attend the trial was connected to the expected role that
attendance would play in memory work; trials were expected to play an essential role in
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recovery for participants who felt a duty to others deceased or living or for those who feIt
a visceral hunger for information or personal needs for completion or justice.
Participants did not attend the trial or ceased to attend when it became apparent that the
attendance experience would not assist reconstructive memory work, or worse, would
hinder such recovery efforts.
Attendance at Trial as an Important Step in Being Involved

Whether or not participants felt that attendance at trial was an "important step in
being involved" spoke to a felt need to attend legal proceedings for the construction of
individual and collective memory. Significantly, 15 participants felt that attending the
trial was an important step, and their responses spoke of a need to bear witness to justice,
not to attend in the names of murdered victims. It is readily apparent that that number
exceeded the"number of participants who reported feeling a duty or responsibility to view
the trial. As the following table shows, however, participants who reported feeling a duty
or responsibility to attend were more likely to feel that attendance was an important step
in being involved; all but one participant who reported feeling a duty or responsibility felt
that attending the trial was a significant step in being involved.
Attending Trial Important:
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No
Duty or Responsibility
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to View Tria!

Yes

I

10
1
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Table 3: Crosstabulation: Duty or responsibility to vie"" trial*attending trial as important
step
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The memory work that attendance facilitated revolved around the needs to
achieve "completion" and "justice." Three of the 15 participants felt that attendance
offered needed completion. Participant 22 remarked, "I don't think ... had that
legislation not been passed and I not, I had not been able to view and learn what had
occurred I think I'd be a basket case. I don't think I could've stood it."
Four participants mentioned the concept of "justice" in explaining why attending
the trial was an important step in being involved. Participant 1 described "a desire to see
that, that justice was served and witness it so that if it didn't come out the way I knew it
should've I could understand why, it didn't." Participant 7 stated that it was healing to
see justice be done. Justice was the only proper response to the victims' murders;
Participant 8 noted, "we didn't have our loved ones I mean at least we could see that we
got justice." -Some survivors felt that the trial was the rare forum in which they received
justice; Participant 15 remarked, "It was like, there is justice and there was a lot of times
when we didn't feel like we had any, there was not any justice for the survivors."
Other reasons for feeling that attending the trial was an important step in being
involved included maintaining an active presence at the ttial (one participant), seeing
progress or advancement (one participant), and the inability to get the "whole picture"
from news media (one participant). Attendance at trial, then, continued to be perceived
as a progressive behavior that would assist in memory reconstruction.
Whether Participants Felt a Duty or Responsibility to Witness the Execution

Like participants' desire to attend the trial, participants' desire to witness the
execution was linked to the role that they expected this experience to play in
reconstructive memory work, invoking the perceived link between execution and closure.
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Some participants did not hesitate to decouple the witnessing experience from closure
because it would not restore murdered loved ones to life or because the focus of their
memory was no longer on vengeance against McVeigh. Others chose to witness because
they perceived a need to be present for the last legal proceeding for purposes of
completion or because they needed to bear witness to justice. Interestingly, the concept
of "duty" did not break down along the lines of "debt to others" versus "debt to self' as it
did in participants' descriptions of whether or not they felt a duty to witness the trial. The
reason for this is a matter of speculation; perhaps the personal need to see McVeigh die
was stronger than the need to attend the trial had been, or perhaps the idea of witnessing
another's death was a culturally taboo hurdle that required the weightier imperative of a
"duty" to one's self.
Eight~en participants did not feel a duty or responsibility to vicw the execution,

and only nine said that they did. Fifteen participants who did not have a duty or
responsibility to witness did not witness the execution. Their most commonly cited
reason for the absence of a duty or responsibility to witness the execution was that they
felt that witnessing the execution was unnecessary since it would not provide closure or
assist in healing, or that participants had moved on past that point. In short, most people
did not feel that witnessing the execution would assist them in bearing witness. This
reflects the perception that the execution would not help construct or supplement social
frameworks of memory, that there was some barrier to obtaining a narrative endpoint
from the execution. Participant 9 cited as evidence her belief that many who had felt the
execution would bring closure were still "upset" afterwards, and concludes that "it didn't
do anything for them." Participant 14 stated that witnessing was useless because it could
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not alter the past: "I didn't feel like I needed to see it. I mean, I, 1 didn't feel like that was
going to make my pain or my hurt ... or that of my girls any less. It wasn't going to
change what had happened." Participant 24 supported a death sentence for McVeigh, but
had "moved on" so that witnessing the execntion was not important: "It was not
something that was important to me. 1 knew it was going happen.... But I did not have
to personally be there to see it happen for that part of it to be over for me."
Other participants who did not feel a duty and did not witness felt it would
somehow be distasteful. Although Participant I felt McVeigh should die, he did not want
to see him die: "I don't wanna see anybody die no more 1 wanna see people die the day
of the bombing." It was hard for I to understand how anyone could watch an execution,
despite the brutality ofthe bombing:
I, 1can't understand why anybody wants to watch somebody die, even
if the vicious crime he committed I want to know it happened, 1 don't
want to see it on TV and I don't want to watch it. 1 just want to know
it happened I, 1 can't understand how anybody could uh ... regardless
of how painful it was and everything, the event, to, to really want to
view that but I, 1 obviously some people do and that's, 1 guess that's
okay, with them ifit's okay with them it's okay with me. 1 don't want
to see it.
Participant 6 couldn't stomach the thought of attending based on her beliefthat the
witnessing would be gruesome: "It wasn't so much that 1 didn't feel a duty so much as 1
knew I couldn't stomach it. I have read about executions."
Additional reasons for not feeling a duty or responsibility to witness included
being with family instead (one participant), being against the execution (one participant),
and feeling that others had a greater need or desire to witness (one participant).
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Participants who did not report feeling a duty or responsibility to witness, but
nonetheless attended the execution, cited a reason which overlapped with those of
participants who felt a duty: a need to see justice donc. Participant 15 remarked, "I
guess I wanted to see him suffer but he didn't suffer. ... The execution was something I
needed to do for myself because I deserved; I believed he needed to be punished because
he knew those babies were in that daycare." Participant 22 witnessed for reasons of
completion, to see the process through, to know exactly what happened, and because she
had fought to have the execution broadcast via closed circuit TV:
I was not joyful about it even though I'd fought so hard for that to
happen. .. It was a difficult thing for me to do because its not,
watching someone die is not something I just thought I really wanted
to do but I felt I'd fought so hard for that I had been through the trials .
. . . I had watched that man and I needed to complete the process. I
nec.ded to see it through.

Finally, Participant 2 I witnessed to support other family members and survivors who
attended.
Ideally, for reconstructive mnemetic processes to be successful, traumatic crimes
melit punishments of an appropriate severity. Certainly participants had different
conceptions of what this sentence according to their death penalty beliefs; but for the·
majority who supported McVeigh's death sentence, his execution was the "answer" to the
bombing, and witnessing the execution was seen as a way to answer McVeigh, an
affirmative act that was not only bearing witness to justice but using onc's presence at the
event as a voice of protest. The idea of seeing justice done encompasses needs for two
forms of resolution in mnemetic reconstruction: accountability, and the spectacle of that
accountability.
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Of the eight participants who felt a duty or responsibility to view the execution,
the two most frequent reasons for wanting to witness were a personal need to be present
(to be involved or to see justice done) in response to what McVeigh had done (three
participants) and a need to see it through to completion, often related to having fought to
have the execution televised (three participants). Predictably, these two reasons were
similar and often contlated. Participant 12, though unable to attend due to injuries
incurred in the bombing, characterized the execution as a "response": "the execution was
a response to what he did to us and so I would like to have witnessed it ... " Participant
29, a family member and live witness, felt a profound need to physically be present at
McVeigh's execution:
I think that was the most important thing to me .... I could have
viewed it at the FAA center if I had to ... But it was just ... just
complete relief when I found out I was one of the 10 selected ....
there aren't enough words to describe how important it was for me to
do that. Oh wow. It's just- I stilI can't believe it. ... Oh God, I don't
even know if! can put that into words .... Physically being there.
Participants also saw completion as being important; Participants 7 and 29, in addition to
wishing to physically be present to see the proceeding, also felt very strongly the nced to
complete the process. This suggested that the conclusion of legal proceedings against an
offender was important in structuring memories about the event; one had a complete
mnemetic narrative when the offender was been convicted and held accountable through
serving his sentence, particularly when the act of serving the sentence was accomplished
virtually instantaneously through death.
Two participants stated that witnessing was a step towards becoming more
involved; Participant 25 described the decision to witness as a decision to "pick up the
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stick," and he also started doing media interviews at the same time. Other reasons for
attending were that the execution was the most meaningful proceeding (one participant)
and a duty to attend (the live) execution as a representative of a survivor's organization
(one participant).
Thus, in summary, like his federal tlial, McVeigh's execution provided
opportunities for further memory work, with participants' willingness to witness the
execution stemming from their expectations of what the experience of witnessing would
accomplish.
Participants' Perceptions of McVeigh Prior to the Execution

Two sets of interview questions provided insight into how participants'
perceptions of McVeigh as an offender and as a human being affected the manner in
which he was Included within their individual and collective memory frameworks:
whether participants had forgiven McVeigh, whether they would have been willing to
meet with him prior to his execution, and what behaviors participants wished to see from
McVeigh immediately before he was executed.
Whether Participants Had Forgiven McVeigh

Forgiveness was important in a mnemetic sense because a forgiven perpetrator
signifies a very notable development in individual frameworks of memory. A forgiven
offender is no longer the negative focus of memory work, a magnet to which an
individual's negative emotions are instantaneously and involuntarily attracted. Thus,
while it is possible to "move on" in the absence of forgiveness, forgiveness itself
indicates that an individual is no longer drawing each breath in the shadow of a traumatic
event.
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Participants were equally divided in their ability to forgive McVeigh. Of27
participants, 12 had not forgiven McVeigh, 11 had forgiven him, one did not know, one
stated that McVeigh was dead so forgiveness is a moot point, and one had forgiven
McVeigh for what he did to that participant personally but not for what he did to others.
Participants who had not yet forgiven McVeigh cited two main categories of reasoning:
that McVeigh's act was unforgivable, and that forgiveness was enabled by an external
stimulus that was lacking. Two participants felt that McVeigh's extreme culpability
eradicated the possibility offorgiveness; as Participant 1 stated, "How can you forgive
him." Participant 24 could not forgive McVeigh because he had affirmatively chose to
hann innocents: "I've never forgiven them for what they've done to change our lives
forever and to, to take those away from us that we -- that were important to us. Because
they had a choice. !t's not like a natural disaster ..." Three participants stated that the
childreus' deaths perhaps barred forgiveness; Participant 27 believed that she did not
have the ability to forgive McVeigh for what he did to others, particularly in telms of the
murdered children:
I've forgiven him for what you know, my injuries and what I was put
through in a way. But I'm not sure I can ever give the ... or I can ever
forgive him for the people ... specially since I've got a child of my
own, but the people who lost children that day. I mean that I can't
reconcile really.

Five other participants' replies intimated that they were under no obligation to forgive
McVeigh because an external "trigger" needed for the act of forgiveness was missing;
Pmiicipants 20 and 29, for instance, both remarked that forgiveness is religious and
unnecessary since they did not espouse that creed. Finally, participants 22, 28, and 29 all
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mentioned that they were not obligated to forgive McVeigh because he never asked to be
forgiven.
Those participants who had forgiven McVeigh did so for two reasons: for their
own benefit or because they empathized with McVeigh in some respect. Five
participants forgave McVeigh for their own well-being; as Participant 17 stated, "it was
all about me .... 1 was the one that got, got relief from all this pain. Totally. And it wasn't
about McVeigh. He received nothing for me actually being able to feel, feel the
forgiveness." Participant 19 described how forgiveness was healing: "I have so much
energy and you have to choose how you use your energy and to hate is a real energy
drainer that often times doesn't do anything except drain you .... " Participant 21 spoke
offorgiveness as a way to regain control:
One of the services that church is talking about forgiveness and that
was being able to pick up with your life [or] go on and let somebody
control your life because you are so angry. 1 had gone through that part
offorgiveness .... T am going on with my life.
Other participants forgave McVeigh when they were able to empathize or pity him in
some respect. Participant 2 forgave McVeigh because McVeigh was convinced that
what he did was right: "He thought he was doing was a good thing and, I, T, just can't
hate him for it." Participant 6 pitied McVeigh and his father after reading about
McVeigh's childhood: "I began to feel towards McVeigh that here was a child where
something had gone horribly, horribly wrong and then as I felt towards his father that
here was a father of a son that he was about to lose and how would T feel about that."
Finally, Participant 23 felt that understanding McVeigh's motivations and reading the
Turner Diaries was important in being able to forgive him.
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Interestingly, participants had differing conceptions of the relationship between
forgiveness and hatred. Three participants who had forgiven McVeigh stated that an
absence of hatred entailed forgiveness in the sense that not to hate is to forgive, and three
other participants who had not forgiven McVeigh stated that it was possible to not hate
and yet not forgive. Both gronps conceived of "hatred" as a negative force that one must
release. Those who' espoused the "no hatred entails forgiveness" approach all repudiated
anger. Participant 6 spoke of hatred as a destructive emotion that freezes one in the
aftermath of the bombing:
I have seen what the hatred has done to some of the people associated
with the bombing who, by the tenth anniversary, as I said to one of my
friends, 'what are they going to do now that Nichols is in jail and
McVeigh's dead and they're still out there backed up clear back to the
tlrst year with their anger and they haven't worked through that?
Similarly, 19'also spoke of hatred as a "killer disease." 26 had to "let go" of the hatred
and anger since "ifI carried that hatred around, I would stay mad. And it was hard
carrying that with me." Other participants, however, speak ofletting go of hatred without
forgiving. 22 moved on without forgiving:
and alot of times people say that affects your life ... If you can't
forgive them it eats away at you ..... But I don't feel that's the case.
haven't forgiven McVeigh. I haven't forgiven Nichols. But I don't
think about them much anymore. I really don't. 1 don't focus on
them: I don't have enonnous hatred ..... I don't have that now but 1
cannot forgive their actions .... So I think you can be ok without
forgiving.
For some, reconstructing mnemctic structures and negotiating relationships with
perpetrators such as McVeigh took place in conjunction with preexisting belief systems
such as Christianity which set forth reconstructive principles that guide the recovery
process. Thus, Christian survivors must come to terms according to their rcligious
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beliefs. But while some participants received direction from the Christian imperative to
forgive, others were deeply troubled by their inability to forgive McVeigh. Eight
participants identified forgiveness as a Christian or religious ideal. Of these, two
specifically connected their Christian beliefs and their ability to forgive McVeigh; as
Participant 7 stated, "that's part of, of the walk, urn is forgiveness .... it's required by
God and that urn, if there's a chance that ... me not forgiving someone would keep me
from going to heaven then I'm going to forgive someone 'cause I'm going to heaven."
Two participants, both closed-circuit witnesses, found the execution to be a religious
experience; 7 was surprised to be moved to pray with a coworker for McVeigh during his
execution "that he would, with his last breath receive Jesus as his Lord and Savior so he
could go to heaven." And 21 had a religious experience of forgiveness during this same
moment:
when I was there viewing him and watching him, it was like, all of
sudden he came to me, I don't know what's on the other side and when
I get to the other side all of this may mean absolutely nothing. I started
to thinking of him as Timothy McVeigh, the soul and not Timothy
McVeigh, the man and I started praying for him that this is his last
chance, this is his last breath and I prayed for him and it just like
overtook me.
However, several other Christian participants acknowledged a tension between being
Christian and an inability or unwillingness to forgive. Participant 3 thought it strange
that one would pray for McVeigh and want to execute him: " ... I did not get that. Well
if you've forgiven him, ok I forgive him now let's go out and hang him, you know, why?
Wait!" For him, McVeigh's humanity was the barrier to execution:
I don't care if that is one of the callings of Christianity or any religion
to forgive someone. I'm not going to .... But having said that, whether
I like it or not, McVeigh, like Hitler, is a child of God .... and even
166

though I would never in my life find room for forgiveness I still knew
in my mind that whether I liked it or not he was a creation of God, the
creator or whatever he, tenn we want to use, and I had no right in
ending that life.
Participant 28 found that the need to forgive evolved over time; after having not forgiven
McVeigh for years because he never asked and because it was God's place to forgive
him, she recently felt like she should forgive him according to Christian creed: "But of
course now my ... my ... at church, I'm having this guilt inside.... And I know should,
religiously I should forgive him."
The idea ofa McVeigh that was reconciled with Jesus and thus granted
admittance to heaven was troubling to many participants. Participant 9 had never
conceived of McVeigh going to heaven until her father, a pastor, delivered a sermon that
stated that McVeigh would go to heaven ifhe confessed his faith in Jesus Christ: "That
really hit me hard. Cause I thought he was going to hell the whole time." Participant 21
was disconcerted the Sunday before the execution while attending a Sunday School
discussion on McVeigh's ability to ascend to heaven ifhe asked for forgiveness because
she felt that McVeigh didn't deserve it. After the execution, however, she "was able to
let it go, turned it over to my God and it's between McVeigh and God now." Participant
28 was similarly disturbed by the idea of McVeigh in Heaven: "If he did, asked for
forgiveness, then he's the same place [my child] is. And I can't. .. ugh." These
acknowledgements of discomfort point to the tension that Christianity as a helief system
introduces in memory work. Participants' discomfort with McVeigh in Heaven, where
they believed deceased victims were taken and where they hoped to be after their own
deaths, stcmmed from the role that Heaven plays in participants' reconstructive memory
167

frameworks. Heaven seemed to be a mnemetic soother; the idea of deceased loved ones
at "home" with their Lord was a cherished one in participant interviews, and the insertion
of evil into this divine realm in the form of McVeigh seemed traitorous to the victims'
memory.
Some Christian participants diminished the discomfort that came from picturing
McVeigh in heaven with the victims by placing the burden to forgive McVeigh upon
God. For Participant 22, this struggle was easier because "even though I'm a Christian
and that's been something that I've battled with, um, there is a verse in the Bible that says
that unless the person asks for forgiveness we're not expected to forgive." Participant 28,
however, did not forgive McVeigh for years because he never asked and because it was
God's place to forgive him, but has recently felt like an urge to forgive him; yet, her
discomfort with pictming McVeigh in heaven may have prompted her to favor the
perspective that God must forgive, for that is the conclusion to which she ultimately
returned after describing her discomfort: "If he did, asked for forgiveness, then he's the
same place [my child] is. And I can't...ugh. But again it's for God to forgive and not
me."

In summary, participants' individual decisions with respect to forgivenessencompassing the struggle to forgive. the accomplishment of forgiveness, and the
conscious refusal to forgive-all signaled that negotiating an involuntary relationship to
McVeigh was a necessary process in reconstructive memory work. In addition, like
participants' attitudes towards the death penalty, the impact of Christianity upon the act
offorgiveness illustrated the influence ofpreexisiting belief systems upon memory work.
Willingness to Meet with McVeigh .
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Of27 participants, II stated that they would be willing to meet with McVeigh, II
stated that they would not, and five stated that they did not know whether they would be
willing to meet with him or not.
Three of the II participants who were willing to meet with McVeigh had actually
tried but been unable to meet with him in person before the execution. The II
participants who were willing to meet with McVeigh listed a variety of reasons for this
willingness, including "why" McVeigh had committed the bombing, the desire to see
McVeigh in person and/or interact with him outside oflegal proceedings, the desire to
learn something from being in McVeigh's presence, and whether or not McVeigh had
been in the bombing.
The most frequently cited response as to why participants would have wanted to
meet with McVeigh was "why." Six participants wanted to know "why," described as an
unanswerable query that encompassed not only a deep inquiry into "why did McVeigh
commit the act," but also the question of "why us." 22 described the question of "why"
as an incessant question that drove victims "crazy": "] think it's not just us, I think it's
any crime victim, that just drives you crazy the first several ... months] guess it was ....
all day, that question, why, why, why, why, why, why. It drives you nuts .... You need
an answer." Participants described "why" as including McVeigh's motivation and his
decision to blow up strangers, to hann imlOcents. Participant 7 described the question of
"why" in terms ofthe impersonality of the bombing:
Why? Help me understand your thought process in this. I, I
understand vengeance .... Help me understand why you thought this
would serve your need for vengeance. What did] ever do to you that
makes me die, pay for those people dying in Waco? Help me
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understand that. . . . these are strangers to him, just as we were
strangers to him. What was it about this that made him think we,
should be the ones to suffer for them, those strangers dying, what
made the connection there?
Participant 15 described the question of "why" as being directed to why McVeigh chose
to blow up the building when people were inside: "Why. I mean other than the fact that
you hate the government, why the babies .... If you wanted to blow it up why didn't you
blow it up when there wasn't anybody there? You're still making a statement; you're still
costing the gov"rnment lots of money." 22 described "why" as knowing not only
McVeigh's motivations but also what led up to his need to commit the bombing: "I
wanted him to help me to understand where in the world he was corning from. Why in
the world he thought this action would cause the reaction that he thought it would."
These statements reveal that there was a profound sense that one who seeks to reconstruct
memory following a tranmatic event first needs to understand how and why that
traumatic event occurred.
These remarks also illustrated that one of the hardest mnemetic tasks which
victims' families and survivors faced was reconciling the very personal impact ofthe
bombing's aftermath with McVeigh's impersonal, terroristic decision to murder unknown
innocents. Participants sought a rational reason why the Murrah Federal Building was
bombed, but did not feel one was proffered in legal proceedings; McVeigh's hatred of the
government was perceived as too superficial an explanation. For 22, the trial did not
answer every question, and the reasons given at trial for McVeigh' s motivation to commit
the bombing were not satisfactory:
I knew going in that you don't get every question answered but that's
[the trial is] the place that you can get more questions [answered] than
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anywhere else. Um, so I didn't expect everything to be answered. We
got, we were given a reason. You know, Waco. But for, for those of
us who think fairly nonnally that's not enough ofa reason to do what
he did. So you know you still have questions. You wanna understand
what motivated him.
But infonnation revealed at trial about McVeigh's childhood may have allowed attendees
to provide psychological reasons for McVeigh's decision to bomb the Murrah building:
What happened in his childhood. What ... was it, you know, when
his mother left and did, that seemed to have an enonnous affect on
him. His mother leaving him and his mother being the run-around
person that she was and evidently the strong personality in her, his
father was a weak personality and I think, urn, he kept going back to
his mom really trying to get from his mom something whether it be
approval or love or whatever and he never could get it. ... But, I, you
know, needing to understand why for me went, you know I just kept
trying to go further back and further back and figure out why.
However, part of the process of leaming to come to terms with this query most likely
included leaming that there was no perfect answer. This is the conclusion to which
Participant 7 came: "And it never will be [answered]. I don't think.he could, I honestly
don't think he would be capable of giving an answer that, a human being with a heart
would ever be able to understand." This demonstrated that the trial and execution were
inherently ineffective for participants in this way, verifying once again that it was
unrealistic to expect legal proceedings to fulfill every demand of memory reconstruction.
The second most prevalent reason for wanting to meet with McVeigh was to hear
an expression of remorse; Pm1ieipant 7 stated, ''I'd like him to have truly, honest
expressed to me his remorse. His, urn, his understanding that he misunderstood. If that
makes sense." McVeigh's apology at execution would have punctuated the narrative of
the bombing with a gesture of reconciliation. But while memory may be idealistic, it is
not blind to the likelihood that certain fonns of reconciliation will come to pass;
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participants acknowledged McVeigh's "soldier" mentality would make apology unlikely.
As Participant 26 noted, "Well, I would have asked him ifhe was sorry, although I don't
think he was. I think he viewed himself as a warrior." What was ironic was that
participants grasped that the impact of McVeigh's soldier mentality with respect to the
unlikelihood of his apology, but could not acclimate themselves to the idea that the
bombing was an impersonal act of terrorism or ideological warfare, in endeavoring to
answer the question "why" or "why us."
Another reason for meeting with McVeigh was to infonn him of how the
bombing had personally affected participants' lives, in hopes of eliciting remorse.
Confronting McVeigh with specific, personal tales of death, survival, and recovery,
would satisfy two mnemetic needs: the need to bridge the gap between the impersonal
act of terrorism and its terrifyingly personal effects, and the need to personalize the trial
proceeding through attendance and through telling one's own story of.loss through victim
impact testimony. Two participants wanted to confront McVeigh with their personal
stories; Participant 17 wanted to tell McVeigh ofthe impact of the loss of his murdered
child in the hopes of eliciting some remorse to "break him a little bit ... " Participant 19,
on the other hand, wanted to tell McVeigh that he "failed": " ... I think he wanted the
revolution to rise up and all ofthat and you know you failed buddy, you failed."
Another reason for meeting with McVeigh mentioned by three participants was to
intcract with him outside of the trial forum. This indicates that the constraints placed
upon the victim-offender relationship and the accountability process by the criminal
justice system also unfortunately constrained reconstructive memory work. Thns,
participants wanted to escape these institutional constraints upon access to the offender
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and/or as to the types of queries that were asked, and were unwilling to entirely defer to
the criminal justice system as arbiter of guilt and innocence. Participant 8 stated that
attending in person would confirm whether or not McVeigh was guilty: "I had to see for
myself, I mean all the media was telling you was that he was guilty but I had to look at
him and know and I knew ifllooked at him I'd know ifhe was guilty or not no matter
what the jury came back with ... " Participant 25 wanted to ask different questions than
were asked in the trial: "I wanted to find out why, with the questions that I had, not some
lawyer or the judge or whatever asking him. I wanted to ask my own questions."
Resisting the mediated access to McVeigh, Participant 28 wanted to break through the
communicative barrier of the trial and "not have to, you know, go through a lawyer or go
through a whatever, you know, just to say you know, why did you do that?"
Beyond asking McVeigh "why" he committed the bombing, other participants
simply desired real, interpersonal interaction with McVeigh outside t.~e terms of the
criminal justice system; they feel that being in McVeigh's presence or in interpersonal
encounter with him may have allowed them to "reach" McVeigh. Participants regarded
McVeigh himself as a form of bombing evidence that could yield personal insight.
Participant 6, for instance, wondered what she may have "picked up on" from bcing in
McVeigh's presence:
I'm an intuitive person. I'm not psychic, but I can pick up in a rough
way people's energy and urn, it would have been interesting to just be
in his presence and ask him some questions and let him answer and see
what I might or might not pick up on.
Similarly, Participant 25 wanted to gauge McVeigh's deceit:
I wanted to look him in the eyes because ... I know how to deal with
people and I can tell [allot of times when people are lying to me. And
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so ] wanted to see ifhe would lie or whether he would tell me the truth
about why and so forth .... I think maybe right before his death,
maybe if! could have got in there, maybe] could have found out
something.
But in speculating about what it would have been like to meet with McVeigh,
participants returned again and again to the obstacles that McVeigh's stoic demeanor
introduced to the nanemetic efficacy ofthis hypothetical encounter. Three participants
perceived that McVeigh would not have been forthcoming in a face-to-face meeting.
Participant 6 qualified her remarks about what she would ask McVeigh with the
statement, "] mean ifhe would open up - he probably wouldn't have. ] think he was a
very guarded person by the time he did and very much crazed against the government."
Participant 21 wanted to know whether McVeigh and others had entered the Murrah
building pretending to seek employment prior to the bombing, but added, "of course]
know he wouldn't have told me." Participant 22 also expressed doubt that McVeigh
would have been cooperative in helping her to understand why he committed the act: "]
would have, not that he would have done it but uh, ] wanted him to help me to understand
where in the world he was coming from."
In addition to speaking with McVeigh of his intentions and remorse, a few
participants who believed they had seen McVeigh in the Murrah Federal Building or
Journal Record building before the bombing felt that it was necessary to confirm these
recollections. This was an important pat1 offormulating a personal chronology of the
bombing, and confirming McVeigh's presence would have reassured participants that
they had not imagined these encounters. Two participants who recalled seeing McVeigh
and defendants in the building wanted to know whether McVeigh remembered coming to
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their offices, and whether these visit changed anything. Participant 23 recalled meeting
with McVeigh the Thursday before the bombing:
was there anything said on Thursday before the bombing when he was
in my office ah that changed his mind one way or the other. My head
knows nothing was going to change his mind, because the bomb
materials were already bought by Terry Nichols. They were already
stored. He was on his way up to build the bomb. Nothing that I said
caused him to bomb the building.... I'm the one who talked to him,
I'd kind a like to know how he experienced that. Because I really tried
to find a job for him. And he smiled and he was just as happy as he
could be about ...
Other reasons for wanting to meet with McVeigh were to tell him that he was
forgiven (one participant), to ask him ifhe would change anything ifhe could go back in
time (one participant), and to find out who else was involved (one participant).
In summary, pat1icipants who would have wanted to meet with Me Veigh wanted
to escape institutional stIictures such as the guiltlinnocence inquiry to access MeVeigh
not just as a defendant but as a person, toconfront him with the persQpal cost of his
crimes, and to ask him questions geared to issues beyond guilt, issues such as whether he
had accepted responsibility, whether he felt remorse, and whether he had in fact entered
the MUlTah Federal Building and surrounding locations prior to April 19, 1995.
For those four participants who were unsure about their willingness tomee!
McVeigh, McVeigh's demeanor contributed to participatlts' uncertainty as to whether
such a meeting would be productive. Two participants mentioned wanting to know
"why"; as Pm1icipant 9 stated, "I mean, I just want to know why. I mean ifhe wanted to
make a statement he could have blew the building up without atlybody there."
Participants who were undecided also stated that it would be good to hear Me Veigh take
responsibility (one participant), to ask McVeigh ifhe remembered coming to an office in
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the Murrah building (one participant) and to see whether McVeigh would apologize (one
participant). But these participants also believed that McVeigh would not have been
forthcoming; Participant 9 noted, "Just thinking, you know, cause he probably wouldn't
say anything ... ," and Participant 14 remarked, "1, 1 don't feel like it would have made
any difference .... he wasn't saying anything anyway to anybody ... "
The majority of participants were unwilling to meet with McVeigh for reasons
which illustrated that McVeigh's demeanor was a mnemetic barrier to information
recovery and thus to reconstruction. Ofthose 12 participants, five felt that McVeigh
would not be forthcoming, as Participant 7 noted, "1 don't think it would have done any
good. You know, 1 don't know what 1 would have derived from it. Because just from
what 1 saw, just from what 1 saw of him on television and I'm not sure 1 would have ever
gotten any real answers from him." Attending a meeting with McVeigh may have even
fueled anger; Participant 29 stated, "1 think he would have been as dt:fiant and arrogant as
he'd been the whole time. That would really have pissed me off." Three participants
believed that McVeigh would not have expressed remorse or regret, rendering the
meeting useless. Participants felt that McVeigh was "proud of what he did. He believed
what he did was right," and regarded himself as "ahead of his day, a martyr."
Nonetheless, participants who were unwilling to meet with McVeigh readily
admitted that they would have liked to ask him the same questions as those participants
who were willing to meet with McVeigh. The question of "why" was still the most
compelling area of inquiry. Participant 3 wanted to know "how could you, what were
you think[ingJ," and Participant 18 was most concemed about how McVeigh, a decorated
veteran, could have committed such an act: Other reasons given for an unwillingness to
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meet with McVeigh include anger (one participant), and no longer being at a stage where
such a meeting would have been important (one participant)
In summary, participants' remarks on their willingness to meet with McVeigh
prior to his execution revealed the profound effect that a defendant's demeanor had upon
memory work. The offender's defiance encouraged victims' families and survivors to
maintain animosity, an antagonistic attitude towards him that went deeper than the
natrnal adversarial positioning following from the crime. In addition, a defiant defender
was not perceived to be particularly forthcoming, encouraging family members and
survivors to choose alternative memory processes that would exclude a face-to-face
meeting with the offender. Thus prevented the offender from becoming a tool of

. memory work . 179
reconstructIVe
What Participants Wanted McVeigh to Do or Say Before the Execution
Not all participants wanted McVeigh to say or do something hefore his execution;
seven did not want to hear from him. But for the majority of participants, the execution
offered one last opportunity for a meaningful resolution to the accountability inquiry. If
McVeigh had sincerely apologized, he would have accepted why he needed to be held
accountable for his actions-a more satisfying outcome than having accountability forced
upon him. Participants seemed to regard a reconciliatory gesture as more likely than an
apology in face-to-face interactions with McVeigh, perhaps because it would be one of
McVeigh's last acts before dying. Without resolution, participants would be deriving
accountability entirely from a death sentence forcibly imposed by the criminal justice
179 This explains why, in existing victim-offender mediation-programs implemented in several states, both
victims' family members and the offender have to voluntarily consent to· such a meeting. Otherwise,
finding themselves opposite a defiant or outright hostile offender could detrimentally affect family
members' memory work.
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system upon McVeigh's body. Therefore, it is not surprising that the behaviors that
participants most yearned to see were those that could demonstrate McVeigh's
acceptance of responsibility.
The statements that participants desired to hear from McVeigh tracked the
questions that they would have asked him in a face-to-face encounter. Seven participants
wanted McVeigh to tell them "why," five wanted him to tell the "truth" or the "real
story," six wanted him to show remorse, two wanted him to accept Christ or make peace
with God, two wanted him to admit guilt or take responsibility, one wanted him to make
a statement to family members, and one wanted him to quote from the poem "Invictus."
17 participants did not feel that an apology was important, and I 0 participants felt that it
was important. 18 participants did not feel that it was important whether McVeigh
confessed to a priest or sought last rites, eight felt it was important, and one was unsure
as to its importance.
As reported in the discussion of why participants wanted to meet with McVeigh,
knowing "why" McVeigh committed the act, as well as "why us," were central concerns.
Participant I wanted to hear from McVeigh "what in his demented mind was he thinking
when he did this .. " Participant 9 detined "why" in tenns of McVeigh's tenning victims'
deaths "collateral damage": "I've always just wanted to know why. And why were we
collateral damage, .. , and why did he do it to the kids?" Participant 14's remark echoed
this desire: "you know, what made him do what he did. Urn, the fact that, that he took
the lives of 19 children ... , I couldn't even comprehend the mind of a person who could
do that. , . , I just, I just could not understand that at all." Participant 15 wanted to hear
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McVeigh give additional reasons for committing the bombing other than Ruby Ridge or
Waco.
Predictably, six participants also wanted to hear remorse from McVeigh.
Participants 17 and 19 thought it would be good for McVeigh to make a "remorseful
statement" for the sake of the victims. Commensurate with longing for expressions of
remorse, participants also wished for McVeigh to be morally reconciled to his crimes and
his punishment. Two participants expressed the hope that McVeigh would find God;
Participant 7 "wanted him to accept Jesus as his Lord and Savior," and Participant 10
"had hope that he'd made his peace with God." And two participants wanted McVeigh to
affinnatively "admit guilt," again acceding to having their understandings of the bombing
mediated through the criminal justice system.
Participants' remarks also confirmed that the production of "truth" of whether
McVeigh and Nichols acted alone was not confined to McVeigh's trial, and that ideally it
would be revealed by McVeigh himself instead of by attomeys. Five participants wanted
to know the "truth" or the "real story," including whether any others were involved.
Participant 25 stated, "I think there are things there that's not being told." Participant 6
craved the "whole truth," and Participant 11 stated that "I would have liked to have
known the real story behind all this and why he did it and ifthere were others involved."
In summary, it is not surprising that the gestures and statements that participants
most hoped that McVeigh would make prior to his execution tracked the questions they
would have asked him in a face-to-face meeting; the execution was the last forum in
which these queries could be answered, and because they had not been effectively
answered up until that point, they were still open points of inquiry. Nor is it surprising
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that family members and survivors were slightly more hopeful that McVeigh would make
efforts at explanation or reconciliation in his last moments; the penal tradition of
providing an offender to be executed a chance to impart "last words" is centuries-old, and
gallows speeches used to be prime opportunities for offenders to express regret for sinful
moral failings and speak of a hunger for divine forgiveness. One's last actions before
dying are presumed to be one's most honest, forthcoming, and forthright gestures; hence
the legal evidentiary tenet known as the "dying declaration," which redeems from the pits
of hearsay the last words of a dying man giving the identity of his killer. Nonetheless,
participants did not have much confidence that their desires for reconciliation would be
fulfilled and so were perhaps prepared for a witnessing experience that was less cathartic
in many respects than they otherwise would have anticipated.

Summary
In conclusion, the institutional strictures placed on the victim~offender
relationship and the process of holding McVeigh accountable were necessary. They
rendered legitimate legal proceedings that were key to producing mnemetically-crucial
accountability. They were also too narrow, because the guilt/innocence inquiry was
merely the threshold inquiry for participants who wanted to know "Why?" Legal
proceedings were perceived to either avoid the questions that were most important for
memory reconstruction or to provide responses inadequate to support mnemetic
structures.
Thus, although the criminal justice system successfully held McVeigh
accountable through a conviction and death sentence, it did not effectively mediate the
crucial memory work needed for family members and survivors to come to tenns with the
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bombing. These individuals were thereby left on their own to cope with McVeigh's
defiant response to the horrors he had unleashed, to reconcile themselves to the
unbridgeable gap between an impersonal act of terrorism and the terrifyingly personal
scale ofloss with which they had to cope in its aftermath, and to continue with memory
work despite crucial questions remaining unanswered. The following chapter discusses
how these many unanswered questions affected the experience of witnessing the
execution, as execution witnesses brought to the execution issues heretofore left
unresolved. In this regard, they continued to negotiate their involuntary relationship to
McVeigh by scrutinizing his behavior in his final moments.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
MEMORY SET FREE:
THE EXECUTION AS THE END OF THE VICTIM-OFFENDER
RELATIONSHIP & MEMORY SET FREE

Prior to McVeigh's execution on June 12,2001, victims' family members and
survivors perceived that they were trapped in an involuntary relationship wherein
McVeigh was a unwanted part of their lives, an intruder into the processes of memory
reconstruction who could manipulate or unsettle recovery at will with callous media
commentary. McVeigh's behavior at trial upset many because McVeigh did not comport
himself as a remorseful defendant, but as a detIant offender who took pride in the
devastation he had wrought. The few participants who testified at trial or otherwise met
McVeigh eye to eye also spoke of being disconcerted by the fact that they were
confronting McVeigh face-to-face; brought into such proximity, Participant 28 felt as if
she were "looking at the devil eye to eye" and the experience took her brcath away,
Participant 22 went cold, and Participants 21 and 24 were distracted while testifying by
McVeigh's confrontational presence.
Those who witnessed the execution contI·onted McVeigh again in his final
moments, face-to-face in the case ofthose who witnessed by closed-circuit. However,
this confrontation was on different terms. Me Veigh was no longer a man presumed
innocent but a condemned offender strapped to a b'llmcy to die. And the ones witnessing
that death had survived a tremendous tragedy and were adamant that they were not only
going to survive, but that they were going to live. As a result of the execution, family
members and survivors were able to finally exorcise McVeigh as a presence in their lives
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and detangle himn-om their day-to-day mnemetic reconstructive formations. For years,
the involnntary links that family members and survivors perceived chained them to
McVeigh had dampened, interrupted and delayed the formation of individual and
collective frameworks of memory, imperiling reconstructive processes. In addition, his
execution terminated the mediation of the criminal justice institution in reconstructive
processes. With McVeigh removed as a reconstructive roadblock, and with legal
proceedings against him finally at an end, mnemetic healing could resume.
This chapter begins by discussing executions as communicative events that play
formative roles in victims' and survivors' reconstructive mnemetic processes. It then
proceeds to analyze the roles of gazing behavior and silence in the McVeigh execution.
With respect to gaze, not only did witnesses perceive that McVeigh's gaze held
communicative import, but his gazing behaviors confinned witnesses' prior impressions
of McVeigh as a detlant and remorseless offender. This chapter then.discusses three
dimensions of silence: witnesses' silence, McVeigh's silence, and execution as a means
of silencing McVeigh. Finally, this chapter discusses witnesses' reactions to McVeigh's
peaceful death and their desires for a more palpable display of suffering. This chapter
concludes by observing that, although many characteristics of an "ideal" execution, such
as the offender's apology, were not present, McVeigh's execution was ultimately
successful because it effected a period of silence in which victims' families and survivors
could finally proceed with mnemetic reconstruction.

The Execution as a Mnemetic and Communicative Event
Again, victims and survivors believed that they were entitled to view the
execution, because it was the culmination oflegal proceedings and for reasons of finality;
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those who met with Ashcroft to persuade him to arrange for a closed-circuit broadcast of
the execution stated that it was not only their desire but their "right" to witness the
execution, evidencing participants' linkage of attendance at legal proceedings and
recovery. Like the experience of attending the trial, McVeigh's execution was an event
that witnesses experienced in common. All nonwitnesses were aware that the execution
was going to be held on the morning of June 12, 200 I and remembered watching the
clock during the early morning hours, as they knew others were~thus consciously taking
part in the execution as a collective experience. Though family members' and survivors'
exposure to McVeigh was even more constrained by the execution routines employed by
the criminal justice institution than those employed during the trial, the execution venue
was structured differently in one key aspect. Whereas the judge, trial witnesses, and the
jurors (and to a lesser extent counsel and McVeigh himself) were on the "stage" of the
courtroom and thus positioned as the focal point of attendees' visuaUield, McVeigh
himself was the visual focus for both live and closed circuit witnesses to the execution.
McVeigh's body, then, and in particular his face, was the object

ofwitnessing~its

behaviors and its sufferings. For closed circuit witnesses, the face was the primary object
of attention, as the closed circuit camera was positioned on the ceiling directly over
McVeigh's gurney, creating a closed circuit feed consisting ofa close-up of McVeigh
from collarbone to crown. Unlike the trial, which did not facilitate close scrutiny of
McVeigh's behaviors, the climinal justice institution orchestrated the execution as an
event to be witnessed.
McVeigh's last actions made a profound impression on execution witnesses.
Witnessing is an interactive experience, for "witnessing is always, at a fundamental level,
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a relationship of mediation. ,,180 In considering the execution as an interactive experience,
it is essential to explore the relational dimensions of McVeigh's execution and their
boundaries, including McVeigh's interactive behaviors, the positioning of witnesses, and
their roles and motivations.
That executions can be vehicles of collective memory is not a novel proposition.
Both Foucalt and Spierenburg discuss at length the symbolic spectacle of early modem
public executions and the collective lessons that the populace took away from them.
Commenting upon the symbolism of the publicly tortured body, Foucalt stated that public
torture
is an element of the liturgy of punishment and meets two demands. It
must mark the victim: it is intended ... to brand the victim with
infamy; even if its function is to 'purge' the crime, torture does not
reconcile; it traces around or, rather, on the very body of the
condemned man signs that must not be effaced; in any case, men will
remember ... torture and pain duly observed. And, from the point of
view of the law that imposes it, public torture and executiOlLmust be
spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as its triumph. The very
excess of the violence employed is one of the elements of its glory:
the fact that the gnilty man should moan and cry out under the blows is
not a shameful side-effect, it is the very ceremonial of justice being
. aII'Its fiorce. 181
expresse d 111
Attendance at executions offered the chance to glimpse divine Truth, with the length of
suffering itself being laden with symbolic value by which "the body has produced and
reproduced the truth ofthe crime": "each word, each cry, the duration of the agony, the
resisting body, the life that clung desperately to it, all this constituted a sign.,,'82 In
addition, the public execution reflected an affronted sovereign's right ofretribution and
180
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therefore is one example of the "great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored," a
ceremony affirming "that every crime constituted as it were a rebellion against the law
and the criminal was an enemy of the prince," effecting "justice as the physical, material
and awesome force ofthe sovereign deployed there."IS3
Spierenburg further notes that Western European "executions were dramatized in
order to serve as a sort of morality play" with a religions message, often assisted by
lengthy and impassioned "gallows speeches" in which condemned prisoners lamented
their sins so that "punishment was shown and the possibility of a penitent and edifying
death is present.,,184 In addition, the public execution both "warned potential
transgressors of the law that criminal justice would be practiced and it warned everyone
to remember who practiced it." In the ideal early modern execution, the criminal was
both a believer in Christ and a penitent figure who was convinced that his punishment
was righteous and determined to endure it for the salvation of his

so~!,

and so was to

meet his Maker having confessed his crime. To die unrcconciled to authorities, fellow
men, and God was to meet death as a beast, a mere animal. 185 Spectators were
accordingly impressed by a "beautiful death," which coincidentally also reinforced
Christian and legal doctrine. The gallows place itself held an imposing position in the
culture of Western European countries; it was a place of infamy and taboo, and
executioners were held in awe and publicly reviled. Thus, the public execution in the
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collective memory of early modern Western Europe was the demonstration of the "truthpower relation" which still remains at the heart of punishment today. 186
Victims' family members perform a much different function than do media and
oftlcial witnesses to an execution. Official witnesses to an execution represent the state
and are present to ensure that an execution is in fact carried out; journalists who witness
the execution traditionally perform a watchdog function to ensure that the state is acting
as it should (i.e., not executing in a barbaric fashion) and to report the orderly completion
ofthe execution to the public. Victim witnesses, however, are there for an altogether
different set of reasons. They do not represent the state or the public-at-large, but instead
embody the most localized and private of interests-that of the murdered victims, and of
those who have borne witness to the aftermath of murder. Allowing victims' families to
witness executions is a fairly recent development, with many states first allowing
victims' families to witness in the early to mid-1990s. A handful of states still do not
allow victims' families to witness. Interviews with victim witness advocates in charge of
prepping family members to witness executions and accompanying them to the
witnessing room reveal that states, such as Oklahoma, often passed legislation allowing
family members to witness after state legislators, themselves survivors of homicide,
wanted to attend the execution of the offenders responsible. Other states allow victims to
witness not through the passage oflegislation but by the prerogative of the prison
warden. IS7 In whatever institutional form it assumes, however, the advent of victim
witnessing illustrates an acknowledgement by the criminal justice institution that there
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are other interests at stake in execution besides those of the state. It augurs a change in
the conception of justice that at first sounds rather pedestrian; crimes are not only
committed against the state, but against the victims as well. But this marks a radical
reconceptualization of "justice" that terminates the exclusion of victims from
participation in legal proceedings, one that accords victims a stake in legal proceedings
not only by providing opportunities to witness executions but also to provide victim
impact testimony at sentencing. "J ustice" is no longer meted out by the state as sovereign
through a punishment formally imposed upon a condemned citizen, it is the end point of
accountability to which victims are entitled in acknowledgement of their suffering.
Official executions now intersect with rituals of popular justice-what tenets of popular
legal culture, informed by the victims' rights movement and on "war-on-crime"
conservatism, advocate is due victims' family members.
McVeigh's execution specifically played a crucial role in thetormation of
collective memory of the Oklahoma City bombing. Legally, it was the moment when
accountability was imposed, the execution of sentence, the conclusion oflegal
proceedings. It also marked the event through which media coverage of the Oklahoma
City bombing and its legal aftermath would grind to a halt, and the moment when
McVeigh himself would be silenced. Socially, it was an opportunity for both live and
closed circuit witnesses to socialize with one another once again, to gather to discuss the
bombing and individual recovery as well as new goings-on-all framed by an awareness
of what event witnesses had gathered to see.
Significantly, the reasons why McVeigh's execution was broadcast back to
Oklahoma City via closed circuit are mnemetic in nature. Significantly, it was not at all
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certain until a few months before McVeigh's execution that more than 10 live victim
witnesses would be able to attend. The struggle to televise McVeigh's execution was
framed in terms of a need to witness "justice," with victims' families and survivors
advocating that everyone who was atTected by the bombing had a right to choose for
themselves whether or not to witness. As McVeigh's execution date approached,
numerous Oklahoma City bombing survivors and victims' families, including many
participants in this study, sought to persuade Attorney General John Ashcroft to arrange
for a closed circuit broadcast of the McVeigh execution from Terre Haute to Oklahoma
City. On April 10,2001, Ashcroft visited Oklahoma City and met with 100 survivors and
victims' families who were united in their belief that seeing the execution was important
to them. At that meeting, according to Participant 28, family members and survivors
conveyed "why it was so important to see it through and that we have the right to attend
that." According to Participant 28, the change in Ashcroft's attitude tq,vard televising the
execution was obvious:
... I don't really know [why Ashcroft came to Oklahoma City to meet
with victims' families and survivors] unless it was because he just
thought ... like so many people, uh, it appears ghoulish. You know,
he didn't have any concept of why we needed to do that. But once he
met with this group of people it was, it was pretty amazing. It was
obvious that he kind of had his knees knocked out from under him. He
was overwhelmed by what he heard in that room, um, he had a whole
new perspective of what the needs were. Why there were needs ....
he was really upset, he was ... and he could see it. You could tell it.
Two days later, on April 12, 2001, Ashcroft acceded to the request to televise
McVeigh's execution via closed circuit broadcast. Paramount among the reasons for
granting this request was Ashcroft's desire to ensure "closure" for victims' families.
Announciilg the closed-circuit broadcast of the execution, Ashcroft stated
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1 also met with about 100 survivors and victim family members on
Tuesday to hear their stories and try to understand their loss. The
magnitude of this case is certainly stunning. My time with these brave
survivors changed me. What was taken from them can never be
replaced nor fully restored. Their lives were shattered, and I hope that
we can help to meet their need to close this chapter in their lives. IS8
Thus, the decision to undertake a closed-circuit broadcast to accommodate additional
witnesses was framed in terms of resolution and closure. Accordingly, Ashcroft reasoned
that since the "Oklahoma City survivors may be the largest group of crime victims in our
history," the Department of Justice "must make special provisions" "in accordance with
our responsibilities to carry out justice.,,189 President Bush's remarks after the execution
was carried out also impose this frame: "Today, every living person who was hurt by the
evil done in Oklahoma City can rest in the knowledge that there has been a reckoning.,,19o
The response of the legal community to the decision to televise McVeigh's
execution via closed-circuit transmission was anything but predictable. In an April 12,
2001 broadcast of NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. New York Law School professor Robert
Blecker stated, "1 think we have a right to see and in a sense a responsibility to see what
is being done in our name" and opined that McVeigh "should not control the process"
and that "his last statement should not be televised." Bonnie Bucqueroux, Executive
Director of "Crime Victims for a Just Society," did not "see a real role for the victims
here," and advocated that "this is the business of the government and it is the government
that should be held accountable tor this." Bucqueroux remained concerned that "victims
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are being used in the process .... I think they are being sold, some ofthem, a bill of
goods that is going to lead to a kind of closure that they are not going to achieve because
this really isn't retribution, this is vengeance.,,191
McVeigh's execution, then, was not only an event experienced in common that
assisted family members and survivors in the reconstruction of social frameworks of
memory; it was also a communicative event. It may seem odd at first to speak of an
execution as a communicative event, which herein will be defined as a specific episode in
which someone is engaged in meaning-making by drawing on enculturated systems of
communicative practices, the underlying sociocultural systems or toolboxes from which
we strategically choose spoken, written, or gestural behaviors. Human communication is
not a transmission of transparent meaning but a negotiated exchange of meaning.
Communication does not take place in a vacuum but in a social context filled with
entities that may either facilitate or hinder human interaction. Differing cultural
backgrounds or ideological assumptions may result in deviating perceptions as easily as
does a noisy environment or technological malfunction. A communicative framework of
action and reaction is the ideal means by which to address punishment in general, capital
punishment in particular, and the execution as a specific imposition of capital
punishment. Criminal law's efficacy itself presumes the existence of communication,
expressions that some actions are illegal and that those who commit crimes will be
punished. That citizens understand what actions are illegal is proof that those concepts
have been successfully communicated to them. As a state-instituted ritual, punishment is
a social act, and capital punishment is its most extreme form.
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Thus, an execution is both communicative action and an event with social
consequences. An execution is the enactment ofthe pronounced death sentence. The
state is the primary actor in the execution ritual that outlines, regulates, and supervises the
execution though the execution is carried out in the name of the people. The state actor
communicates both with and through the condemned to reach the immediate witnesses
and more remote audiences exposed to the execution through media. The state's
expression to the condemned is a unique punitive message. Usually punishment is meant
to express censure, and a "don't do it again" warning. Here, the object of the punishment
will not live to learn his lesson, so one can infer that the state's ultimate communicative
target is not the condemned but the witnesses to the execution.
The condemned plays a remarkably passive role in the execution process. The
execution is designed to subordinate the will of the individual to the will of the state,
reenacting the contract between the governed and the governing. Punitive acts, then, are
the means by which the state seeks to "prevent the despotic spirit ... from plunging the
laws of society into its original chaos." 192 Executions are the ultimate confirmation of
this reposited popular power over the body of the infractor. The state has codified its
gatekeeping role in carrying out the execution, most notably for our purposes in 28
C.F.R. § 26.4(f), which prohibits photographic, audio, and visual recording devices at
federal executions. 193
Giddens has noted that "[ eJxecution finally puts the body beyond the possibility
of social control.,,194 However, it would seem instead that the state's control over the
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social person must cease upon death, but its control over the body can continue in
perpetuity. The body is the site and target of the most rigid fonns of social control. The
state imprisons the condemned until the date of his death, and impresses additional
restrictions upon his final moments. Since the days of public hangings, prisoners have
often been hooded or masked "to spare spectators the sight of the condemned person's
distorted or disfigured features," and after the electric chair replaced the noose, leather
face masks concealed the condemned's features. '95 When lethal injection is used, the
prisoner's body is often sanitized by a sheet cover, and the prisoner lays supine upon a
gurney so that witnesses see only one side of his features. In McVeigh's execution, the
closed-circuit camera was suspended directly over his head, so that witnesses had an
unobstructed view of his features.
The state also restrains the condemned's final expressions and actions. Fonncrly,
"at large spectacles and at small private executions as well, the prisotler was made a part
of the ritual by being offered an opportunity to deliver his final words." Now, however,
this privilege has been "gradually withdrawn" because "there is a fear that he will say
something nasty that will disrupt the proceedings," and in some cases, the prisoner is only
' d to wnte
. h'IS Iast words. 196
permltte

Finally, the physical space in which the execution is carried out further
emphasizes that the state is the primary actor and others but incidentally connected to the
act. According to Foucalt, the execution, once a "pure event" and "collective spectacle,"
moved out of view with the invention of the prison organization. Giddens further states
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that executions were often "noisy and prolonged". 197 Death was dissected into silent and
rehearsed routine processes, "a sequence of technical modifications" to make it
"instantaneous" and "unobtrusive.,,198 The existence of the witness room distances
witnesses from the invocation and metaphysical and physical consequences of the
execution; witnesses become bystanders because of the distance imposed by concrete and
glass. The layout of the witness rooms fmiher regulates witnesses' impressions and
responses and structures the execution as a distant communicative event, allowing the
state to "minimize the fascination oflooking by effecting death as mechanically and as

. I y as POSSI'bl e. .,199
preCIse
Like other communicative events, McVeigh's execution was structured through
gazing behavior and through silence. Each of McVeigh's behaviors was perceived to
have repercussions for individual and for collective formation of social frameworks of
memory. Thus, this chapter will first discuss witnesses' perccptionspfMcVeigh's
gazing behaviors during the execution. discussing gazing behavior as a normative
phenomenon and questioning whether McVeigh's gaze was marked by witnesses because
it defied such interactional rules. It will then explore the role of silence in McVeigh's
execution, addressing it in three contexts: the silence of witnesses, witnesses'
perceptions of McVeigh's silence, and the execution as an act of silencing McVeigh.

Deconstructing McVeigh's Gaze
Witnesses literally attend and attend to an execution on the basis of general
communicative expectancies, behavioral signals that interpersonal interaction will likely
197
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commence. Such dynamics are activated when the condemned invites or opens an
interaction by either looking into the witness rooms or by addressing witnesses through
"last words." Often, the condemned does make some communicative endeavors, but
rarely makes the gestures that witnesses say they most desire. In exploring the interactive
dimensions ofthe McVeigh execution, the importance of his visual awareness of
witnesses is established through his gaze. Participants 25 and 29, both live witnesses,
recall that when the curtain was opened, McVeigh physically lifted his head and slowly
stared into three ofthe four witness rooms in which sat his own witnesses, bombing
victims, and mcdia witnesses 200 There is some question whether Me Veigh stared into
the room reserved for government witnesses. Persons in all of these rooms but the
offender witness room were concealed by a one-way glass. McVeigh then lay back down
and stared up at the ceiling, into the closed circuit camera. This active visual engagement
with witnesses was noted by several attendees, and remote witnesses_ believed that
McVeigh was staring directly at them.
Execution witnesses are often intensely interested in watching the offender's face
throughout the procedure, to the point that corrective measures may have to be taken
when logistics such as the location of the gurney vis-a-vis the victim witnessing room and
the girth of the defendant make this impossible 201 Closed circuit witnesses felt that the
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Participant 25 stated,
.. once they opened up the curtains, and he looked at his lawyers, gave them kind
of a nod. Then he turned his head to the media, looked at them for a few seconds,
nodded to them and turned to us and looked at us and it was only a couple of two or

three seconds. I guess he realized then that he could not see us. And so once that
happened and he turned back around and stared right straight at the ceiling.
Tn an intcrvieVlf with onc state victim advocate who witnesses executions with victims' families and who
wished to remain anonymous, the victim viewing room was positioned at the foot'ofthe gurney, which was
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placement of the camera directly over the gurney in Terre Haute was ideal because it
allowed them to clearly see McVeigh's facial expressions. The desire to see McVeigh
face-to-face fueled some witnesses' desire to view the execution. When asked about the
desire to see the execution in person, Participant 25 remarked in a media interview five
days before the execution:
I have not been able to see this guy face to face. I have watch[ ed] him
on TV, I've watched him on closed-circuit. And I'm the type of guy
that I need to see what is going on. I'm hoping that if! can see his face
maybe I can get some kind of idea exactly who he is and what he
'nk
thI
S . . . 202
Closed circuit witnesses reported being "shocked" or "jarred" by the sudden sight
of McVeigh' face on the screen. The spouse of Participant 5 stated that "I think I thought
they would just show a picture of him laying on the table from a sideways view or
something. So it kind of surprised me a little bit when they did click on that it was just
his face there." Participant 21 experienced shock: "I visualized YOtJ [were] going to see
like him across the room on the bed and he [would be] strapped down and everything,
when the curtains opened his face was right there big huge, I mean the camera was like
right on his face .... Yeah, like shoulders up, that shocked me." Participant 22 also
found McVeigh's enlarged face a "little startling."
But this shock did not prevent most witnesses from unhesitatingly endorsing this
placement, since they wanted to see his face for a variety of reasons. Participant 5's
spouse stated, "I'm glad I saw him that close up and everything cause that way I knew

parallel to the tloor. During the execution of an obese offender, victims complained that they were not able
to see past the offender's girth to his face. Afterwards, the head of the gurney was positioned at a sloping
angle to allow witnesses to see the offender's face at all times.
202 Transcript, CNN Breaking News, Judge Denies Stay afExecutionfor Me Veigh, Appeal Expected (June
6, 2001), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0106/06/bn.03.html.

196

from his eyes and his expression what he was feeling." Participant 21 credited a spiritual
experience of forgiveness that she underwent during the execution to being able to see
McVeigh's face: "I think the face thing is what, really brought it to reality with me.... it
was a face-to-face thing and I think that's probably what drew me in to what [ needed to
go through." The two closed circuit witnesses who wanted to see a more inclusive
picture stated that they wanted to see more of what was going on in the execution
chamber; Participant 15 wanted to see all of McVeigh's body despite being somewhat
wary of doing so, and Participant 7 would have liked to see additional preparations for
the execution as well as a more expansive view that included all of McVeigh's body
along with the corrections staff and other people in the witness rooms, so that it would be
as if she were there in person. She felt that it was odd that closed-circuit witnesscs could
not see more:
I mean honestly this was a protected room, where we wer~, protected
room where they were, we knew each other. Urn, so what's wrong
with us seeing who's there? The warden, the other family mcmbers
and survivors that were present, him, his family, who was there with
him, I, I would just like to have for it have been like we were there in
that room, rather that just watching from the chestup .... We didn't
even get to see the injection go in, we didn't get to see the needle in
his arm.
Interviews with witnesses also show that McVeigh's gazing behaviors gave rise to
an intense perception among closed circuit witnesses that McVeigh was aware that his
death was being witnessed, that he wanted to create a certain image, and that his gazing
behavior produced an interactional expectancy for witnesses. Closed circuit witnesses
believed that McVeigh was staring at them through the camera and that he was conscious
of their prcsence. Larry Whicher, a closed circuit witness, stated in a media interview
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immediately after the execution that McVeigh "actually lifted his head and looked
directly into the camera and it was as if he was looking directly at us" and described his
stare in the following manner:
It was a totally expressionless, blank stare -- and his eyes were
unblinking, they appeared to me to be coal black and he didn't need to
make a statement. I tJUly believe that his eyes were telling me he had a
look of defiance and that ifhe could he'd do it all again. 203
Participant 5's spouse sensed that McVeigh was aware that he was being watched: "He
knew that people were looking at him, watching him ... " When McVeigh's face
appeared on the screen, it seemed to Participant 7 that he was looking at the witnesses in
the viewing rooms:
you almost, you could see him almost like visibly like he's looking at
each person in there. Specifically making specitIc attention of the fact
that he's looking at each person in there.... It's almost like he's
looking at each family member or whoever's there ..... His eyes
could move, I don't recall him picking up his head .. .
Participant 22 believed that McVeigh was "very aware" that there~as a camera.
suspended above him. Not only did witnesses feel that McVeigh was aware oflive and
closed circuit witnesses, but there was a defInite perception that he was actually and
purposefully looking at all witnesses, even those viewing by closed circuit. Three closed
circuit witnesses described McVeigh's gaze as unmediated, despite the closed circuit
feed. Participant 21 stated that "he raised his head up and I mean he kind of did like this
and it was almost like he was just staring at each person .... and it was something he did
on purpose .... It's almost like it was a face-to-face contact with him." Participant 22
stated, "there's his face looking at you" (emphasis added). Finally, Participant 28
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perceived that McVeigh was not only aware of witnesses' presence and that his gaze
seemed to penetrate through the mediated images to reach witnesses:
And as he stared at the camera, knowing that we were watching, ... he
would just stare at that camera. And it was just.. . like it was just he
was just staring right through you. 1 mean absolutely everyone said
the same thing. It looked like he was looking right at you, like he was
looking right at me.
Witnesses in the death chamber in Terre Haute had a different experience of
McVeigh than witnesses who viewed via closed-circuit television. Live witnesses, then,
only had seconds of perceived eye contact with McVeigh. Participant 25 stated that
McVeigh "glared into the room, you know, trying to figure out who was who, whowas in
there and where we were standing at." Participant 29 recalled that McVeigh raised his
head in an effort to look at victim witnesses, although it was unexpected: "I never
expected him to look at us. And then ... it was like drum roll. His head turns to his right.
He rolls over and he looks at all of us. Or at our window. Four, ma~?e five second and
then turns his head back."
In the closed-circuit image, McVeigh was lying on his back and so his gaze
defaulted to the ceiling, making it unclear whether he was looking at the camera, the
ceiling, the remote witnesses, both, or neither. The remote witnesses, however, did
impose meaning upon that gaze, and perhaps even felt its full impact even though they
were the most removed. As closed circuit witness Larry Whicher stated in a media
interview immediately following the execution: "I think that stare in the camera is
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something that will stay with me .... It won't haunt me, but I think it will be a memory
that will stay with me and make me think there are others like that in the world.,,204
Normative Dimensions of Gazing

The implications of McVeigh's communicative gaze for the formation of
individual and collective memory is closely tied to the social interpretations of gazing
behavior. For sighted people, gaze is an important social behavior. 205 Above all else, a
gaze conveys visual attention?06 In a classic 1967 study of eye gaze, Kendon proposed
that eye contact had three functions, the first two of which are directly relevant here: to
express emotion, monitor others' actions, and regulate conversational
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Similarly,

Argyle found that eye contact signaled the level of intimacy which existed between two
interactants; the greater the eye contact, the closer the relationship between them. 2os
Mutual gaze is also physiologically arousing; Mazur ct al found that mutual gaze between
experimental participants caused more arousal (measured by "strong, significant, and
consistent drops" in thumb blood volume, or TBV, which measures the quantity of blood
moving from the "periphery of the body to the heart, lungs, and large muscles") than
·.
contro I con dItlOns
0 f nonmutuaI gaze. 209

204 Terry Horne, Viewers Struck by Look in McVeigh's Eyes,
available at

THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR

(June 12,2001),

http://www2.indystarcom/library/factfiles/crime/national/1995/oklahoma_city_ bombing/stories/200 1_061
2b.html.
205 MICHAEL ARGYLE & MARK COOK, GAZE AND MUTUAL GAZE ix (New York: Cambridge UP, 1976).
206 ]d. at 84.
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209 A. Mazur, Eugene Rosa, Mark faupel, Joshua Heller, Russell Leen, & Blake Thurman, Ph~v:'\io!ogical
Aspects o(Communicatiol1 via Mutual Gaze, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 86(1) (July 1980).
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McVeigh's gazing behavior led witnesses to perceive that he was both conscious
of and paid careful attention to their presence. Gauging from closed circuit witnesses'
comments, McVeigh's staring behavior was likely more marked for them than for live
witnesses since it was prolonged, and therefore interpreted as unexpected behavior or a
breach of social norms. 2lO According to Kendon, II out of20 subjects in an
experimental interview situation spontaneously commented on variations in an
interviewer's gaze pattern when it deviated from normal, whereas none mentioned the
·
.
, s gaze patterns remame
. d norma.~
I "II
gaze w h en th e mtervlewer
Establishing that McVeigh's gaze was socially significant begs the question of
what it signified and how it positioned McVeigh vis a vis the witnesses. The most
obvious element that a gaze conveys is visual attention: "people who notice when others
are looking at them, or who are aware of how much someone is looking, will probably
draw some inference from this bchavior.,,212 McVeigh's attempt to gaze into each
witness room informed witnesses of his conscious and careful attention to and awareness
of their presence. In actuality, witnesses who were in the death chamber in Terre Haute
had a more immediate or intimate encounter with McVeigh than closed circuit witnesses
because of their close physical proximity to his body. However, it was closed circuit
witnesses who felt a more intimate connection with McVeigh through his gaze. McVeigh
was reclining on his back so that his gaze was directed upwards to the ceiling as a matter
of course, and so it is unclear whether his upturned gaze into the camera (and through its
According to Kendon, 11 out of20 subjects in an.experimental interview situation spontaneously
commented on variations in an interviewer's gaze pattern when it deviated from normal, whereas none
mentioned the gaze when the interviewer's gaze patterns remained normal. ARGYLE & COOK, supra note
205, at 83.
110

ld.
211 ld. at 84.
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lens to the witnesses in Oklahoma City) was targeted at the ceiling, the remote witnesses,
both, or neither. Thus, for whatever reason, it was the closed circuit witnesses who felt
the full impact of McVeigh's gaze.
Because visual attention can act as a summons, an attentive gaze may be the
indication that a communicative interaction is starting or is likely to start. A gaze unites
persons who were previously inattentive both towards each other and to the interactive
potential that arrived with an awareness of the gaze. This interpersonal unity is there
even if the motivation that engendered the gaze divides its participants, as in the case of
an openly hostile stare. When a gaze thus serves as a trigger for attention,
communicative expectancies are a logical corollary: "if someone is looked at by a
stranger or someone he is not interacting with, he expects something to happen or an
interaction to start.,,2l) In effect, then, the gaze constitutes a summons to pay attention
because the gazer is paying attention, implying that attention is a reciprocal behavior.

The attentive gaze also objectifies its target: "when A becomes aware that B is
looking at him, he is aware that B is attending to him and therefore that he, A, is the
object ofB's attention." The effect of this objectification differs depending on the
environment in which the gaze is delivered: "ifB can see better than A, e.g. by ... being
behind a one way screen, then A becomes very uncomfortable." Feeling as if one is
observed is "a function of role." According to Mcrleau-Ponty, people can be "stripped of
existence" or "transflllmed into an object" by "being looked at by someone who dares not
strike up any relationship.,,2l4 Thus, a gaze that is an invitation to attention (and therefore
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to awareness of attention) but is not an invitation to further communicative interaction is
a truly objectifying gaze, a behavior which has significant social consequences and
positioning effects for its target.
A gaze may also signify an attempt to establish dominance. Evidence suggests
that status is determined very soon within an interaction, from the first 15 seconds to 1
minute, instead of emerging over a longer term 215 Staring behavior is commonly
interpreted as assertive in a wide range of cultures. In addition, empirical research has
shown that staring behavior can be perceived as threatening or dominating. 216 Stares are
likely to be perceived as showing anger, aggression or assertiveness when accompanied
by lowered eyebrows.217 The experimental findings of Mazur et al suggest that mutual
gazes accompanicd by lowered brows were more physiologically arousing than mutual
gazes accompanied by raised brows; declines in subjects' TBV were "significantly
deeper"' in the lowered brow situations.218 Mazur et al found that participants' level of
comfort with staring behavior was a "strong predictor" of dominance in subsequent

:m Fisek and Ofshe found that half of groups comprised of students undifferentiated in status characteristics
such as sex. race, and age formed a stable status order within the first minute of interaction. M. Fisek & R.
O[,he. lhe PI'Oc("s orStatus Evolution. SOCIOMETRY. 33 (1970) at 327-46. In addition, Rosa and Mazur
were able to predict students' rankings in similar groups moderately well by observing eye contact behavior
during the first 15 seconds ofinteractiol1. E. Rosa & A. Mazur, Incipient Status in Small Groups, SOCIAL
FORCES 58 (1979). at 18-37.
216 See II. l\1oore & A. Gilliland, The A1easurement afAggressiveness, JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 7 (1921). at 623-26; S. Thayer, The LiJect ofJnterpersonal Looking Duration in Dominance
Judgments, JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1969). at 285-86; R. Exline, S. Ellyson, & B. Long,
Visual BcJul1'ior as an Aspect uf Power Role Relationships, in NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION OF
AGGRESSION (P. Pliner, L. Krames and 1'. Alloway eds., 1975), at 21-52; P. Ellsworth, Direct Gaze as a
Social Stimulus: The Example of Aggression, in NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION OF AGGRESSION (P. Pliner,
L Kramcs and T. Alloway eds., 1975), at 53-75; P. Ellsworth & E. 1. Langer, Staring and Approach: An
Intelpretatiun a/the Stare as a Nanspec[/ic Activatur, JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
33 (1976). at 117-22; E. LIEBOW, TALLEY'S CORNER. (1967); D. Fromme & D. Beam, Dominance and Sex
D{flerences in Non-verbal Responses tu D{flerential Eye Contact, JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY
8(1974), at 76-87.
e'17 Mazur ct aI., supm note 209, at 63.
ng Tel. at 64.
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interactions, with participants who reported being more comfortable with the stare taking
a dominant role in subsequent conversation and decision making tasks. 219 In
communicative purposes related to asseliions of dominance, gazes can also communicate
threat or challenge 220
The positioning effect of a gaze can result from an active "staring down" which
puts the subject "in her place," or may result from deviant behavior that violates norms of
interaction and thus provides discomfort in the subject. For instance, "staring on the part
of strangers constitutes a bizarre piece of rule-breaking, whose meaning is unclear, from
which the person stared at might well want to escape:,,221 The interpretation of a gaze,
like the meaning of other nonverbal signals, is heavily dependent on its social context and
on how actors define the situation 222 An execution setting is not the same type of
interaction as a friendly chat between friends; the condemned's past behavior has
opposed him to those who witness his execution either because they.were somehow
hanned by him (survivors or family members of victims) or because they are there to
commemorate the consequences of his transgression (media and government witnesses).
This explains why McVeigh's gaze was interpreted as confrontational or defiant,
particularly when interpreted in light of his silence at the warden's request for "last
words." Such a confrontational gaze connotes animosity and dominance and implies

219 Id. at 70.
220 BJ. Smith, F. Sanford, & M. Goldman, Norm Violalions. Sex, and the 'Blank Stare, JOURNAL OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 103 (1977), at 49·55.
22! ARGYLE & COOK, supra note 205, at 93.
222 See Mazur et a1., supra note 209.
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emotion and power roles: "looks can express aggression and hostility, and can also
evoke it.,,223
Witness responses snggest that McVeigh's gaze conld have been perceived as one
of two particnlarly aggressive gazing behaviors, a "stare down" or a "hate stare." A stare
down is a "dominance encounter" in which one party decides to hold another's gaze so
that it becomes a staring contest in which each interactant attempt to outstress the other
that ends only when one party looks away.224 Participant 8 wanted to stare down
McVeigh when 8 attended his trial in Denver: "1 just stared at him, 1 said I'm gonna stare
at you until you look me in the eye and he did. And I said I'm not going to, you're going
to look away before I do." An especially antagonistic gaze that Goffrnan termed the
"hate stare" is a deliberate breach of the nonstaring accord between strangers that
Goffinan terms "civil inattention.,,225 The hate stare is "insulting partly because it implies
the person stared at doesn't really count as a person at all." This

per~pective

prioritizes

the "deliberate breaking of the social norm.,,226 Both consequences of the hatc stare
parallel likely consequences of McVeigh's gaze: objectifying the targets of the gaze, and
its deviance from social norms. Such a gaze implies that the gazer is dominant and has
the right to stare at and impose upon the target of his gaze. In studies of dominance,
increased looking hy a person makes him or her appear more dominant to others.
Rules define gazing behavior in public spaces. This is significant because
McVeigh was surrounded by unseen others, mostly strangers, all of whom were staring at
him. According to Goffinan, gaze is rule-governed; "people are expected to gaze in
ARGYLE & COOK, supra note 205, at 74.
Mazur et aI., supra note 209, at 52.
225 ARGYLE & COOK, supra note 205, at 74.
226 [d. at 74, 75.
123
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certain ways, and it is disturbing to others if they gaze in a different manner.,,227 Rules
may be defined by the group to which one belongs, and rules forgazing at group
members differ from those regulating gazes at nonmembers. A group of people in a
public place "defines itself as a group of means of spatial proximity and by the members
orienting towards each other;" it is expected that members will gaze at other members
and will not attend (again the emphasis on attention) to those outside. The gaze of an
outsider may beregarded as an "invasion." Certain events merit different rules than
those that govern other gatherings. Greeting another, moving from unknown to known,
requires "bodily contacts and mutual gaze." Such a "mutual gaze" "has the special
meaning that two people are attending to each other," and "is usually necessary for social
interaction to begin or to be sustained." 228
McVeigh's execution was certainly public in the sense that many people were
present as witnesses, either in person or via closed circuit television .•.Live witnesses in
Terra Haute were organized into four groups-government witnesses, victim witnesses,
media witnesses, and McVeigh's witnesses-arrayed in witnessing rooms surrounding
the gurney. Similarly, closed circuit witnesses in Oklahoma City were assembled in each
other's presences. The execution was only private in the sense of not being "open to the
public"; witnesses had to be family members or survivors or in a supportive capacity for
those individuals. However, the execution was by no means an "ordinary" public space,
where normal rules and conventions of interaction and gaze apply. It was a liminal
space, involving many changes of status-living to dead, sentence pronounced versus

227 ld. at 112 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES (Glencoe: The Free Press 1963).
228 1d. at 112, 114.
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sentence carried out~that invoke the ritual context and its ensuing fonnulaics. Instead,
these rules have much in common with the theatrical "audience," where participation is
defined by the expectation that one will await the spectacle, and that when the curtain
goes up (or slides open) the audience member will then fix his gaze upon the revealed
sight.
The rules for witnessing an execution, then, are simple in fonn: gaze is expected
and encouraged. The rules for the condemned, however, are much more temporal and
. tenuous. There protocol of the lethal injection ritual lacks the physical prohibitions on
gaze inherent in other fonns of execution~the hood for hanging, the blindfold for death
by firing squad, the face mask for

electrocution~which

incidentally were foisted upon

the condemned not to restrict his gaze but to protect witnesses from being horrified by his
unsightly visage during and after the execution. The only restJiction that a prisoner
condemned to die by lethal injection faces is the gurney which restrains him prone on his
back, and forces his face towards the ceiling. The head of a prisoner, however, is not
restrained, and so he ostensibly has the freedom to· tum his head and gaze into the witness
rooms sunounding the death chamber, summoning witnesses to attention and invoking
the potential of communicative interaction.
Witnesses' Perception of a Communicative Gaze

When participants recalled how McVeigh's gazing behavior made them feel, they
spoke of unease and incompleteness as well as pollution, defilement, and anger. This
notion of a "communicative gaze" is similar to the diseased gaze of the murderer in
ancient Greek culture. The Athenians placed great importance upon the spectacle as a
means oftransfening emotion, and therefore exchange; eyes themselves were associated
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"not only with knowledge and the arousal of emotions but also with justice and properly
ordered reciprocity.,,229 Thus, "the justice of punishment, the right response to
wrongdoing, inhabits or takes place in the realm of human intersubjectivity marked out
by the gaze," and the "wrongdoer and the punisher ... exchanged 'glances' when they
exchanged justice." These cultural tenets found expression in Greek tragedy, where the
effects of wrongdoing included a "disease" that was not so much biological as social, an
anger that threatened to overwhelm victims and communities. Tragic victims who
suffered from the disease of anger signaled their distemper through their gaze.
Wrongdoers were diseased in another sense; they were agents of contagion that could
spread the disease of anger throughout the community, polluting its inhabitants through
the gaze. Thus, "to be seen by a murderer was also to see the murderer with one's own
eyes," and following this exchange become "inspired to anger." By these means,
wrongdoers "introduce[dJ negative forms of intersubjective exchangeo--glares and
glances of anger-to the community." Anger, in tum, was linked to memory through its
longevity, and thus became "a powerful motor for the production and maintenance of
systems ofknowledge.,,23o Some participants' remarks directly invoked this sense of
contagious anger; Participant 28 had a disturbing sensation of evil upon meeting
McVeigh's eyes:
And but he started looking around the room. And I remember he
met. .. met me eye to eye. And 1...1 mean Ijust...I'm sure I just went
white and I had to turn around. I just ... I was like ... it's like someone
had just taken my breath away. In shock I you know, I said it was like
looking at the devil eye to eye. It was just a homble, homble feeling.

229 DANIELLE ALLEN, THE WORLD
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What is immediately obvious is that McVeigh's gaze did have communicative
dimensions for most witnesses, so much so that one journalist was prompted to refer to
McVeigh's gaze as "a look they will long remember, the long hard stare into the camera,"
that was comprised of a "blankness" and an "unblinking gaze.,,231 Closed circuit
witnesses certainly perceived that McVeigh was attempting to send a message.
Witnesses described McVeigh's expression as either confrontational ("staring" into the
camera), or "stern" or "defiant" ("I've seen it a lot in my grandchildren. You know that
kind of defiance of ah, you can whip me if you want to but it's not hurting. ") or as overtly
malicious, terming it a "go to hell" or "eat shit aud die" expression, one that "just spit on
us all some more," and an "evil" expression 232 For Participant 22, McVeigh's
expression was so defiant that a relaxation in his facial posture was the preeminent
physical sign of his death. Witnesses also stated that McVeigh's face registered pride or
arrogance, describing it as "triumphant," a "fuck you all, 1 won" look, one that said "I did
the right thing and I'm not sorry" or 'Tm willing to die for my idea." Ironically,
witnesses further described McVeigh's expression as registering absence, explaining that
it was blank ("nothing"), unremorseful Cno remorse"), uncaring Cdidn't give a flip,"
"didn't care") aud free of suffering ("you're not hurting me", "no sign of discomfort,"
"showed no pain").
Interpreting McVeigh's gaze as communicative had interpersonal consequences
from survivors, from angering them to disappointing them to hurting them further or, in
one case, enabling forgiveness. Participant 25 stated in a media interview following the

Home, supra note 204.
The impression of "evil" was also echoed by closed-circuit witness Gloria Buck, who stated in a media
interview that "It was almost like the devil was inside him, looking at us." ld.
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execution that "What I was hoping for, and I'm sure most of us were, we could see some
kind of, maybe, 'I'm sorry,'" he said. "You know, something like that. We didn't get
anything from his face.,,233 Similarly Participant 15 stated, "he died like he didn't care
and I cried because of that, because he did not care." Participant 5 remarked in a media
interview following the execution that "He got the final word .... I thought I would feel
something more satisfying.,,234 This perception was echoed by Jay Sawyer, a
nonparticipant closed-circuit witness whose mother was murdered in the bombing, who
stated in a media interview, "[w]ithout saying anything he got the final word, absolutely.
His teeth were clenched, just like when he was first arrested. His teeth were clenched, his
lips were pursed and just a blank stare. It was the same today. ,,235
But according to Participant 21, confronting McVeigh face to face is what
enabled 21 to have an intensely spiritual experience in which 21 forgave McVeigh:
I am still not looking at him and he kind of raised up and I 'think was
glaring into the camera, and all of sudden it's like, you know because I
have this faith ..... when I was there viewing him and watching him,
it was like, all of sudden he came to me, I don't know what's on the
other side and when I get to the other side all ofthis may mean
absolutely nothing. J started to thinking of him as Timothy McVeigh,
the soul and not Timothy McVeigh, the man and I started praying for
him that this is his last chance, this is his last breath and J prayed for
him and it just like overtook me .... Urn, J was able to let it go, I guess
to me that was the true forgi veness, not to oh yeah Timothy you could
be my best buddy type forgiveness. So it's forgiveness in different
stages .... To me this was a true forgiveness letting it go.
As the following table reveals, individual witnesses often describe McVeigh's
execution in many different ways.
5

I "I saw a man laying there on a bed or a table, ah, the camera was
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pointed right at his face, he had a go to hell look er expression on his
face .... He had a triumphant look on his face ..... (I) Like a smirk?
(S) 1 wouldn't even call that a smirk. He didn't go that far to smirk.
He didn't show that much expression but just like an anxiety mood.
He knew that people were looking at him, watching him and urn, he
just showed no remorse, nothing he showed no pain."
"I thought he was telling everybody 1 won. Fuck you all, 1 won.
Excuse my language, 1 don't usually talk like that, but that's what 1 felt
he was doing."
"I think he was urn, when he was looking at each one J think he was
trying I, 1 felt he was kind oflike saying you, you're not hurting me ...
. I've seen it a lot in my grandchildren. You know that kind of defiance
ofah, you can whip me if you want to but it's not hurting."
"He just, he just laid there like ... just spit on us all some more....
[asked to describe facial expression] None, none. It's just like he didn't
give a flip at the end .... But he didn't care still. 1 think that's what,
even to the end he didn't care.... he, his, his expression on his face
was just like eat shit and die people, 1 don't care."
"looked so evil," "glaring into the camera," "confrontational,"
"defiant"
"very very defiant until the last instant."
"He did just glare into the camera. He didn't just look. He had that
same look in his eyes when they arrested him. Do you remember him
coming out of the court house and that stem look on his face? That's
the look he had ..... Like defiant. 1 did it. 1 did-the right thing and
I'm not sorry. He was just, defiant is the word 1 would use. He didn't
back down one iota."
.

7

15

21

,
22

25

28

"And he ... what he did is he once they opened up the curtains, and he
looked at his lawyers, gave them kind of a nod. Then he turned his
head to the media, looked at them for a few seconds, nodded to them
and turned to us and looked at us and it was only a couple of two or
three seconds. 1 guess he realized then that he could not see us. And so
once that happened and he turned back around and stared right straight
at the ceiling."
"different kind of thank type smile, kind of stuff'-for his witnesses
"kind oflike, okay guys, it's going to happen type situation"-for the
media
"glared into the room, you know, trying to figure out who was who,
who was in there and where we were standing at"-victim witnesses
"Yeah, because he didn't say anything, because he ... he'd just been so
defiant the whole time, and that I'm willing to die for my idea, my
cause. I mean he fcIt like he was a martyr and so yeah, so yeah, I guess
I do, because he was doing the same thing that I was doing. He talked
the talk. He's going to go all the way through."
211

29

"] think] saw Me Veigh, he looked over at his witnesses which] think
were his attorneys. He of course didn't have any family there. Looked
over at them and you know they're hands were up to the window.
Maybe he could see our pictures. We could see their hands. Anyway.
And then he turned and he looked at the press. ] mean and he's laying
down and he's strapped down and he can barely lift his head because he
is pretty strapped down but maybe lift his head up an inch. ] never
expected him to look at us. And then ... it was like, drum roll. His head
turns to his right. He rolls over and he looks at all of us. Or at our
window. Four, maybe five second and then turns his head back."
"More, 1'd say leaning towards more like a glare like you know boy- I
can't give him credit for anything. You know, the guy ... has never had
much of a look in his eye. Even when I listen to like that 60 Minutes
interview, I saw that not too long ago. I don't know- there's just- I
don't ... and] have wondered since then why did he even look at us?
Was he trying to give us something?] don't know."

Table 4: Witnesses' interview descriptions of McVeigh's expression during execution

Particularly interesting is the description of Participant 5's spouse, who stated both that
McVeigh's gaze simultaneously showed "nothing" and was a "go to hell" and a
"triumphant" expression. This suggests that, for her, "nothing" meant something else
other than completely devoid of expression, as in "nothing appropriate" or "nothing that I
wished to see."
Live witnesses who viewed the execution in Terre Haute did not sense either that
McVeigh was attempting to communicate with witnesses or what he was attempting to
communicate. Participant 25 stated that McVeigh "glared" into the victim witness room,
"trying to figure out who was who, who was in there and where we were standing at," but
he did not interpret anything significant in McVeigh's expression other than confusion; in
a media interview immediately following the execution, he stated, "we didn't get
anything from his face."236 Similarly, other than characterizing that look as being akin to

236 Transcript, CNN Live Event, Family Members Witness [sic} to AlcVeigh Execution Recount Their
Experience, (June 11,2001), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/OI06111/se.08.htm!.
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a "glare," Participant 29 did not know whether McVeigh was "trying to give us [live
witnesses 1something." Live witnesses may have wished for more communicative
interaction; survivor Anthony Scott, another live execution witness, said in a media
interview immediately following the execution that "I wish that there might have been
eye to eye contact, but he couldn't see US.,,237 Participant 25's disappointment was also
evident, "I was hoping to look at this man, but it didn't work, guys. So we went with what
we felt like going in.',238 This communicative ambiguity may have made it difficult for
live witnesses to categorize McVeigh's emotional state at the moment of his execution.
As Participant 25 remarked in a media interview, "I mean he's not a monster, guys. I
mean not when you're looking at him in the face. I mean he's just a regular human being.
But, you know, there's no facial expressions on him whatsoever so there was no way of
knowing just exactly what he is and how he is"
Still other closed circuit witnesses revealed in media interviews or statements that
McVeigh exhibited signs of fear. Survivor Calvin Moser said, "To me, he had the look
of, 'I'm not in control ofthis. As much as I've criticized the government, the government
has me.",239 Oneta Johnson, a family member, noted that "He looked up and stared at us,
··
.
,,240
b ut I saw h IS Jaw qUIver.
Witnesses, whether live or closed circuit, wanted to respond communicatively in
turn to McVeigh's gaze. Particip311t 7 stated that she wanted McVeigh to be able to see
her, "Just so that he could see that I'm not a monster. That we are not monsters, we're

237

ld.

238

I d.
Horne, supra note 204.
JeI.

239
240

213

just people too. You know and all we did was go to work that day. That's it." Similarly,
Participant 28 stated:
I would like for him to look at my face and know the pain that I knew
he's caused. And to see, you know, to see my daughter and to know
that you know, you killed my daughter and her baby. You killed them.
You know, yeah, I wish he could have seen my face, because I saw
his, ] wish he could have seen mine.
Though live witnesses may not have felt as if they had an opportunity to
communicate their thoughts to Me Veigh, this did not prevent them from wishing that
they had been able to. Participant 25 wanted to communicate defiance back to McVeigh:
"] wanted to see him when he was in the chair, like that, and] wanted him to see me.
Because] wanted him to know that no matter what hc did or didn't do, we were going to
survive this thing and we would be better afterwards." Similarly, live witness and
survivor Anthony Scott stated, "] wanted him to see me, to somehow let him know that
you didn't break the spirit that you thought you were going to break ..... "."
One closed circuit witness stated that it was not meaningful that McVeigh could
not actually see other witnesses. Participant 22 explained that "] think maybe for
someone who has a lot of vengeance would want that maybe but I didn't care anything
about that."
Two of the live witnesses brought in small photographs oftheir murdered loved
ones and held the photographs up against the glass during the execution. Participant 29
brought a photograph of her murdered sibling. While entering the witnessing room in
Terra Haute, she was in the front row and placed it up to the glass; she described how
another witness did the same thing with a photograph of a murdered child:
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I was again lucky enough, I got in the front row and [another live
witness] and I had both had a picture ... She had her [child]' s picture
and we put them right up to the window. Not that he could see it. It
was more symbolic and we had to do it very discreetly because we had
guards behind us. But yeah, stuck a picture up there so [sibling's
name] could watch it happen.
When asked whether it was "almost like not only were you witnessing but it
was also like your brother was also witnessing," Participant 29 replied "Yeah,
that's why I did it. Symbolically I felt that way ... "
The Mnemetic Effects of McVeigh's Gaze

In summary, McVeigh's gazing behavior had several mnemetic consequences.
First, although witnesses expected the execution to be a moment of resolution,
McVeigh's gazing behavior obstructed that expectation. With the exception of one
witness who was able to forgive Me Veigh after viewing the execution closed-circuit,
witnesses did not gain the "satisfaction" from McVeigh's gaze that they might have felt
had he not appeared to be defiant or nonplussed by the execution. Instead, witnesses felt
once again as if they were being challenged by McVeigh, although the nature of the
execution allowed some witnesses to trump that sensation by realizing that they would
walk out of the enconnter alive bnt McVeigh wonld not. In particular, although the
mnemetic effect was magnified by the closed-circuit technology which broadcast a
frontal picture of Me Veigh's face, such intimacy merely allowed witnesses to confirm
their earlier impressions of McVeigh, although they now felt as if they were confronting
that defiance head-on. Thus, if witnesses found the execution to be "fulfilling" or
"satisfying," it had to be for some other reason than his gazing behavior, such as its status
as the final legal proceeding or the fact that it was the moment in which McVeigh would
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be put to death and thus held accountable for his actions. Ultimately, witnesses who were
unsettled by McVeigh's gazing behavior returned to these same overarching concerns to
explain why they felt relief after McVeigh was executed.
Dimensions of Silence in the McVeigh Execution
Silence has a multitude of meanings. It may be "a sign ofsomeone's power or
control over others, or it may be a sign of a person's weakness and submission," it may
be "a state in which one gains knowledge, or it may be a state of idle ignorance or
unlearning.,,241 "Affection, reverence, attention, hesitation, and other states and emotions
are ordinarily and naturally communicated through silence.,,242 Jaworski states fhat
silence is a "highly ambiguous" form of communication as "it does not manifest any
particular assumptions in a strong way" and so "is more open for the audience to
speculate about which assumption(s) the communicator had in mind to make manifest or
more manifest in his or her use of silence. ,,24] Therefore, we must reject a simplistic vicw
of silence as merely a counter to speech, an absence defined as such because it is bereft of
verbal presence. Under such an impoverished perspective, "humans are metaphorically
conceptualized as machines, and the constant 'humming' of the machine is regarded as a
sign of its proper functioning," but when the humming ceases and silence reigns, "the
(human) machine is perceived as if it no longer work[ s1well.,,244 Under this perspective,
wording equates to working. However, silence does "retain the illocutionary force of
speech ... it is tully capable of actualizing the common speech acts of apologizing,

241 ADAM JAWORSKI, THE POWER OF SILENCE: SOCIAL AND PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVES 69 (1993).
1d. at 38.
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1d. at 85.
I d. at 46 (quoting R. Scollon, The Machine Stops: Silence in the lv1etaphor ofMa(jimction, in
PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE (D. TaIllen & M. Saville-Troike eds., 1985), at 21-30.
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refusing, complaining, questioning, etc.," and "it is through this potential that silence can
have positive or negative social consequences: cohesive or devisive ... informative and
revelational.,,245 Jaworski posits instead a conceptualization of silence that does not treat
it as a "negative phenomenon with respect to speech" bnt locates both silence and speech
"on a commnnicative continnum of forms ... from most to least verbal.,,246
Of particnlar interest here are the commnnicative dimensions of silence. It is a
clear prereqnisite that, for silence to be communicative, it must bc invested with meaning.
Jaworksi posits that one person only interprets another's silence when there is an
interactional expectation, when "the commnnication process is expected or perceived to
be taking place," when one person intends to communicate something to another 247 He
then exemplifies "noncommnnicative" silence by a hypothetical situation where two
strangers pass on the street without intending to interact with one another; the lack of
intent to communicate means that the silence is not socially meaningiul. This seems a
strange notion, for as researchers, we would contest that this silence does have
communicative meaning regardless of the intentions ofthese two strangers. In
Jaworski's eyes, then, meaningfulness is constructed from the perspective of the
interactional participant and not an extcmal observer. This conception of communicative
silence thus presupposes communicative engagement or the expectation tor such
engagement. It is noteworthy that to place silence and speech on the same
communicative spectrum is not to equate the commnnicative dimensions of one with
those of the other. Each has a different communicative threshold; "the mere occurrence
245 Wlodzimierz Sobkowiak, Silence and Markedness ThcOJ:Y, in SILENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 46 (Adam Jaworski ed., 1997).
'46
- JAWORSKI, supra note 241, at 46 .
247 Id. at 34.
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of words is capable of creating a communicative situation, while the mere occurrence of
silence does nol.,,248
Because meaningful silence is "indistinguishable in its aconstic form" from
noncommunicative silence, there must needs be some method to determine one from the
other. The concept of meaningfulness hinges upon communicative engagement or
interaction, such a tool must be a relational tool, and "the identification and interpretation
of these two types of silence will have to rely on the functional and psychological aspects
of the perception of interaction." Jaworski utilizes Relevance Theory to explain the
communicative dimensions of silence. Relevance Theory understands communication to
be the intentional conveyance of assumptions between participants in a communicative
encounter, and defines two "levels of intentionality," informative intention and
communicative intention. "Informative intention" is present when a communicator
attempts to make manifest a set of assumptions to another interactant}49
"Communicative intention" is present when the interactant and the communicator both
recognize that the communicator has this informative intention 250 Analyzing McVeigh's
execution calls forth both the informative intention and the communicative intention, I
would argue, because within its interactional bounds "silence is used ostensibly to
manifest explicitly (or make more manifest) as set of assumptions.,,25!
When silence is meaningful, then, it may assume social functions. According to
Jensen (1973), there are five functions of silencc: a linkage function, where "silence may
bond two (or more) people or it may separate them"; an affecting function, where
Jd. at 77.
Jd. at 91.
250 1d. at 85.
25] Id. at 87.
248
249
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"silence may heal (over time) or wound"; a revelation TImction, where "silence may make
something known to a person ... or it may hide information from others"; a judgmental
function, where "silence may signal assent and favor or it may signal dissent and
disfavor"; and an activating function, where "silence may signal deep thoughtfulness ...
or it may signal mental inactivity.,,252
Within the interactional context of the McVeigh execution, there are three
primary contexts of silence: that of the witnesses, that of McVeigh himself, and that of
the execution as imposing silence upon McVeigh.
Witnesses' Silence
The morning of McVeigh's execution marked the merger of the healing,
voluntary group relationships and the destructive, involuntary victim-offender
relationship between familymembers/survivors and McVeigh. As family members and
survivors congregated to await the closed circuit broadcast or

assembJ~d

to be transported

to the death house, the strong interpersonal bonds forged between group members over
the six years from bombing to execution were tapped as a source of support to carry
friends through whatever the day would bring-including a confrontation with McVeigh.
At the FAA Center in Oklahoma City, the remote site to which McVeigh's
execution was broadcast via closed circuit television, intermittent talking took place
before the execution began. Several witnesses spoke of the execution as something of a
reunion or social gathering. Participant 7 recalled that juice and fruit were provided in
the kitchen in the back part of the viewing room, and that witnesses were greeting one
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another: "it was almost like just a little social gathering before a meeting." Similarly,
Participant 21 stated,
because it had been a long while since a lot of us had been together
and we all were there for one purpose.. . .. we were able to talk and
laugh and share things that have gone on with our families because I
mean we're like a whole community .... it's almost like a, a family
reunion. I have an extended family because now all the people that I
knew, who have died, I know their families now.
Participant 28 noted that witnesses were not speaking only of the execution, but primarily
of other things, including recollections of the bombing itself and the recovery process.
The social dimensions of collectively witnessing the execution were especially
apparent for live witnesses, some of whom traveled to Terra Haute together, and all of
whom dined together the evening before the execution and the morning of the execution.
Participant 29 already knew many of the other live witnesses: "you only have 10 people,
that 1knew about half of us was really weird. So we had a nice sense of camaraderie right
offthe bat." 29 and other witnesses shared a similar attitude toward many aspects ofthc
proceedings, including viewing in a humorous light the many counselors and other
professionals present at a dinner with the warden the evening before the execution:
They were ... I'm exaggerating, maybe 20. But I mean preachers,
psychologists, psychiatrists, therapists .... it's sort oflike they're just
waiting for all of us to crack up or something .... we were all like- wc
were in a pretty good mood given you know what- maybe we hadn't
thought about what we're getting ready to do, the gravity of it .... I
think the people I was close to there kind offelt the same way. Like
God, get- just get out. Anyway, we made a joke of it.
According to 29, the "good mood" of witnesses persisted through the execution
itself: "I think there was one person and this was not even until we were in the room that
one person seemed you know to be very solemn about it. ... we were just kind of, I don't
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want to say joking and certainly not laughing, but it was not a somber experience in that
room."

Closed circuit witnesses described the atmosphere inthe witnessing room in
Oklahoma City as being very different that the atmosphere in Terre Haute. Despite the
interactions between witnesses, an air of nervous anticipation was palpable. Participant
5's spouse said that closed circuit witnesses were "milling around" "really restless" and
"on edge" before the execution began because "their anticipation was kinda getting to
them." Participant 21 remarked that different witnesses awaited the execution in
differing frames of mind: "There were some that were just, somber like me just, you
know, there were some that were like, I remember one, one woman go, 'This is a great
day for an execution.' I mean, you know, you had every feeling in there." Participant 22
stated that "Everybody was nervous. I think. I mean it appeared to me that everybody I
talked to was pretty nervous. One girl just passed out. She just, she just was too
overwhelmed. She stayed thongh. She got better." Participant 28 described there being
"all kind of nervous talk, kind of chitchatting."
During the remote broadcast ofthe execution itself; witnesses were silent;
Participants 7 and 15 recalled that they were "very quiet," and 7 did not remember any
audible crying. Participant 5's spouse was allowed to describe to her husband what was
going on during the closed circuit execution even though "everybody else was cautioned
to be quiet, be orderly, ... they didn't want any outbursts or no, ah, they didn't want any
kind of clapping or yelling or loud crying or anything like that," and so she described the
proceedings in a "real low" voice. Participant 21 noted that things were "Very quiet, I
was amazed, when he actually died, It was silent. ... I really expected some people to, to
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have an outburst, you know, clap or something. It was very silent." In Terra Haute,
however, according to Pmiicipant 25, there was some talking in the execution chamber as
some of the female witnesses who had brought photographs made comments: "Probably
the women made comments about this is my husband or this is my brother or what. ...
With photographs." Participant 29 also stated that one of the witnesses was speaking
during the execution: "I mean [witness 1was 'hey you son of a bitch over here, look at
this picture. ' You know yelling at him."
After the closed-circuit viewing of the execution, Participant 7 recollected that
there was an attitude of "okay it's done, let's move on." This is precisely how live
witnesses described the execution; as Participmat 25 said, "when it was over with, you
know, they said, 'It's over, it's done. '" In Oklahoma City, there was an air of quiet
afterwards according to Participant 28: "everyone kind of just got up, made their way
out, went and got in the cars."
Ifwe accept Jaworski's proposition that silence and speech are two ends of a
communicative spectrum, it is easy to understand that, like speech, silence can be
"situation specific," depending on "the practical conventions of the event itself.,,253 Such
events may actually be interactions structured through silence 254 It thus appears that the
closed circuit viewing of McVeigh's execution was structured for witnesses through
silence, while the live viewing was either structured to a much lesser degree through
silence or, more likely, was not structured at all through silence.

253Id. at 22.
254 laworksi posits that meditation and walking are two such activities. ld. at 19.
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It at first seemed surprising that live witnesses reported less silence in the

witnessing room at Terra Haute than closed circuit witnesses reported in the remote
witnessing room in Oklahoma City. After all, one might think that prison strictures
would impose silence upon the act of witnessing in Terra Haute. This would suggest that
the farther one gets from the event, the looser the controls become over speech and
silence during the act of witnessing. Clearly, participants' remarks supported fhe
opposite of this observation. An explanation may be found, however, by switching the
focus from how far removed witnesses are from the witnessed event to whether the target
of witness' communicative actions was within communicative rangc. Thus, it is more
likely that the converse is true: that closed circuit witnesses in Oklahoma City had little
rcason to break silence because McVeigh, the target of any communicative efforts they
would have made, was literally remote, appearing through a mediated image. It was the
live witnesses standing in a room removed from McVeigh by only 011.e wall who stood in
communicative proximity to Mc Veigh 255
In summary, witnesses' degree of silence during the execution, as contrasted with
their social interaction beforehand, reveals that live witnesses were much more likely to
attempt to communicate with McVeigh during the execution than remote witnesses.
Thus, while remote witnesses experienced greater degrees of gazing behavior than live
This change in focus was provoked by a conversation I had with a colleague concerning the college
graduation of his daughter. Graduation day temperatures soared to 90 degrees, and there was limited shade
for attendees, prompting college officials to open a remote witnessing location featuring a big screen in the
campus chapel. Attendees in the chapel, including my colleague, could see everything of note-individual
graduates receiving degrees, the enthusiastic cheering oflive spectators. However, when remote witnesses'
loved ones received their degrees, the remote witnesses did not cheer or clap; a "sheepish few" clapped, but
did so half-heartedly and stopped their clapping very soon. There seemed to be little purpose in either
communicating in the absence of the communicative participant, particularly in view of the code of silent
witnessing that was imposed. So with the differences in communicative, activity in the closed circuit
location in Oklahoma City and the witness room in Terra Haute. I am indebted to William 1. Bowers for
providing this insight.
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witnesses, live witnesses' physical and therefore communicative proximity to McVeigh
was far greater than that of remote witnesses. This prompted some live witnesses to take
advantage of the proximity in order to verbally challenge or lambast McVeigh,
suggesting that live witnessing may prompt the active release of more aggression than
remote witnessing. In a mnemetic sense, then, witnessing an execution live may be more
satisfying for witnesses, who are more likely to assume an "active" role in the execution
and thus may be less likely to feel that they have been denied an opportunity to confront
the condemned offender.
Witness Perceptions of McVeigh's Silence

Witnesses elect to view executions for many reasons, prominent among them the
longing for some sign of repentance or suffering from the condemned-an apology, an
acknowledgment of the pain and suffering endured by those reclaiming their lives after a
capital crime. Thus, witnesses subject the condemned's behavior to intense scrutiny,
searching for a communicational opening, some sign of interactional engagement.
McVeigh did not make any statement, remorseful or otherwise, at the warden's request
for last words. However, copies of his final written statement, a copy of the poem
"Invictus" by William Ernest Henley, were distributed to media representatives.
After the execution, McVeigh's appellate attorney Robert Nigh, who had visited
McVeigh prior to the execution, addressed the media to explain why his client had not
made a final statement: "To the victims of Oklahoma City, I say that I am sorry, that I
could not successfully help Tim to express words of reconciliation that he did not
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perceive to be dishonest.,,256 Thus, Nigh connected McVeigh's silence to an unbending
insistence that his actions were justified.
Whereas some execution witnesses wanted McVeigh to say something instead of
remaining silent, other witnesses were fearful that McVeigh would use the opportunity to
hurt survivors and family members further; Participant 5 just wanted McVeigh to say
something instead of remaining silent. Witnesses' hopes for a remorseful statement Were
dimmed by their perceptions that it wasn't in his nature to apologize. Thus, witnesses
wanted an apology, yet either did not expect one or would not have believed McVeigh if
he had apologized. Participant 5 was not surprised when McVeigh did not make a
remorseful statement, and stated that "I think it'd have been important ifhe'd apologized,
but 1 don't, I don't think he'd meant it ifhe did apologize .... And he didn't mean it even
ifhe you know, no, no apology was really in that man as far as I could tell." Similarly,
Participant 22 remarked, "you just can't help but have this hope evcnJhough you know
its ridiculous and that's not going to happen you still have that hope you'll say something
that is remotely remorseful. And, uh, you know, it didn't happen. He was very very
defiant until the last instant." Participant 7 was the only execution witness who was
angered by McVeigh's silence, particularly given the fact that he was "behind [his]
movement," but she also was not surprised that McVeigh chose to remain silent in view
of his military training, acknowledging that McVeigh's behaviors were constructed by
past life experiences. Two live witnesses, Participants 25 and 29, did not care whether or
not McVeigh apologized; both of them noted that they did not expect an apology. Two
execution wihlesses were relieved that McVeigh was silent, in view of other, more

256

McVeigh Shows No Remorse at Execution, supra note 175.

225

harmful statements he could have made. Finally, one witness was relieved that McVeigh
did not make "death sounds" as that witness's father had done when he struggled for
breath.
In communicative interactions, the refusal to speak can be troubling and
potentially toxic; "one's failure to say something that is expected in a given moment by
the other party can be interpreted as a sign of hostility or dumbness.,,257 In hostile
situations colored by anger and violence, where silence is usually thought to be the
antithesis of noisy rage, silence can be a weapon, and "silent treatment of the opponent
may be even more powerful than uttering the harshest of words and drives many people
crazy.,,258 Hence the power of the adage "tum the other cheek." How much more painful
can silence as a weapon be when there is no future opportunity for the one who wields it
to reestablish communication and contact? When delivered in response to an offer or
invitation, "silence is the extreme manifestation of indirectness"qnd, consequently, a
strong form of disengagement, ifnot disregard. 259 It is also a "highly face-threatening
act.,,260 Here, silence embodies rejection-of the offer, and potentially of the offeror as
well.
When this request to speaklrefusul to speak pattem plays out in the context of an
execution, the condemned only has a very limited attempt to respond, and to refuse this
invitation to give "last words" is to remain silent forever, barring a last minute reprieve.
The scripted regimentation of an execution protocol provides an opportunity for the
257
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warden to invite the "condemned" to utter any last words. Under the "Countdown"
section of the execution protocol manual followed by those in the death chamber at Terre
Haute in 2001, for example,
3. The Warden will ask the condemned individual if he/she has any
last words or wishes to make a statement. The condemned
individual will have been advised in advance by the Warden that
this statement should be reasonably brief. This statement will be
transcribed by a BOP staff member and provided to the media.
4. At the conclusion of the remarks, or when the Warden determines
it is time to proceed, the Warden will read documentation deemed
necessary to the execution process. The Warden will then advise
the Designated United States Marshal that, "We are ready.,,261
This request/refusal pattern played itself out in the McVeigh execution. Thus, one ofthe
obvious manifestations of a condemned body's taboo status is that the condemned
becomes silenced through the order-bearing protocol of the execution, speaking only
when he is bidden, just as other taboo bodies do when subject to the strictures of other
ceremonies, in giving vows, taking oaths, and delivering eUlogies. 262 ..•
In the point-counterpoint pattern of offer and refusal, McVeigh's silence was in
effect interpreted as his response. Witnesses were not interested in McVeigh's actual
intent in remaining silent because they found his silence to be so meaningful. As the
remarks of witnesses to the execution made clear, some fonn of communication was
desired but in many cases not expected. Yet, witnesses still interpreted McVeigh's
silence as pregnant with defiant meaning.
In summary, McVeigh's silence, like his gazing behavior, confirmed witnesses'
prior impressions that he was a defiant and remorseless offender. It thus did not disturb

2001 BUREAU OF PRISONS EXECUTION PROTOCOL, available at
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262 JAWORSK!, supra note 241, at 198.
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mnemetic frameworks relating to McVeigh as a defendant or to his relationship to the
Oklahoma City bombing. If anything, McVeigh's silence was a boon in light of the fact
that he could have taken that final opportunity to further irritate witnesses in some way.
Such a gesture would undoubtedly have unsettled wihlesses far more than his expected
silence actually did.
McVeigh's Death as Imposing Silence

A third dimension of silence in Timothy McVeigh's execution was the fact that
McVeigh himself was now permanently silenced, a communicative absence occasioned
by death. A living Timothy McVeigh was simultaneously a reminder of his potential to
"jab" at victims, a reminder of the bombing, and a reminder of injustice. In addition,
participants spoke of a fear that McVeigh could still influence others and a weariness of
continuously hearing the defendants' names in the press; as Participant I, a nonwitness,
stated of Nichols: "to think he's still influencing people every day irr the media, I am
tired of seeing his name appear in the Oklahoma newspaper and it still appears in there

every few months." Execution was perceived by many participants as the only way to
effectively silence an offender; as Participant 24 stated, "You know, after someone is
executed you are completely finished with every battle you have to fight in that arena.
No more McVeigh battles to fight. Don't have to worry about what's gonna come out in
the newspaper that he said to some reporter somewhere."
Several nonwitnesses and witnesses experienced relief that there was silence
following the execution. However, participants characterized this silence very differently
depending on whether they were for or against the death penalty. All participants who
opposed the death penalty spoke of this relief from recurrent media activity, whereas
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those for the death penalty remarked on the end to his life that provided relief. This
suggested that participants who supported the death penalty felt that their relationship
with McVeigh as a para-social enemy was somehow more threatening.
Both nonwitnesses and witnesses who supported the death penalty expressed
relief from McVeigh's death. Participant 1 stated, "when those people are executed and
you know they're gone, there, there is a change for the people that were victims ofthat
crime. It's gotta be better. It was for me." Most participants who were for the death
penalty specifically connected this reliefto either McVeigh's ability to no longer speak
with the intent to hann others or his ability to incidentally harm others in speaking. In
these statements, survivors and family members were affected by communications from
the ofIender(s) and thus accorded a quasi-participant status in these interchanges.
Participants also acknowledged that McVeigh was the subject and not the origin of media
coverage was also problematic and hurtful; as Participant 24 remarkgd,
And part of that [the inability to entirely leave behind the emotional
entanglement with offenders], without blaming the media, part of that
was a media because I constantly -- I think I tell you the story about the
reporter who asked me about closure and why we kept opening up our
wounds and my answer to that was I never closed and I never will. As
every time you write a story, every time you, you know, question what
happened or who was involved and those kind of things, those lesions
were always there, period.
Similarly, Participant 16 was thankful that "I don't hear his name constantly for the rest
afmy life."
Several nonwitnesses who supported the death penalty also expelienced relief that
McVeigh was silenced. Describing her relief after the execution, Participant 8 stated that
"It's still death but yeah there was that relief. We don't have to hear his crap anymore.
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He can't he can't hurt us. He's gone. He got what he deserved .... You know he can't
write no [sic] books any more, he can't grant no [sic] interviews .... " Participant 8
stated that it would have been harder if McVeigh had remained alive: "1 think that would
have been harder because he would've, you would've heard things. Every now and then
I'm sure he would've wrote something or talked to a reporter or you know it would have
been in your face for life." For that reason, she could only forgive McVeigh "[ w Jhen his
mouth was shut." Participant 12 feIt a physical relief from McVeigh's silence: "when,
when McVeigh was killed 1 felt a huge sense of relief. ... 1 think physically it was a
major u11 benefit to me, and uh 1 think spiritually urn he's not making headlines, no one is
reading his letters in the newspaper, likc the bomber the clinic, abortion clinic bomber."
Speaking about a recent statement that Nichols had released from prison, Participant 12
compared Nichols to the infamous murderer Charles Manson, stating "he [Nichols]
should be dead, he shouldn't be capable of speaking, and I knew that this was something
that could happen because Manson is alive. And he's still impacting people and .... and
that shouldn't happen, and that can't happen for McVeigh, he's gone." Participant 12
stated that even life imprisonment should mean an inabiIityto communicate with others:
"to me, life imprisoument would be cruel and uuusual punishment, because they should
not see another living human being, they should not be able to communicate with another
human being." 12 connected an offender's ability to communicate with the ability to
impact victims and survivors: "1 don't care what they do, it's what they say, if they can
impact, affecthave any type of bearing on any other human being, it's wrong. And if
they're dead, they can't do that."
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Execution witnesses who supported the death penalty also focused on McVeigh as
a communicative agent in expressing relief in the aftermath of his execution. Participant
15, a survivor and closed circuit witness, spoke in terms of silencing McVeigh: "1 don't
have to listen to his mouth ever again, ever. ... That's what 1 wanted. You know 1
wanted someone to silence him because all he did was hurt people still and he got his
kicks out of it .... even in prison he still had freedom of speech." For Participant 25,
McVeigh's willingness to use the media to continue to inflict harm on family members
and survivors was one reason why he felt McVeigh needed to be executed, in contrast to
Nichols, whose quiet prison presence meant that he could "live with" his continued
existence:
McVeigh, even though he knew that he was getting the death sentence,
he was defiant all the way up to the point where it actually happened,
okay? He would speak out to the media. He would tell the families to
grow up, it's collateral damage that we killed your kids,You know.
And everything that he did was doing nothing but hurting.the family
members here in Oklahoma. So the only way for us to have any kind
of peace was to execute this man. Now on Nichols, Nichols is a little
different because since he's been tried and convicted, you don't hear
about him. And so even though he was ninety percent involved ... 1
can live with him being in prison for the rest of his life, for the simple
reason that he is not defiant and he's not going out and getting on the
news and so forth and trying to hurt the family members.
Similarly, Participant 28, a family member and closed circuit witness, found the
execution meaningful in terms ofthe silence of McVeigh:
Seeing it through and to know that he really was silenced. That he
really is dead. 1 saw him die. It can't be any of this - we saw
President Kennedy on a yacht or we saw ... you know, Elvis Presley
working at Burger King or whatever, you know. 1 mean you hear all
this crap. And 1 mean 1 know 1 saw him die and I know he is silenced.
And that is what 1 wanted. I wanted him to be silenced and 1 saw him
being silenced.
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For Participant 29, a live witness, the execution ended McVeigh's presence:
Peace. 1 mean 1 felt a real peace. Within my self. And again because
I'm not carrying him in my head. He's gone. He's out of my head
now. And that's more room for [29's sibling]. To thil)k 1 have to share
room with that son of a bitch with such a nice guy like my [sibling].
That sucks.
Participant 21, one of the few who expressed no opinion on the death penalty, also
explained the sense of relief after the execution in terms of terminating McVeigh's
potential as a communicative agent: "Urn the jabbing is what 1 am very happy has
stopped ... Because that was a very, very painful when he came out and said the children
were collateral damage and it was like, that was so hard on the families."
Pm1icipants who were against the death penalty, on the other hand, described their
sense of relief as emanating from the termination of media coverage from McVeigh, and
not the death of McVeigh in itself. Participant 3, a survivor and nonwitness, stated that "I
just wanted the media to quit talking about it [the execution] .... 1just wanted some
return to, as much return to normalcy as 1 could have." But 3 stated that, while cessation
of media coverage was an improvement, coverage would have "died down" if McVeigh
had been given life imprisonment, as it had with respect to Nichols. Participant 11 also
confessed to being kept "on edge" by media coverage: "I just felt like, it was kept
stirring up, stirred up, stirred up, stirred up ... all the time and it just, there was still
Terry Nichols to deal with, that all thc media and everything, it just -- that kept me toned
up ... constantly bringing everything up again." Participant 19, a survivor and
nonwitness, specifically attributed a sense of relief following the execution to media
coverage instead of McVeigh's presence:
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it's not so much that he is or isn't alive, it's that his -- here we go
again, access to media. See he had access to media and you know
maybe that's another thing, maybe that's another type of punishment
that needs to bed given is non-access to media because ifhe wouldn't
have been writing people and calling people and giving interviews and
making pronouncements and so on, you know, it'd be a lot easier to
live with him, being in prison for the rest of his life.
Participant 19 described a feeling of being set free by the cessation of media coverage:
"all the media packed up like you know what we are free, they will not ever come back in
this manner again ever, you know, you will not ever get any more pronouncements from
McVeigh on anything."
Thus, participants conceived of the "relief' and "satisfaction" that they obtained
from McVeigh's execution differently; their opinion on the death penalty dictatcd
whether it was the media or McVeigh himself who hindered mnemetic reconstruction.
Most importantly, however, it is abundantly clear that what was e±lectivc about the
execution was that it resulted in silence and thereby enabled a state of peace to descend
and the stabilization of mnemetic structures to proceed.
Witnesses' Reactions to McVeigh's Death

The more painful and prolonged the experience of death, the more terrible that
death becomes. "Good" deaths need no response save mourning, because they are deaths
that occur within the natural order.

~'Bad"

deaths, on the other hand, require a response.

Formulated through a fatal calculus, means of extracting accountability are the usual
proper "response" to a bad death. A death from a tragic car accident and a death from
first degree murder will both merit responses designed to seek accountability-a
wrongful death lawsuit in the former, and a criminal prosecution in the latter. Deaths
from genocide merit investigation by "truth" commissions. Such deaths, then, are
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abnormal occurrences that must be taken apart, studied, and understood in order to create
a "record" of the fatal circumstances and to prevent similar episodes from occurring in
the future. For those in favor of the death penalty, the response to a "bad" death is
another "bad" death.

In the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, the murders of the eight federal
agents for which McVeigh was prosecuted occurred simultaneously with the murders of
160 other adults and children and the wounding of hundreds of survivors. These deaths
were "bad" deaths that cried out that McVeigh be held accountable. And McVeigh was
sentenced to death in response. Y ct, McVeigh's own death, however unnaturally induced
it may have been, visually resembled a "good" death-a peaceful, rapid, and painless
instance of passing away while asleep. A number of participants who witnessed the
execution felt that it was not right that McVeigh's death was not more painful; various
reactions included statements that McVeigh should have been electrocuted, hanged, or
mutilated. McVeigh's death as an image, then, while interpreted as the proper "response"
to the Oklahoma City bombing, was seen as "improperly" peaceful. The responsive
properties define what was meaningful in a positive or negative sense about that image;
just as a photographic image is burdened by its historical context, McVeigh's death was
bounded by the nature of his victims' deaths and his behavior from arrest to execution, as
well as the physical spacc and technologies in and by which McVeigh was executed.
Those witnesses who watched McVeigh's execution viewed his death as a
"response" to the 168 murders and countless instances of suffering McVeigh had dealt
out to innocents through the Oklahoma City bombing. Thus, his manner of death, as
witnessed, was contrasted with the victims' terrible deaths and survivors' years of painful
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physical and mental suffering and recuperation, with the result that McVeigh's death was
felt to be too peaceful and too brief.
There was much sentiment among witnesses that lethal injection was too "easy"
of a death for McVeigh. As Participant 28 stated,
1 think he should be hanged, you know, and in the public. Public
should see him, be hanged .... because you know, injection was too
easy. You know, even the electric chair execution to me, was too, too
easy. You know. But of course that's been outlawed and that didn't
happen of course. That was just my point of view. And yon know, I
know 1 said that. It was 1 wanted something severe ....
Witnesses were angered that that McVeigh passed peacefully as ifhe were going to sleep,
without any evidence of pain upon his countenance. As the spouse of Participant 5
stated, "He pissed me off cause he didn't show anything. I wanted him to do a little
sufferin'. It upset me because he didn't." Participant 7 also wanted McVeigh's death to
be more violent: "I don't think it was a gruesome enough. I, 1 think it should have been
more painful. 1 think it should have been the electric chair at the minimum .... He just
went to sleep. That's the easy way out." Participant 15 wished McVeigh's death would
have been more akin to the deaths of his victims: "to be honest with you 1 wanted them
to blow him up. I wanted him to be hurt. 1 think he was actually afraid cause it was the
unknown but 1 wanted him to be mutilated like my friends were."
Witnesses wcre also disconcerted by the fact that it took McVeigh only moments
to die, and juxtaposed it to the years of suffering caused by the bombing. Pmiicipant 15
stated, "Yeah, 1 was [angry] cause 1 thought you know this hasn't taken any time to kill
him and you know it took hours to get some people out, some people didn't come out
alive. You know 1 have ftiends that are still getting glass out oftheir body." She
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compared the brevity of the execution to the length and complexity of preparations to
attend, and to a visit to the restroom she made shortly before the execution began:
it took, it took me longer to get out of the bathroom then it took him, it
was just like, this is it? My [support person1goes, "We got up at 3
0' clock in the morning to come down here for this?" Cause I just
thought it'd take a long time .... And like I said it was just like this is
it? It took me longer to get out of the restroom then it took him, for
him to die.
She approved of McVeigh's death sentence, and was glad to have made the decision to
attend the execution, but was disappointed that the execution was so banal: "to me it was
a let down because it didn't last long enough. I wanted him to suffer. I wanted him to hurt
you know .... people that were hurt had to walk, to endure the pain .... " Live
witnesses also exhibited anger at the speed of his death; survivor Sue Ashford stated in an
interview immediately following the execution that "He didn't suffer at all .... The man
just went to sleep or, as I said, the monster did. I think they should have done the same
thing to him as he did in Oklahoma.,,263
Thus, participants' remarks revealed that ideally an offender's death should he as
close to the death(s) of his victim(s) as possible in terms of suffering and duration.
Mnemetic justice demands that the suffering ofvictim(s) be recompensed through the
physical suffering of the offender; death in and of itself is not enough, and so a painful
death is necessary.
Summary

In a mnemetic sense, executions are frequently held out to be points of resolution
or "closure" for victims' families, proceedings that enable them to feel relief after years

263

"McVeigh Shows No Remorse at Execution, supra hote 175.
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of waiting in sentencing limbo. It is not surprising, then, that Gross and Matheson's
concept of a "hallmark execution" turns upon the reconciliation of the condemned to his
crime and of the victim's family to the condemned; in this "ideal" execution, the
condemned looks directly at the victims' family members and apologizes honestly, the
victims' family accepts the apology and forgives the offender, and the killer achieves
peace and is reconciled to God before being put to death 264 Notably, the visible
suffering of the condemned is not mentioned as part of this ideal; presumably, if the
victim's family is reconciled to the condemned, there is no need to see such displays of
suffering.
McVeigh's execution exhibited none of these qualities; instead, his gazing
behavior unsettled witnesses and together with his silence confirmed witnesses' prior
impressions of McVeigh as a defiant and remorseless offender. Yet, participants
characterized this execution as satisfying in that it enabled victim wit!1esses to reconnect
once more with one another and it had the desired effect of silencing both McVeigh and
the news media. McVeigh's execution, then, succeeded as an "ideal" execution because
it was open to as many victim witnesses as wanted to view it. This suggests that whether
or not any execution is "ideal" actually depends on the circumstances of the crime as well
as on the offender's behavior prior to execution.
Ultimately, however, participants' remarks revealed that the most mnemetieally
successful execution was the one that was expeditiously carried out, for only then could
the dust settle, silence reign, and the frameworks of memory solidify. While defiant

264 Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What Thev Sav at liIe End: Capital Victims' Families and the

Press, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2003).
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gestures may unsettle victim witnesses and a refusal to deliver apologetic last words
might sadden them, neither communicative behavior was particularly surprising at the
execution stage. Similarly, that fact that an offender's death was peaceful in complete
contrast to the murder he committed did not surprise victims already angered by a
perceived lack of balance between services accorded to the offender and the
marginalization of the victim that pervaded the entire criminal justice system. Thus,
surety of the offender's death-and the end of the victim-offender relationship-was the
most crucial factor for victim witnesses.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has analyzed how the membership of family members and
survivors in Oklahoma City bombing advocacy and support groups and participation in
legal proceedings-including execution-impacted upon their mnemetic work about the
bombing.
The research has illustrated how unmediated relationships among group members
contributed to the collective memory of the Oklahoma City bombing. These
relationships helped address members' vulnerable emotional states, ameliorating their
vulnerabilities by providing companionship, providing sites for narrative and normative
reconstruction and organizing members toward chosen reconstructive goals. In addition,
membership in groups helped channel members away from or further into participation in
legal proceedings, including witnessing McVeigh's execution.
Moreover, this research has revealed the existence of an involllntary relationship
between family members/survivors and McVeigh that was initiated by media images of
him. It was also strengthened by McVeigh's conduct during his capital trial and
execution. Unlike voluntary relationships formed between group members, this victimoffender relationship was mediated by the institutional strictures placed on the victimoffender relationship. They were both simultaneously necessary-because they rendered
legitimate the legal proceedings that were key to producing accountability-and too
narrow, because the guilt/innocence question was merely the threshold inquiry for
participants who wanted to know more. Legal proceedings were perceived by family
members and survivors as either avoiding the questions most important for memory
reconstruction or providing inadeqnate responses to support mnemetic structures. Thus,
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although the criminal justice system successfully held McVeigh accountable through a
conviction and death sentence, it did not effectively foster the crucial memory work
needed for family members and survivors to come to terms with the bombing. This
meant that individuals had to cope on their own with McVeigh's defiance and continue
unassisted with their memory work.
At the same time, however, this research has documented how the execution
allowed many to complete the memory work that was disrupted by McVeigh's continued
existence and left unresolved by legal proceedings until that point. Although McVeigh's
staring behavior and silence unsettled witnesses and confirmed witnesses' prior
impressions of him as defiant and remorseless, his execution was still satisfying to
participants. It enabled victim witnesses to reconnect once more with one another, and it
silenced both McVeigh and the news media. McVeigh's execution, then, succeeded as an
"ideal" execution because it was open to as many victim witnesses as wanted to view it,
suggesting that the degree of satisfaction victim witnesses derived from the execution
depended not only on the circumstances ofthe crime but also on the offender's behavior
prior to execution.
This inquiry is but a first step toward researching the perceptions which murder
victims' family members form towards legal proceedings, including execution, and the
psychological and mnemetic effects that participation in legal proceedings has upon
reconstruction and recovery. More research is needed to determine more precisely the
effects of perpetrator media images upon families' perceptions of those perpetrators, as
well as on the permutations and limitations of the victim-offender relationshi p. In that
McVeigh was an atypical perpetrator and the Oklahoma City bombing an atypical murder
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case in terms of mass victimage and intensity of media coverage, additional research is
needed to address what occurs in less-publicized murders with fewer victims.
This research into the collective formation of memory and resolution of the
cultural trauma of the Oklahoma City bombing through social group membership and
participation in legal proceedings offers a glimpse into the mechanisms by which
"justice" is expanded. It also offers a view on the extension of the status as "justice"
stakeholders to victims' families and survivors. The expansion has two legal dimensions.
First the status of "victim" no longer is granted only to the dead body ofthe murder
victim whose wounds and markings serve as objective "evidence" at the murder trial, but
now encompasses as well the murder victims' family members and all the subjectivity of
their suffering. The living make more demands than the dead but speak with the weight
of the grave in their rhetoric. Prosecutory proceedings for McVeigh and Nichols were
rife with instances where victims asserted their right to move out ofthe legal peripherythe right to be allowed to attend the presentation of evidence despite being slated to give
victim impact testimony, the right to attend the trial after venue was moved from
Oklahoma City to Denver, the right to witness the execution despite a witness room with
a capacity often witnesses. Second, the concept of penal "justice" itself has been
enlarged from what is privately owed the perpetrator in recognition of his individual free
will and capacity for responsibility to include that which is publicly owed the victims'
family in recognition of its loss and suffering. As part of this expansion from privatized
punishment to public reckonings, demands for justice have increasingly called for

witnessed justice, as exemplified in the McVeigh execution. These developments
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problematize concepts such as accountability and vengeance, rendering them more
complex than merely prosecuting and obtaining a conviction, as the law presently allows.
The implications of this case study for the relationship between victims, the law,
and collective memory are sundry. As the social construction of victims and justice
expands, the state will likely face increased demands to expand the responsibilities of its
criminal justice system to incorporate such constructions into its judicial operations.
Victims want the law to develop an increased capacity to not only institutionally
recognize their trauma claims but to accommodate these claims by including them in
legal proceedings through victim impact testimony and expanded execution witnessing
opportunities. In essence then, as this research documents, many victims are no longer
content for the state to anest and prosecutc, but call upon it to recognize suffering and
compensate for their losses as well, to expand its focus so that "[ilt is no longer about
individuals and their responsibilitics, about crime and punishment,"JJUt increasingly
about "public responsibility and public solidarity, about risks oflife and collective
support.,,265 In many cases, then, victims are still seeking for law to become a more
collective institution that "not only defines the imperfection of the social order but takes
responsibility also for its repair; it not only assesses the harm inflicted to victims but also
carries the burden of its healing.,,266 It remains to be seen to what extent law will
accommodate these demands.

265 BERNHARD GIESEN. TRIUMPH AND TRAUMA
266

66 (2004).

Id.
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APPENDIX A: DISSERTATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
I. May I record this interview?
Reasons:
It frees me to listen to you instead of taking notes
Your gift to me is your story, and my gift to you and to others is the best possible
research, so I can best listen to your story if it' s recorded
If you wish, I can return the recording to you or destroy it at the conclusion of the
research project

The Bombing
"I'd first like to ask you some questions about the bombing."
I. Is there anywhere you would like to start? OR Please tell me about your loss.
2. How did you seek to come to grips with what happened in the Oklahoma City
bombing?
3. Sometimes when a tragedy occurs we can cope better by finding a certain way of
looking at that tragedy. Were there particular aspects of the experience that help you to
cope with what happened? Was there anything about the experience that was particularly
memorable? Poignant? Painful? Surprising?
4. Did others share their experiences surrounding the bombing witli·you? How often? In
which kinds of situations?
5. Did you share your experiences surrounding the bombing with others? With whom?
How often? In which kinds of situations?
6. Was there any similarity in your experiences? Please describe. Was there anything
particularly different about your experiences? Please describe.
7. Were any individuals important to you in dealing with the bombing and your loss?
How were they important?
8. Were any groups important to you in dealing with the bombing and your loss? How
were they important?
How did this group come about?
What did the group do together?
At what point was the group most and least helpful?
Are you still involved with the group? If not, when did you stop becoming
involved?
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9. Have different groups been important to you over the experience with the bombing?
For example, was one group very important immediately after the bombing, but not so
crucial later on as a second group?
How dId this second group come about?
What did the group do together?
At what point was each group most and least helpful?

McVeigh's Trial and Execution
"Now I'd like to ask you some questions about McVeigh's trial and execution."

10. Did the fact that the bombing was a crime make you feel better in any way? What
about the fact that it was a crime for which McVeigh could die?
11. Did you attend the trial? In Oklahoma or in Colorado or both? How much ofthe
trial did you attend? What phases of the trial did you attend?
12. Were you involved in the sentencing phase ofthe trial, such as by giving victim
impact testimony? If so, did you?
13. Did you follow the trial in the mass media (print, broadcast, internet, word of mouth,
etc.)?
14. What exposure, if any, did you have to death before the bombing? Before the
execution?
15. Apart from the bombing, have you or one of your friends ever known someone who
was murdered? When did this occur? Was it a case where the defendant could be
sentenced to deathry Did you/your friend view the execution?
16. Prior to the execution, did you watch or read anything about the death penalty or
execution? If so, do you feel that these experiences prepared you in any way for the
execution?
17. Did you have an opinion on capital punishment before the bombing? If so, did this
view change after the bombing? After the execution?
18. Would you say that you have ever forgiven McVeigh? If so, when do you feel this
occurred?
19. Did you feel a duty or responsibility to view Me Veigh's trial? Please describe.
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20. Did you feel a duty or responsibility to view McVeigh's execution? Please describe.
21. Do you think attending the trial/execution was an important step in being involved in
the process (do you think that seeing it occur made a difference?)
22. Did you witness McVeigh's execution?
Follow Ups:
Did you submit your name to be included for the lottery drawing to view the
execution in person?
Did you want to see it and were not chosen?
Did you just not want to see it?
If not, why not? Overwhelming/expeuse/already had other plans/family members
discouraged?)
23. If given the chance, would you have been willing to meet with McVeigh before he
was executed? Why or why not?

Follow Ups:
Would you have preferred to meet him alone or with others? Which others"?
What would you have said or done in such a meeting"
What would you have wanted McVeigh to say or do?
IF INTERVIEWEE WITNESSED THE EXECUTION (IF NOT GO TO QUESTION
XX):
24. Did you witness the execution in Terre Haute or Oklahoma City?
25. Did you imagine beforehand what the execution would be like? If so, what did you
expect that it would be like?
26. Did you feel the execution would be meaningful to you? If so, how?
27. Did you feel prepared to view the execution" If so, please explain.
28. Did you bring a support person with you to the execution" If so, who? Did that
person witness the execution with you?
29. Were you allowed to bring anything with you to the execution, such as a photograph,
etc.?
YES: What did you bring?
NO: If you would have been allowed, what would you have brought?
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30. Did you wear a particular outfit to the execution?
31. Did you want McVeigh to do or say anything before he was executed? If so, what?
32. Was it important to you whether or not McVeigh apologized? Please explain.
33. Was it important to you whether or not McVeigh confessed and obtained last rites
from a priest? Please explain.
34. Tell me about what happened at the execution.
Follow Ups:
What was it like to first sec McVeigh?
When McVeigh first became visible, did you feel that he was trying to send any
messages or communicate to witnesses in any way?
How did you feel about McVeigh's silence? Surprised? Saddened? Angered?
What about when the lethal injection began?
What about when McVeigh was pronounced dead?
What were you thinking of during the execution?
Is there anything that stands out as being particularly memorable?
How would you characterize the experience? Predicatable? Unreal?
Could you tell when McVeigh died?
What did you think ofthe poem "Invictus"?
35. Did McVeigh look at witncsses? Ifso, how did this contact make you feel? Do you
wish he would have been able to see you?
36. Did McVeigh's way oflooking remind you of the looks you have received in other
situations? Please describe these situations,
37. Were you debriefed after the execution?
YES: Who debriefed you? Was this debriefing helpful to you?
NO: Do you wish you would have been debriefed? By who?
38. Did you feci physically, socially, or emotionally removed from the execution
procedure in any way" If so, did it make the execution easier to watch?
39

-How do you feel about thc way McVeigh died?

40. Did McVeigh's death set in place a "before and after" moment for you? Please
explain.
41. What word do you use for how you felt after McVeigh was executed?
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42. How do you feel about the word 'closure'? What does that word mean to you?
43. Do you feel as if you were a victim or a survivor, or would you suggest another term
besides victim or a survivor? (In what ways?)
44. Did you take a support person to the execution? If so, who~ Did you prefer to view
the execution with other survivors and family members, or would you have
preferred to view it alone?
45. Did you take anything away from this experience? How do you think the execution
was meaningful to you (i.e., lending finality to your experience with the bombing,
affecting your ability to deal with your loss)?
46. Do you think that your reaction would have been different if McVeigh had been
given a life sentence instead? What about ifhe had killed himself in the attack.
47. After it was over, did you discuss the execution with anyone? Ifso, who?
Follow Ups:
Was it easier to talk to your support person or to other non witnesses about the
experience?
48. Did talking about the execution with others change the experience for you at all? If

so, how?
49. Do you feel that the execution sent a statement?
50. Do you feel that the execution accomplished anything for you? All survivors or

families of victims? America?
51. Thinking back, do you wish that officials had done anything differently with respect
to the execution? Would you change anything about the execution procedure if you
could?
52. Hypothetical: Another domestic terrorist blew up a federal building in Dallas, TX.
A close friend was the survivor ofthis tragedy/lost a loved one, and was invited to
witness the execution of the person responsible. What would you advise your friend
to do?
IF DIDN'T WITNESS:
53. Did you follow news ofthe execution in the mass media/other forums?
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54. Were you thinking of the execution while it was occurring?
55. Did you mark the execution in any way?
56. Did you want McVeigh to do or say anything before he was executed? Please
explain.
57. Was it important to you whether or not McVeigh apologized?
58. Was it important to you whether or not McVeigh confessed and obtained last rites
from a priest?
59. Was anything different for you after McVeigh was executed? Did knowing that
McVeigh was dead change things for you? Ifso, how? Would you have felt differently
if McVeigh had been given a life sentence?
60. What word do you use for how you felt after McVeigh was executed?
61. How do you feel about the word 'closure'? What does that word mean to you?
62. Do you feel as if you were a victim or a survivor, or would you use suggest you are
something other than a victim or a survivor? (In what ways?)
63. What was your reaction to the outcome of the recent Nichols trial 7 Do you feel it is
important that he was held accountable for the deaths of those killedin the bombing? Do
you feel that he should have gotten the death penalty?
FINAL QUESTIONS:
63. If you had a spouse or significant other at the time of the bombing whose life was not
directly threatened, did that person have the same attitude towards/perception of the
execution as you had?
64. What questions would you have asked McVeigh, Nichols, or anyone else concerned?
65. How would things have been different if the person responsible for the bombing was
a member of al Qaeda?
66. How are the acts ofterrorism on 911 I different from the Oklahoma City bombing?
67. Are there any other questions or statements that you think I need to consider as part
ofthis research?
.
FOLLOW-UP: Ask the question interviewee would have asked.
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APPENDIXB: PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS
Participant
No.

Sex

Statu~

lnl. Date

Viewed
Execution

Attended Trial

Testilied at a
Legal Proc.

I

M
F
M

S
S
S

6/24/2005
6/24/2005
6/24/2005

N
N
N

Y-all
Y-2/3 days
N, didn't need, too
raw

N
Y
N

2
3

4

Opinion on
DP BIF
Bombing
For
Against
Against

Opinion on DP
After Bombing
For
Against
Against

RESCUE

Not Included in
Analysis

.

6

M
F

S
S

7/212005
7/3/2005

Y
N

7
8

F
F

7/5/2005
715/2005

Y
N

9

F

S
V's
Friend
S

7/5/2005

N

10

F

7/6/2005

N

II

F

V's
Daughter
S

7/9/2005

N

12

M

S

7/9/2005

N. but
would
have liked
to

5

I
~-3

Y
Y, one day, still
struggling with
guilt, too difficult
emotionally
Y
Y

N
N4

For
Against

For
Against

Y
N

For
For

For
For

Y -1 day, decided
didn't want to hear
it
Y, about 12 times

N

No opinion

For

Y

For

For

N

Against

Against

Y

Against

For

Y ---went once to
pre-trinl/early trial,
too upsetting
Y

RESCUE
F

15
16

F
F
M
M

17
18

V's exwife,
mother of
V's
children
S
S
F's Dad
S

7/16/2005

N

7/1612005
711712005
7117/2005
7/24/2005

Y
N
N
N

N, but got badges,
was going to go
with daughter, felt
uncomfortable
going by self
Y ----40 hours
Y
Y
N

N

For

For

N
N
Y
N

For
For
Against
For

For
For
For, then Against
For
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Critically injured

Not Included in
Analysis

I
14

Misc. Info

Does not live in

----

...

Oklahoma
19

F

S

9/29/2005

N

Y

Y

For

20
21

M
I'

S
S

9/29/2005
9/30/2005

N
Y

N
Y

N
Y

22
23
24

F
M
M

V's Wife
S
S

9/30/2005
1012/2005
1112/2005

Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y

25

M

V's Dad

412912006

Y·Live

Y
Y
Y only as witness,
too draining to
attend other parts
Y -1 week Denver,

For
No opinion,
on fence
For
Against
For

Come to be more
against
For
No opinion, on
fence
For
Against
For

N

Case-by-case

N

40-4Y;:() at FAA
~.

F

S

4/29/2006" N

,j

Y·rAA 2 weeks

N

For

Ca~e-by-case,

IN

For

more against
Against

Y

For

For

Y

Case·by·
case

Case·by·case

I

l'

I
.

27

I'

S

4/2912006

N

28

F

V's Mom

4/30/2006

Y·Live

29

F

V's Sister

5/2212006

Y·Live

Y, FAA (not very
much, enough to
keep up), 1 day
Denver (there on
vacation) (3 days
total)
Y, 1 week Denver,
2·3 dayslweek
FAA
Y-l week for
each of 3 trials

250

now

